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it is a common occurrence in the literature classroom: a student muses 
aloud that if only Pip would face the facts and get over estella, or if 
Dorothea would realize the horrors that await her and refuse to marry 
Casaubon, or if angel Clare would just forgive Tess’s past transgres-
sions—if characters in a novel would simply do something other than 
what they do—then they would avoid the painful events of the novel. 
equally common, i imagine, is the professorial response: Pip is not real; 
Dorothea is not real; angel is not real. These are not real people and they 
cannot choose to do something other than what is written on the page.
 The tendency for students to relate to a novel’s characters as real 
people, with real choices and real agency, seems painfully obvious to 
the practiced scholar. in order to facilitate students’ attempts to analyze 
a text as a text, we must first break them of the comfortable habit of 
approaching texts as people.
 and yet, aren’t we so often guilty of the same? as easy as it is to spot 
the facile simplicity of the student who wonders why Jane eyre doesn’t 
just fix herself up—a dear friend vividly remembers when, as an under-
graduate herself, a fellow student asked that very question in a victorian 
literature course, to which the frustrated professor responded in a tone 
of woe-tinged anger, “Jane eyre had no hair!”—we fail to recognize the 
tendency of criticism, especially ethical criticism, to relate to novelistic 
characters exactly as if they were people. and not simply any people, 
but people who can teach us important lessons, encourage us to altruistic 
behavior, and provide cautionary examples of how not to behave; think 
of Wayne Booth’s description of that “unique value of fiction”: “its rela-
tively cost-free offer of trial runs.”1 We insist that our students are wrong, 
that the characters in novels are not people; yet what ethical argument 
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does not depend on their functioning precisely as other humans?
 On a fundamental level, it seems that to deny characters human 
attributes is to foreclose the possibility of ethical growth. if we cannot 
relate to the novel or its subjects on a human level, how might we learn 
the human lessons the novel offers? George eliot’s famous formula-
tion—that art must “enlarge men’s sympathies”—depends on characters 
standing in for people, functioning for the reader in place of the “others” 
they may not otherwise come across, doesn’t it?
 in this book, i argue that victorian novels and paintings work hard 
to disabuse their readers and viewers of this tendency. They do so 
on two levels: first, they depict the unknowability of the human other. 
There are distinct limits to knowledge, and the ultimate limit case in 
the realist work is the human being. Second, these works insist on the 
distinction—in both form and content—between that unknowability of 
the person and the knowability of art. Stories can be learned, novels are 
finite; people, however, are not. These texts and images thus inscribe 
alterity through their representation of human interaction, and they 
enact the absence of alterity through their very substance. a reader can 
know a book, and can know a painting, but the subjects of those books 
and paintings can never fully know each other.
 i do not disagree with the idea that novels teach us how to empa-
thize. indeed they do. But in this book, i suggest a radical revision of 
the mode through which that ethical expansion takes place. art can 
edify its audience, but we have failed to recognize one mechanism of 
that edification. realist art does not make empathy possible by teaching 
readers what it is like to be another person; it makes empathy possible 
by teaching us that the alienation that exists between the self and the 
other cannot be fully overcome, that the alterity of the human other is 
infinite and permanent. But in that radical, inalterable alterity exists the 
possibility of ethical engagement.
 Perhaps this formulation seems ungenerous. it is human nature to 
want to overcome a sense of alienation; we want to think that through 
hard work, we may reach a state of identification leading to sympathy 
or, better yet, empathy. We have been told for centuries, perhaps most 
influentially by adam Smith, that this is how fellow feeling arises. 
novels, under that schema, can teach us how to empathize by moving 
readers through a series of paces: setting up an unfamiliar character who 
becomes known, possibly endearing, potentially lovable, through the 
exposure gained by the time and effort required to read the text. This 
desire explains why a common analogy—that a character in a book, or 
even a book itself, is like a person—is so very compelling. The complete 
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knowledge we can have of a novel’s characters fills up the void that 
must necessarily exist in human interactions. That analogy elides an 
important distinction, however, between character and person: a char-
acter is—to the reader—finite and knowable, but a person is—to another 
person—ultimately unknowable. and so a novel may depict the realiza-
tion of alterity between characters, but the same realization cannot exist 
between a reader and a character.
 Part of what i’m saying may seem familiar—others have gestured 
toward the very limitation that my book is built upon: we cannot know 
people, but we can know the people in books. e. M. Forster describes this 
condition with such clarity and precision that his formulation deserves 
to be quoted:
For human intercourse, as soon as we look at it for its own sake and 
not as a social adjunct, is seen to be haunted by a spectre. We cannot 
understand each other, except in a rough and ready way; we cannot 
reveal ourselves, even when we want to; what we call intimacy is only 
a makeshift; perfect knowledge is an illusion. But in the novel we can 
know people perfectly, and, apart from the general pleasure of reading, 
we can find here a compensation for their dimness in life. . . . They are 
people whose secret lives are visible or might be visible: we are people 
whose secret lives are invisible.
 and that is why novels, even when they are about wicked people, 
can solace us; they suggest a more comprehensible and thus a more 
manageable human race, they give us the illusion of perspicacity and 
of power.2
What makes a character in a novel realistic, in Forster’s telling, is in fact 
antithetical to what makes human beings human: a character in a book 
is real, he writes, “when the novelist knows everything about it,” even 
if the novelist withholds some of that “everything” from the page.3 That 
his argument, so clearly rendered, did not forestall decades of ethical 
criticism insisting on ideas contrary to his demonstrates the concentrated 
power of the solace he describes. i want to insist steadfastly that to the 
reader, a novel’s characters are knowable. Only to the other characters 
within the work are fictional people “others.”
 realist novels depict characters who recognize on some level the 
ultimate unknowability of another character, and more often they depict 
those who plow ahead assuming (erroneously) that in fact they do know 
exactly what the other is thinking and who the other is. Such is the mar-
velous faculty of the omniscient narrator or the multiplot structure that 
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those formal qualities of the book can lay bare the gulf of alterity to the 
reader, even though the characters within may remain ignorant. Tertius 
Lydgate might think he knows rosamond vincy, but we readers know 
better.
 There are two levels of knowledge, then, presented by these works: 
the limited knowledge shared by the subjects of art, and the comprehen-
sive knowledge available to the audience. Where we (the audience) get 
muddled—to borrow Forster’s word—is in the confusing of the two. The 
lesson of victorian realism is that we cannot know the other, and since 
that lesson applies only to the human other, the means of pedagogy—
the book, the painting—must be safe from presumptions of alterity. But 
the impulse to view artworks as analogous to people is strong, as is our 
belief that identifying with or knowing the other is essential to empathic 
or ethical extension. To counter the strength of that desire, i call upon 
the work of emmanuel Levinas, who gives language to the idea that 
acknowledging alterity, and not overcoming it, is ethics. his phenom-
enology reframes the apperception of alterity not as an obstacle but 
rather as the very means to interpersonal ethics. essential to Levinas’s 
formulation is the denial of the book-to-person analogy, as any work of 
art is fungible and ultimately knowable.
 it is indeed problematic for humans living together to treat other 
people as if they were books: knowable, fungible. But for the literary 
critic, at least, and i would argue for any engaged reader, the inverse of 
the analogy is equally troublesome. When we treat artworks as human—
when we insist that the art object can and should function as the other—
we miss the point that these works are at pains to make. We can know 
the subjects of art precisely because they are subjects of art. The nonhu-
man-ness of the novel or painting is what gives us the tantalizing feeling 
that we have access to a person in a way that, in reality, we lack.
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The above scene is not pivotal in the plot of David Copperfield, but it 
illustrates a quiet dynamic which rules that plot: the realization that 
one’s knowledge of another—even family members or dear friends—
is incomplete at best. Copperfield’s aunt is known by her family as 
Miss Betsey, and long before David meets her, arriving unannounced 
on her doorstep after abandoning his miserable London existence, he 
knows her through stories told by his mother. Miss Betsey’s storied past 
mingles with David’s years-long experience living with her, resulting in 
the closest familial relationship David has; he even takes her name. at 
Ludgate hill on a shopping day, David is thus shocked to learn that his 
dear aunt Betsey Trotwood, whom he loves and has known better than 
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alterity and the 
limits of realism
We made a pause at the toy shop in Fleet Street, to see the giants of Saint Dun-
stan’s strike upon the bells—we had timed our going, so as to catch them at it, at 
twelve o’clock—and then went on towards Ludgate Hill, and St. Paul’s Church-
yard. We were crossing to the former place, when I found that my aunt greatly 
accelerated her speed, and looked frightened. I observed, at the same time, that a 
lowering ill-dressed man who had stopped and stared at us in passing, a little 
before, was coming so close after us as to brush against her. 
 “Trot! My dear Trot!” cried my aunt, in a terrified whisper, and pressing my 
arm. “I don’t know what I am to do.”
 “Don’t be alarmed,” said I. “There’s nothing to be afraid of. Step into a shop, 
and I’ll soon get rid of this fellow.”
 “No, no, child!” she returned. “Don’t speak to him for the world. I entreat, I 
order you!”
 “Good Heaven, aunt!” said I. “He is nothing but a sturdy beggar.”
 “You don’t know what he is!” replied my aunt. “You don’t know who he is! 
You don’t know what you say!”
 —Charles Dickens, David Copperfield1
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nearly anyone else in his life, is in this moment a stranger to him. The 
man who Copperfield assumes is a “nothing but sturdy beggar” is in 
fact much more than that. he is the husband of Miss Betsey Trotwood, 
long believed to be dead, and his revelation throws into question, at least 
briefly, even Betsey’s title; she is no longer “Miss,” is she? Betsey herself 
abandons her usual self-command in favor of near-hysterics, a response 
that David cannot comprehend, and though she begins by articulating 
her own uncertainty—“i do not know what i am to do”—she ends by 
transferring uncertainty to David. By repeating “you do not know,” 
Betsey underscores David’s lack of comprehension. This scene, and Miss 
Betsey’s insistent exclamations, illustrate a realization essential to realist 
representation: the human embodies the unknown.
 Miss Betsey Trotwood’s admonition to her young nephew speaks to 
a condition larger than the immediate moment on Ludgate hill. in this 
book, i take up the mantle of Miss Betsey Trotwood’s reproach––“you do 
not know”––to argue that realist texts and images embrace the inherent 
limitations of the unknowable other. as depicted in David Copperfield, 
confronting the real alterity of another person can, paradoxically, lead to 
an enhanced sense of that individual. We cannot fully know the other. 
That the idea can be so simply stated might suggest that the idea can 
be simply learned, but nothing could be further from the truth. realist 
novels and paintings of the nineteenth century demonstrate that mov-
ing into the recognition of alterity is a process through which one comes 
to realize one’s limits. To attain what these texts conceive as literacy is 
to learn that empathetic extension arises from the recognition of differ-
ence. i suggest that realists illustrate the problems that result when one 
individual does not or cannot recognize the difference between herself 
and others, because that failure overlooks the limitations of knowledge. 
in these instances, empathic extension occurs only through the appre-
ciation of the limits of the self. These works demonstrate that effective 
connection between people is predicated on the recognition of such 
very limits. novels employ strategies of reading to present a means of 
engaging alterity; paintings employ strategies of seeing to do the same. 
realism thus points to the unknowable in addition to describing the 
knowable world.
  The works addressed in this study—by Dickens, George eliot, Thom-
as hardy, and J. M. Whistler, among others—not only depict humans in 
community as ultimately unknowable and inscrutable but also engage 
the ethical imperative that arises from interaction with the unknow-
able other, an ethics that, in the twentieth century, emmanuel Levinas 
defined in terms of alterity. as depicted in these works, recognition of 
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this alterity is not easily achieved, not inherent in human interactions, 
but rather must be learned. realist novels and paintings show individu-
als growing into this recognition by learning to appreciate difference: 
a character, for example, might realize an empathic relationship only 
after the often difficult process of setting another character free from her 
preconceived ideas or self-centered readings. realist texts and images 
further insist through both form and content that while an artwork may 
represent the process of apprehending the alterity of the other, it cannot 
provide the reader or viewer a means of achieving that process. The 
novel and the painting, in other words, cannot function as “other” for 
the viewer or reader.
J. M. W. Turner and the Representation of Difference
You will find no better teachers than your own eyes, if used aright to see things 
as they are.
 —J. M. W. Turner, to students at the Royal Academy2
i have so far elided the distinction between textual and visual literacy, 
but the characteristics of visual literacy make it a particularly useful 
entrée into issues of interpretation and comprehension. Joseph Mallord 
William Turner’s oeuvre, spanning from the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury until the middle of the nineteenth, can frame the shift toward the 
foregrounding of uncertainty that fully develops later in the century. his 
work suggests that realist depiction of limitation is not new, but rather 
had been percolating for some time. Turner’s instruction to his students 
at the royal academy offers both a lucid declaration of a primary tenet 
of art in the nineteenth century and an indication of the murky boundar-
ies of that tenet: “paint what you see,” he seems to say, but the advice 
is tempered by one condition—that the eyes are used “aright.” To paint 
the reality one sees, one must be taught to see as much as one is taught 
to paint. and being taught to see is as much learning to appreciate what 
is before our eyes as learning to recognize what is beyond the limits of 
our perception. Turner’s style, with its divergence from the then norma-
tive representational strategies used by other artists, inscribes difficulty 
into the viewing process, complicating the easy approach of reading 
meaning, if not an explicit narrative, into an image. instead, Turner’s 
paintings demand that their viewers encounter them as surface and 
not as narrative. That proto-realist insistence fuels my approach to the 
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novel; Turner’s example makes the case for viewing text as painting, not 
painting as text.
 Turner’s art, with its idiosyncratic renderings of sunsets and fogs, 
made the common world of england appear new to those who had 
seen its landscapes and natural effects throughout their daily lives. Such 
newness was not always appreciated by the viewing public, however, 
and his works were met with ambivalence throughout his active career. 
While Turner’s The Fighting Temeraire received at first a merely “sympa-
thetic reception,”3 by 2006 the painting was voted the “Greatest Painting 
in Britain” by the British public.4 ezra Pound understood that Turner’s 
paintings could only have been misconstrued upon first exhibition. he 
noted that Turner’s pictures “educated up” their viewers: standing in 
front of his paintings one might be perplexed, “but when you leave the 
pictures you see beauty in mists, shadows, a hundred places where you 
never dreamed of seeing it before.”5 Without being overtly pedantic, 
Turner developed a pictorial vocabulary that enriched the visual literacy 
of his audience; his works “taught” their viewers. Pound’s comment was 
itself not particularly novel in 1909, and viktor Shklovsky and the rus-
sian Formalists would later tease the idea into the literary application 
of “defamiliarization.” What Turner did in images in the early part of 
the nineteenth century was precisely to render the familiar unfamiliar, 
changing the public’s vision as well as conventions of the medium. a 
similar effect was achieved by realist authors; note erich auerbach’s 
praise of Zola’s novels, which echoes a Turneresque emphasis on visual 
literacy: “Did anyone,” he asks, “before [Zola] see a tenement house as he 
did in the second chapter of L’Assommoir? hardly!”6 The question is not 
one of sight, but one of vision. and by focusing their vision on stories not 
told, images not painted, and characters not represented, realists built 
upon Turner’s example (not only depicting difference but emphasizing 
it) and ushered in a new artistic vocabulary. That their public or critics 
would uniformly understand it, or even welcome it, was perhaps too 
much to expect.
 Given the significant overlap in the representational strategies 
employed in both realist texts and images, it is not surprising that crit-
ics responded similarly to both media.7 yet there is a danger in collaps-
ing entirely the difference in apprehending images and texts. First, by 
imagining the apparatus of texts and images as being inherently the 
same, many tend either to narrativize every image or regard the image 
merely as a portal composed of symbols to be interpreted.8 Second, doing 
so can result in problematizing verisimilitude in images more than is 
necessary. The overlap between style—the conventions of visual render-
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ing—and a sense of reality in painting (especially) has had an unmistak-
ably strong foundation throughout Western history of the development 
of the medium. verisimilitude has been at stake at least since Zeuxis 
challenged Parhassius.9 and that each successive generation of artists 
sought to improve upon the veridicality of the previous generation 
is also a saw of art-historical surveys—the trick was, the argument 
goes, the development of technologies of representation and the viewing 
public’s ability to process and accept those technologies as being more 
representative of perceived reality than what came before.10 The move-
ment toward greater verisimilitude seems to suggest that we’re moving 
ever closer to the depiction of things as they really are, and along with 
greater lifelikeness, greater recognition and therefore greater knowledge 
will ensue. Turner offers an early example that greater verisimilitude 
can foreground visual uncertainty, and in fact decrease familiarity. it is 
almost as if an actual correlation between representation and “the real” 
in painting is bracketed; this sensation is particularly evident when read-
ing psychologically inflected histories of art such as Gombrich’s seminal 
Art and Illusion, in which he convincingly adopts a formalist reading of 
the seemingly teleological march of the visual arts toward illusionistic 
verisimilitude. One benefit of such bracketing and the formalist readings 
that result is an emphasis on the surface, the artifice, and the conventions 
of the visual arts.
 in light of those conventions, novelistic claims of truth might seem 
quaint in their earnestness, as authors did what painters rarely did—
they included within their works claims of veracity.11 The concreteness 
of those claims (as opposed to the effusive, implicit nature of Turner’s 
sunsets, for example) opens the texts to criticism based on fidelity to 
intention: are the authors able to meet the standards they propose, 
standards that seem impossibly extreme? an impossible aim coupled 
with content focusing on people and places hitherto underrepresented 
in fiction, including the rural, the poor, the laboring, and the common—
these aspects of the movement open literary realists to critique. Claims 
of truth become naturalized, as if engagement with realist texts ought 
to be easy rather than difficult. if what’s being represented is reality, 
we should be able to recognize it immediately; it should remind us of 
ourselves and our world. But problems arise if the reality represented 
is the impossibility of representation, the limits of knowledge. That 
assumption underpins much critical reaction to realist novels, which is 
hyperfocused on the differences between realist conventions or content 
and that of non-realist works, to the extent that it fails to recognize that 
the novels themselves describe and depict the recognition of difference 
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and, more important, the limitations of knowledge. The insistence on 
object-ness embodied in Turner’s work provides a counterpoint to those 
critical gestures, if only his lessons can be retained.
“Defective” Mirrors: Realist Claims and 
Critical Responses
The nineteenth century dislike of Realism is the rage of Caliban seeing his own 
face in a glass.
 —Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray12
in his 1891 preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray, Oscar Wilde’s aphoristic 
take on realism  is partnered with his similarly glib (or genially sincere) 
take on romanticism: “the rage of Caliban not seeing his own face in a 
glass.” Wilde identifies both literary movements as provoking “dislike” 
among their readership, especially their critical readership. That dis-
like is essential to understanding how the critical response frames the 
discussion of realism’s successes and failures, just as the mechanisms 
of realist critique are essential to understanding the role that difference 
plays in the realist project. Moreover, Wilde’s epigrams demonstrate the 
ambivalence that is at the heart of so much criticism of realism, namely 
the pressing desire to see oneself reflected accurately and the repulsion 
at seeing in that reflection an unfamiliar vision of oneself or one’s world.
 Wilde’s invocation of the mirror in both descriptions presents as 
a given one principle of artistic production that is disputable, for he 
seems to accept that realist or romantic art can function as a mirror. 
in fact, the inability of art to reflect reality accurately has always been 
a part of the realist impulse, at least from the perspective of the artist. 
Claims of exact verisimilitude come more often from critics. The loud, 
reductive voice of the most vociferous criticism persists long after the 
more subtle, nuanced modulations of the artists themselves, and critical 
responses to realism lay bare some of the primary anxieties pervading its 
readership, concerns that continue to guide our present conceptualiza-
tion and analysis of the genre. To be sure, the anger at seeing one’s true 
self reflected in art noted by Wilde can certainly account for some, but 
not all, of the vituperative responses to realism. Seeing the other defa-
miliarized, through representations that break free from existent artistic 
conventions and readerly expectations,13 was equally provocative. early 
responses to realism included a mix of reactions to seeing the self and 
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seeing the radically other, manifested in twin objections to form and to 
content.
 The most persistent charge against realist fiction is an assault on its 
perceived claim of veracity, a charge that establishes a dangerous series 
of mutually exclusive potentialities, starting with the most basic: truth 
or falsity. J. hillis Miller summarized the problem with a battery of 
binary constructions; criticism of realism, he writes, “tends to express 
itself in either/or dichotomies: either realism or vacuous, free-floating 
fiction; [ . . . ] either the representation of some verifiable and objective 
truth, or merely the relative, some partial, subjective truth, therefore no 
truth at all.”14 Any indication of deviance from a purely objective truth 
thus rendered the whole effort futile. indeed, early iterations of realism 
did seem to support such all-or-nothing paradigms, as they regularly 
employed superlative language. The earliest definitions of the term 
came out of France, and between 1841 and 1851 French critics of art and 
literature characterized realism as follows: “the exact imitation of nature 
just as she is” (Gautier); “nature herself as she is, without lying and 
without ornamentation” (houssaye); “the great merit of seeing and ren-
dering nature, just as it is” (Clément de ris); “the faithful reproduction 
of the first passing object” (Geofroy); and “[the] claim that all, ugly and 
ignoble, can and must be represented under the single condition that 
the imitation be faithful” (Delécluze).15 Lofty ideals, to be sure. These 
definitions also do not address how realist goals differ from those of any 
other literary movement, which aspects of nature realist artists choose 
to replicate faithfully, or with what formal characteristics they do so, 
demonstrating a lack of precision that was itself regarded as anathema 
to realism’s very goals.
 Such critiques persist to this day, as can be seen in the ongoing 
debates on epistemology and representation in realist fiction. George 
Levine’s introduction to Realism and Representation (1993) presents the 
then current status of the debate, termed in largely stark distinctions 
similar to those articulated by J. hillis Miller: realist versus antireal-
ist, positivist versus relativist, and so forth. after noting the violent 
responses of academics against the very idea of “objectivity,” Levine 
summarizes: “The views that all facts are theory laden, that all argu-
ment is ‘interested,’ that all knowledge is culturally constructed, that 
all reality is mediated by representation, are dominant in literary theory 
and criticism, in sociology of science, and in some areas of the philoso-
phy of science. The exposure of the hidden political, social, and gen-
der implications of ‘facts’ and ‘objectivity’ and rigorous procedures of 
verification has been one of the most exciting and valuable activities of 
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modern intellectuals,” before warning that, taken to the extreme, such 
skepticism leads to “relativism and [ . . . ] anti-intellectualism.”16 Just as 
the “exposure” of fissures in the ideas of “truth” or “objectivity” may 
lead to relativism or anti-intellectualism, those same critiques have also 
led to a wholesale condemnation of the realist project; as described in 
J. hillis Miller’s account, rigid binaries can result in the “realist” baby 
being thrown out with the “subjective” bathwater. Critic Michael Boyd, 
for example, decries realism for “[pretending] to be what it is not” and 
declares it “a form of bad faith” because realist authors “pretend that 
their art is not a compromise but a slice of life—not the whole of life, 
perhaps, but a selection that reveals a one-to-one relationship with the 
experience to which it refers.”17 D. a. Williams similarly speaks of the 
realist’s choice of content as a resignation to what cannot possibly be: 
“Knowing the dream of total absorption of the real to be impossible, the 
realist resigns himself to working with a scaled-down model of reality.”18
 These objections depend on a definition of realism more akin to 
that of the French critics than that of the artists themselves. realists 
repeatedly address another central issue that is raised in Wilde’s quip: 
the trustworthiness of the mirror. The “glass” is a metaphor used con-
sistently by realists to describe their work, but those metaphors often 
hedge the very meaning of the term by limiting or restricting the mir-
ror’s accuracy. For Balzac the mirror was but “some sort” of “concentric” 
mirror (his inability to articulate precisely what that meant is clear in 
the original French: the artist “est obligé d’avoir en lui je ne sais quel miroir 
concentrique où, suivant sa fantasie, l’univers vient se réfléchir”),19 and for 
eliot the mirror was doubtlessly “defective” and the reflections “faint 
or confused.”20 allowing that even a mirror might be affected by the 
experience of the individual acknowledges the difficulty of transcending 
one’s own subjectivity, a proposition that is echoed in constructions that 
do not depend on the mirror as a symbol. Zola describes art not as a 
reproduction of nature but as the representation of objects being filtered 
through the screen of the artist’s temperament.21 Dickens, in the preface 
to Oliver Twist, mitigates his promise to “paint” the criminals of London 
“in all their deformity, in all their wretchedness, in all the squalid mis-
ery of their lives; to show them as they really were” by noting that he 
performed the task “as best i could.”22
 in spite of such admissions, the critical eye often regards limitation 
as a deciding factor in the zero-sum game of truth, which results in criti-
cism dependent on the objective/subjective binary. according to Lillian 
Furst, the mirror’s status as “the symbol of realism” only calls attention 
to the “pretense that [realism] tries to maintain.” She continues:
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Far from the anonymous, unbiased, scientific instrument that it was 
meant to be, the mirror acts as a prism in its passage through the art-
ist’s evaluating mind. it offers, therefore, not a faithful, objective replica 
of actuality as it “really” is, but a subjective interpretation of things as 
they seem through the refraction of the perceiving mind.23
realists seem not only to admit but to promote this more limited vision 
of their powers. The charge of “bad faith” must then be considered in 
light of the literary critics who make the charges, whose own weighted 
assessments affect their readings. Such critics hold claims of compre-
hensive objectivity up to stronger scrutiny than any acknowledgment 
(whether within or without a literary work) that an attempt to com-
prehensiveness is inherently and unavoidably limited. interpreters of 
texts are naturally limited by our own cultural context, our own limita-
tions. and while today we critique the realists’ implicit dependence on 
hegemonic structures to present a supposedly single, privileged, and 
therefore problematic version of reality, in the authors’ own time the 
charge would more likely have been that they were in fact violating the 
standards of the hegemonic order.
 The vituperative cast of much contemporary criticism of realism 
suggests that the claim of objective representation was, at the time, less 
challenged than was the artists’ choice of content: assuming the mirror 
is to any extent accurate, why choose to represent Caliban instead of 
Miranda; why choose to depict the ugly instead of the beautiful? Claims 
of truth and dispassionate representation were collapsed by readers 
with visions of familiarity: the truth was understood to be my truth. if 
the subject choices were unfamiliar to the reader, or were outside of 
the bounds of acceptability (conditions that often overlapped), the cre-
ative agent was seen as culpable. Consider the heated British response 
to Émile Zola’s fiction. Claiming to depict the real, Zola was charged 
instead with opting for a more violent, negatively skewed version of 
life. if this was reality, the British did not like “seeing it in a glass” at all. 
according to The Globe, Zola’s works “sapped the foundations of man-
hood and womanhood, not only destroyed innocence, but corroded the 
moral nature,” and the Birmingham Daily Mail asserted that the author 
himself “simply wallowed in immorality.”24 in charging Zola’s publisher 
with immorality for publishing Nana, La Terre (a novel that won Zola the 
decoration of the Legion of honor in France), and Pot-Bouille, the court 
declared they were “the three most immoral books ever published!”25 
Their immorality arose not because the novels were false or deceitful, 
but rather because their author chose to represent in text realities that 
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were deemed offensive and because their publisher chose to publish 
them.
 If the mirror is regarded as accurate and the reflection as complete, 
the public objects to what is reflected. if, even as Balzac and eliot note, 
the mirror must necessarily be warped or clouded, then the objections 
raised are that the reflection is inaccurate. representation is thus placed 
in a bind; one escape from that bind is to depict the limitations or the 
defects of the reflection accurately (a proposal that gives rise to the Bar-
thian construction of realism as a textual strategy that makes its artifice 
clearly evident26) and to represent the limits of representation.
Responding to Difference: 
Detachment versus Self-Extension
I aspire to give no more than a faithful account of men and things as they have 
mirrored themselves in my mind.
 —George Eliot, adam Bede27
Critical responses both to content and to form demonstrate reactions to 
difference, either a text appearing different from its stated goal or its 
content appearing different from the expected. Further, each objection 
is founded on an assumption: in the first case that an objective point of 
view is possible and or representative of reality, and in the second case 
that the acceptable real is somehow aligned with the pleasant or the 
moral. Overcoming these assumptions is necessary to understanding 
how realism represents the human other as a limit case of knowledge 
without falling into bad faith; it is useful to articulate the realist project 
in terms that emphasize its drive toward an ideal rather than its success 
or failure at achieving that ideal.
 novels and paintings of the period depict the difference of the 
sovereign other from oneself, engage that difference, and replicate the 
alienation felt in an encounter with such difference. Most importantly, 
they show that overcoming alienation is an impossibility. This bears 
repeating: elemental to the moral claims that underpin realism is the 
recognition that alterity cannot be overcome. a most important means 
of addressing difference is via representations of failure, especially the 
failure to achieve an ultimate objectivity. as discussed above, realists 
entertain the mirror’s failure as a foundational truth of their work, and 
not as an impediment. ameliorating the potential negative effects of 
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depictions of the pedestrian or base subject is made possible in part via 
this narratorial distance, born not of bad faith but of an acceptance that 
limitations are inherently part of the human lived experience. it is an 
ambivalent position, to be sure, but such distance allows for a movement 
toward a critical, detached understanding of even oneself, and certainly 
others.
 Current criticism attempts to understand or theorize those realist 
encounters with difference, and one more nuanced way to approach 
realist works is by recognizing their rendering or installation of what 
amanda anderson refers to as “detachment”—a complex balance of 
acknowledging difference or distinction while not employing distance 
as a means to dismiss, wholesale, the other.28 anderson’s analysis pro-
vides a useful model for my study because it embraces ambivalence and 
interminability as being constructive aspects of detachment. Detach-
ment is thus not necessarily a final stance, but is instead a process 
that takes as its aim the possibility of an objective consideration of the 
“facets of human existence so as to better understand, criticize, and at 
times transform them.”29 The movement toward objectivity is not to 
be confused with objectivity itself, and anderson is clear to note that 
the cultivation of detachments is an “aspiration to a distanced view” 
as opposed to an absolute objectivity that cannot be achieved.30 This 
“distanced view” is explicitly not superlative or extreme, a distinction 
imperative to understanding victorian realism. if eliot, for example, 
argues for a disinterested perspective for her readers and characters, she 
also acknowledges the risks of wholesale detachment: in “German Life” 
she warns of the potential for regarding all country hay-balers as jolly, 
happy, rosy-cheeked people.31
 My interest is in the singularity of otherness found expressly in the 
closeness of familial or communal relationships, relationships that sit 
outside of the binary systems long ascribed to realism and elucidated 
above whereby the “other” gets placed in a dialectic relationship with 
the self. it is easy to understand otherness in terms of the seemingly 
radical other, differentiated by nationality, class, race, or gender, while 
necessarily overlooking the fact that those who look much like oneself 
must in fact be understood as radically other as well. The binary formu-
lation lulls one into thinking that if the other doesn’t appear to be wholly 
other, she must be just like me. This sensibility is not born of critics but 
was, as Tim Barringer writes, a paradigm through which the victorians 
“defined” themselves: “respectable society in victorian Britain defined 
itself through a series of structured oppositions by which any group 
thought to adhere to different concepts of social and sexual behavior, 
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of work and time discipline, of value and of religion, was accorded 
the status of an inferior and potentially hostile other.”32 Barringer, in 
his study of the pictorial representation of difference, posits race as the 
“most powerful” of these factors of otherness. as Barringer notes, racial 
difference was regarded as being easily represented and thus easily 
perceived.  if, as he suggests, “the field of visual representation offered 
a site for the production and dramatization of powerful distinctions 
between self and others,” those who are unlike oneself are “constructed 
as deviant,” while those who appear to be like oneself are understood 
in terms of that similarity.33
 While not dismissing the distant or foreign other—whether they be 
the rural poor or those colonized across an ocean34—i wish to focus 
on the intimate interpersonal relationships that, in spite of or perhaps 
because of their banality, populate realist works. it is those closest rela-
tionships that abound in victorian texts and paintings, and which prove 
most difficult to navigate, in large part because intimacy itself (even prox-
imity itself) obstructs one’s realization of the other’s alterity, despite the 
necessity of that realization. in this way, the interpersonal relationships 
depicted in realist works echo the inherent closeness, the connection 
between what is depicted in realist works and what one sees in the real 
world. achieving a critical distance becomes difficult for readers, even if 
it is encouraged by the writers and painters. as Kay young writes, “The 
experience of intersubjectivity—knowing another and being known by 
another—depends on the acknowledgment of separate and mutual pres-
ence, or experiencing one’s own separate presence in simultaneity with 
the other’s separate, co-presence.”35 Thinking outside of the self seems 
necessary to sharing an intersubjective experience, and thus in addition 
to knowing the other better, one comes to know oneself better. 
 it is an idea that already had currency in the nineteenth century. John 
Stuart Mill, for example, asserted that failing to know the other can only 
lead to failing to know the self. Mill reminds us that what we believe 
may be false; those who “have never thrown themselves into the mental 
position of those who think differently” may not, “in any proper sense of 
the word, know the doctrine which they themselves profess.”36 The rub 
is that Mill’s reading of detachment persists in placing the self in relation 
to the other and is fraught (as anderson admits) with susceptibility to 
the same critiques of hegemonic power relationships that are leveled at 
realism itself: there is no pure detachment just as there can be no pure 
objectivity. emmanuel Levinas, as will become clear, escapes this bind by 
removing any definition of the self from a dependent relationship with 
the other. For him, the other’s alterity does not determine the self, just as 
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anderson’s reading hinges on the claim of aspiration toward detachment 
as opposed to an achievement of complete detachment.
 George Levine’s Dying to Know takes up this paradigm of aspiration 
to consider the intersection of scientific epistemology and ethics: “in the 
nineteenth century,” he writes, “despite overt attempts to separate” the 
two, “the epistemological was latent with ethical force.”37 in Levine’s 
telling, scientific inquiry requires dispassion, but the force driving the 
inquiry must be passionate, and the ethical is necessarily bound up 
in that drive. “Can those self-interested organisms usually identified 
through the hermeneutics of suspicion, in fact act in the interest of others 
at the possible sacrifice of themselves?” he asks. “To deny the possibil-
ity of objectivity, the capacity to be in that nowhere from which truth 
at last will be visible, is, logically speaking, to deny the possibility of 
altruism.”38 it is a sentiment echoed in another aspirational model of vic-
torian narrative—the form that andrew Miller terms “moral perfection-
ism.”39 These analyses of victorian works demonstrate that accounting 
for altruism within the realist text is, even in its most simple incarnation, 
a complicated endeavor.
 Levine’s description harkens to anderson’s “detachment,” as he 
notes that the writers he addresses find “that some mode of detachment, 
some way to move beyond the personal and to recognize a responsibil-
ity to community and to knowledge, is essential both to the work of 
knowing and to the work of living meaningfully.”40 anderson accounts 
for this responsibility by describing always the “aspiration” to detach-
ment, rather than working out whether it is even possible, while Levine 
frames the problem by constantly questioning the absolute. To be sure, 
the work of much postmodern and critical theory asserts that there is 
no such absolute. But Levine, echoing his introduction to Realism and 
Representation, points out that such critiques are themselves totalizing. 
Within these critiques, questions of power and hegemony arise. That is, 
because power is at play, definitive pronouncements about the nature 
of realism, or the truth, are generally created by and in favor of those 
controlling the power.
 anderson and Levine thus describe the realist project in terms that 
emphasize its drive toward an inevitable impossibility: the aspiration 
to detachment or to an epistemological perspective that depends on 
objectivity. yet their accounts do not present realism as a failed project. 
realism demonstrates its inherent limitations through depiction; this is 
a constructive, even necessary component of its aesthetics and form, and 
not a negation of its goal that can only be understood as a pretense or 
as exhibiting bad faith. For eliot to consider this process of representa-
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tion as the “raw material of moral sentiment” does not do away with 
Levine’s claim that true objectivity would eliminate the potential for true 
altruism.
 i argue that realist works depict both elements of the complicated 
relationship between detachment and an ethics: realization of the radical 
alterity of the individual is necessary because in its absence, relation-
ships fail, misunderstandings abound, or communities fracture. The 
other is beyond the conception of the self, is the ultimate unknowable, 
and the limit case of objective rendering for an author or painter, for the 
other cannot be rendered completely. and yet if one can appreciate the 
fundamental difference between the self and the other, if one can aspire 
to an escape from solipsism and set even an idea of the other free from 
the bounds of that solipsism, the result can be rife with potential for 
positive (or negative) affective possibilities. escape from solipsism arises 
not from the belief that one understands the other, but rather that one 
ultimately cannot know what it really is to be the other. it is a movement 
toward an understanding of the other completely outside of the self. it 
requires an empathic extension born of detachment.
 This formulation requires a departure from descriptions of self-exten-
sion, whether called sympathy or empathy, that involve the merging of 
the self and the other—this merging is common in criticism of victorian 
literature.41 audrey Jaffe describes sympathy as an undoing of the rec-
ognition of alterity, describing victorian scenes evoking sympathy as 
those that involve a “spectator’s (dread) fantasy of occupying another’s 
social place.”42 and if this fantasy can—should—be used to altruistic 
ends, it can offer an “affective solution to the problem of class alien-
ation,” and can “ameliorate social differences with assurances of mutual 
feeling and universal humanity.”43 This version follows on the heels of 
the predominant eighteenth-century notion of sympathy articulated by 
David hume and adam Smith, and described by David Marshall as 
“experiences of compassion, commiseration, pity, and identification.”44 
Such sympathy is expressly predicated upon identification with another. 
hume conceived of sympathy as a means to uniting people through fel-
low feeling; because “the minds of men are mirrors to one another,”45 
through mirroring the other, one can come to knowledge of that other. 
adam Smith’s description of the process of sympathy opens up some 
room for the distinction between the self and other, though ultimately 
he maintains the solipsism of the sympathizer that characterizes hume’s 
descriptions. in the opening of Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he 
writes, “as we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, 
we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by 
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conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation.”46 here 
Smith acknowledges the untraversable gulf between the self and the 
other, and since our senses “never did, and never can, carry us beyond 
our own person,” if we are to experience what the other experiences, we 
must rely on our imagination. “it is the impressions of our own senses 
only,” Smith concedes, “not those of [the other], which our imagination 
copies.”47 Smith’s version of fellow feeling thus depends on solipsism, 
but a solipsism necessitated by the fundamental inability of one person 
to experience what it is to be another. imagination might be an imperfect 
tool for understanding the feelings of another, but it is nonetheless the 
basis for sympathy, and the limitlessness of imagination creates the pos-
sibility for rich engagements with the other. Sympathy in the eighteenth 
century, Marshall describes, is thus “not just feeling or the capacity 
for feeling but more specifically the capacity to feel the sentiments of 
someone else,” a capacity that “[suggests] the act of entering into the 
sentiments of another person.”48 Under this schema, “entering into the 
sentiments of another person” is both possible and edifying. While not 
refuting the enormity of the influence of Smith and hume’s thinking 
on the victorians, i want to suggest that realists ultimately depict the 
limitations of this kind of fellow feeling. They recuperate the original 
terms of Smith’s construction, terms that emphasized the inability of the 
senses to “carry us beyond our own perception.” They describe scenes 
and instances where that mirroring does not and cannot suffice because 
it is predicated on assumption and projection.
 Catherine Gallagher’s work on humean sympathy in relation to the 
eighteenth-century novel is helpful here, as she so clearly renders the 
paradox of hume’s version of sympathetic extension: ultimately, hume’s 
sympathy forecloses any increase in knowledge of the other because it is 
predicated entirely on the self subsuming the other. She asks an impor-
tant question: “What happens to the otherness of the other people in this 
process, an otherness already blurred by the relationships described?”49 
it is certainly not retained. Gallagher links hume’s sense of property or 
ownership—that the closer a person is to the other who deserves sympa-
thy, the easier sympathy is—with the intervention of fiction. Because no 
one owns the characters in a novel, they are, she suggests, “universally 
appropriated.”50 Sympathy, Gallagher writes, “is not an emotion about 
someone else but is rather the process by which someone else’s emotion 
becomes our own,”51 a construction that models the kind of appropria-
tion Gallagher sees in hume’s articulation of sympathetic extension: to 
take the sensibility of the other and make it my own. For those followers 
of hume (and i mean temporally, not his acolytes), this reading makes 
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good sense. But something shifts in the nineteenth century. This version 
of sympathetic extension is what the realists attend to amend, i think, by 
showing within their works that appropriating people, subsuming them 
into one’s self, does not increase one’s knowledge of the other. Gallagher 
gestures toward the significance of realist insistence on particularization, 
in that the more a character is rendered through particularities, the more 
he or she belongs to the overtly and formally fictional and therefore the 
more he or she is appropriable and thus fodder for sympathy. in realist 
works, i wish to say, authors are drawing out the distinction between the 
reader’s (the audience’s, in the case of painting) ability to appropriate 
the represented character and the relationships between people.
 as is clear from Gallagher’s discussion, separating sympathy from 
empathy as depicted in nineteenth-century works is made difficult as 
identification—the feeling “like” associated with the empathy since the 
word’s early-twentieth-century coinage—is aligned so closely with sym-
pathy. Given the influence of hume and Smith on victorians and on our 
understanding of victorians, it should not surprise that their model of 
identification-based fellow feeling serves as the most common paradigm 
for attempts to explain mechanisms of fellow feeling in the nineteenth-
century novel. nor is it surprising that Smith’s subtle insistence on 
insurmountable alterity is overwhelmed by his descriptions of identi-
fication from which fellow feeling springs; similarly, the limitations of 
identification are overwhelmed by its (positive) affective possibilities. 
Studies of both sympathy and empathy in the novel most often consider 
the reader as the figure who stands to grow into a state of increased 
fellow feeling in relation to the characters within. To that end, they 
consider the readerly identification with characters, as often measurable 
by the real-world altruistic action provoked by a text. Suzanne Keen’s 
recent Empathy and the Novel takes as a given that “character identifica-
tion often invites empathy, even when the fictional character and reader 
differ from each other in all sorts of practical and obvious ways,” even 
as Keen notes that complex identification is not required for empathy to 
arise in a reader.52 rachel ablow develops her arguments on sympathy 
and the victorian marriage plot from a similar starting point. While 
making the distinction between the action- or pity-inducing sympathy 
she notes in the work of Janice Carlisle and Martha nussbaum and the 
fellow-feeling version of sympathy that she describes, ablow allows that 
identification is fundamental to both drives and considers sympathy, “as 
a mode of relating to others and of defining a self,” in contrast to those 
others.53 in descriptions of both sympathy and empathy, emblematic as 
they are of the broader critical literature, affective extension or fellow 
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feeling emerges from identification. Despite their prevalence in critical 
literature, these descriptions do not account for the representations in 
victorian literature and painting that depend on alterity. and if these 
versions of sympathy and empathy guide our engagement with realism, 
since they both depend on the enmeshing of the other into one’s self-
conception, aren’t we bound to ignore the meticulous representations of 
alterity on display in nineteenth-century art and literature?
 For it is in the depiction of distinctiveness, the sovereign individual, 
the different, that realism excels. in her often-quoted description of the 
ethical work that novels make possible, George eliot emphasizes differ-
ence as being a necessary prerequisite of the enlargement of affective 
extension:
if art does not enlarge men’s sympathies, it does nothing morally. i have 
had heart-cutting experiences that opinions are a poor cement between 
human souls; and the only effect i ardently long to produce by my 
writings is, that those who read them should be better able to imagine 
and feel the pains and joys of those who differ from themselves in 
everything but the broad fact of being suffering, erring human beings.54
at the same time that she’s encouraging readers to recognize the traits they 
share with others—that we are all “suffering, erring human beings”—she 
also emphasizes that shared experience does not and should not occlude 
difference. it is easy, when glossing the quotation, to focus on the italicized 
words “imagine” and “feel.” i suggest that we shift our focus to other 
terms of her statement: eliot notes that people should be “better able to 
imagine and feel” the other’s emotions, and that improvement in ability to 
imagine and feel is predicated, at least in eliot’s fiction, on first recogniz-
ing that you do not know the other’s emotions.
 To be sure, identification is important for the expansion of men’s 
sympathies—what some see as enforced didacticism (in Middlemarch, 
one critic writes, “the moralistic tone of the narratorial voice” scorns 
and judges the characters within55), others regard as nuanced depic-
tions of characters that offer a way for the reader to be exposed to the 
intimate particularities of another individual, potentially resulting in the 
self-forgetfulness that leads to sympathy. Felicia Bonaparte makes such 
a claim about eliot’s works, suggesting they “enlist that completely ego-
tistical bias the reader feels on his own behalf in the forging of sympathy 
that undermines self egotism.” The reader, according to this model, “is 
surprised into perceiving about others” what he already perceives about 
himself.56
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 yet readerly self-forgetfulness or intimate connection with a character 
does not, cannot explain realist texts and images or—as noted above—
the reactions they drew from contemporaries. For these works embrace 
and depict the limitations of what is knowable. Limits of representation, 
whether pictorial or textual, collide in the impossibility of represent-
ing the interiority of the human other. in Middlemarch, eliot famously 
describes this choice as a fundamentally practical gesture: “if we had 
a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life,” she writes, “it 
would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel’s heart beat, and 
we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. as it is, 
the quickest of us walk about well wadded with stupidity.”57 in Le Père 
Goriot, that foundational realist text and the same one in which Balzac 
wrote “all is true,” he qualifies the claim by noting that Paris is so vast, 
a “veritable ocean,” that no matter how extensive or comprehensive an 
attempt to describe it might be, “there will always be a virgin place, an 
unknown cavern, flowers, pearls, monsters, unknown, wonderful things, 
forgotten by literary divers.”58 Just as Paris cannot be fully described, so 
too the other remains perpetually and always irreducible on the page 
or canvas. in Le Père Goriot, longtime residents of the Maison vauquer 
can live and eat next to each other for years without having any idea of 
their neighbors’ true emotions, pasts, or even their names.
 So the realist must aspire to comprehensiveness while acknowledg-
ing that there are real limits to what is knowable, and thus what is 
representable. another human individual is the ultimate unknowable. 
applying anderson and Levine’s aspirational model of knowledge to 
affective relationships shows that the attempt-toward is not nullified 
by the recognition or depiction of ultimate impossibility. in the case 
of interpersonal relationships, those limits may in fact be seen as con-
structive: ethics can offer a “configuration of meaning that strikes us 
as profoundly alien to our wants”; realist characters can capture “an 
individuality whose very strangeness” inhibits identification.59 Such 
perspectives point to a way of understanding the relationships depicted 
in realist texts and images through analysis of depictions of the alterity 
of the unknowable other. and because the other is necessarily central in 
these depictions, and because i wish to emphasize the inassimilability 
of that other, i will rely on the term “empathy” to describe the affective 
relationship between the self and that unknowable other.
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Empathy and the Other: The Example of 
Emmanuel Levinas
The relationship with the other is a relationship with a Mystery.
 —Emmanuel Levinas60
aspirational models of criticism credit a drive toward narratorial (and 
pictorial) detachment as one of realism’s primary achievements. The 
connection between detachment and the relationships depicted in realist 
works—relationships predicated on appreciable difference—are those 
that confound many readers, as they stymie an easy identification. These 
texts and images tell us that the alterity of the other cannot be overcome, 
yet their engagement with empathy is undeniable. The argument that 
an interpersonal ethics can be built on recognition of radical alterity 
is elucidated with the twentieth-century phenomenological models of 
emmanuel Levinas. as i note in the preface, embracing that reading 
is difficult, in part because we are so conditioned to view alterity as a 
source of alienation, inhibiting productive interpersonal relationships, 
and as a block that must be overcome. Levinas’s work helps to explain, 
outside of the frameworks articulated by Smith and hume, the tendency 
of realist works to depict failures of communion that arise from one’s 
inability to recognize sovereignty of the individual or inability to escape 
solipsism. he insists that “the other is alterity,”61 yet does not place the 
self and other in a dialectic, suggesting instead that the other remains 
always unknowable and that out of the unknowability arises ethics and, 
potentially, empathy. in his account, only another human is radically 
other and cannot be folded into one’s self-conception or made into an 
object of the self. and in his account, the encounter with that radical 
alterity of the other human opens up the space for ethical behavior. The 
chapters that follow are not, it must be noted, simply “Levinasian” read-
ings of the works of Dickens, eliot, hardy, and Whistler. While Levinas 
provides a vocabulary to explain the interpersonal dynamics seen in 
these works, the texts and paintings tell us what Levinas cannot: that 
the process of recognizing alterity is hard and must be learned, and that 
the process of learning is akin to acquiring literacy (textual, visual, and 
otherwise).
 Difficulty aside, Levinas does argue that literature can depict the 
state of the relationship between an individual and the other. Consider 
his reading of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu, a story that, he 
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argues, develops from an “insatiable curiosity about the alterity of the 
Other that is both empty and inexhaustible.”62 Proust’s development 
of despair of solitude, Levinas argues, is “an inexhaustible source of 
hope”:
This is a paradox in a civilization which, in spite of the progress made 
since the eleatic philosophy still sees unity as the very apotheosis of 
being. But Proust’s most profound lesson, if poetry can contain lessons, 
consists in situating reality in a relation with something which for ever 
remains other, with the Other as absence and mystery, in rediscover-
ing this relation in the very intimacy of the “i,” and in inaugurating a 
dialectic that breaks definitely with Parmenides.63
The other must be human because otherwise it could be appropriated 
by the self (as with objects, commodities, labor, etc.) and it cannot be 
known by the self—it is the limit case of knowability. if the other were 
knowable, or understood to be knowable, he or she would merge with 
the self. as James Mensch frames it, “in reaching the goal, i would not 
obtain knowledge of the other, but rather self-knowledge. Thus, the 
other’s mental life or consciousness is essentially hidden from me. it 
manifests an alterity that cannot be overcome.”64 via this reading, the 
limit of the epistemological urge intersects with the ideal of detach-
ment: the only true knowledge of the other arises from the recognition 
that knowledge of the other is an impossibility. Levinas’s construction 
of the unassailable alterity of the other renders impossible the kind of 
identification on which empathy is built in readings such as Keen’s and 
Bonaparte’s. Levinas revives the alterity that adam Smith describes as 
being fundamental to human interaction, but where Smith encourages 
imaginative projection as the (only possible) means to overcome that 
alterity, Levinas retains the mystery of the other.
 The inescapable alterity of the other person is a limit on which ethi-
cal action depends. in order to recognize alterity, one must not assume 
that the other is just like the self, or that oneself is just like the other, 
but must instead recognize that the gulf between the two is immense, 
inescapable. That is, before one can empathize, one must apperceive 
difference. Levinas’s descriptions of intersubjectivity are helpful in rec-
onciling the depictions of humans-in-relation presented in artworks with 
the particular formal and content markers of nineteenth-century realism. 
nearly all of the works studied here foreground observation, models of 
seeing and interpreting, and the variations of visuality include reading 
and writing.
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 Before proceeding, i must stop to clarify a point often overlooked 
when invoking Levinas’s philosophy for literary analysis. Levinas’s 
description of alterity and its concomitant ethical demand is a unique 
aspect of human interpersonal experience. Levinasian phenomenology 
precludes a text functioning as other; anything that can be commodi-
fied and appropriated to the self’s needs, such as labor or material 
objects, expressly cannot function as the radically other.65 The “lesson” 
Levinas attributes to Proust’s novel was contained within it and among 
its characters and did not result from a reader’s relation to the text. 
novels, paintings, and other artworks exist firmly within the arena of 
the material: a book cannot be an other, nor can a painting. and the criti-
cal response to Levinas’s insistence that the artwork cannot function as 
other shows how stubborn we readers are in clinging to the belief that 
viewing the text or painting as other is the proper way to engage with 
art. That stubbornness is evident in the work of literary scholars who, 
even when explicitly employing Levinas’s philosophy as a foundation 
for criticism, argue that the text can function as the other and therefore 
as the basis for ethics. David haney, for example, notes that Levinas does 
not allow for the relationship between individuals to occur between an 
individual and a work of art. nevertheless, haney advocates this very 
relationship between reader and text: “one’s relation to art can partake 
of Levinas’s own account of the ethical relation to the other.”66 To sup-
port this claim,67 haney must grant the literary text the overwhelming 
power of the radically other, and he does: “[the literary text] overflows 
conceptual structures in a way that gives the conversation the asymme-
try one finds in the Levinasian encounter, and thus it is at least structur-
ally ethical.”68 adam newton, writing in Narrative Ethics, also frames 
his textual analysis on the idea that “certain kinds of textuality parallel 
[Levinas’s] description of ethical encounter in several obvious ways.” 
newton suggests that the relationships between the “narrator and lis-
tener, author and character, or reader and text” often “precede decision 
and understanding”; fiction thus “translates the interactive problematic 
of ethics into literary forms.”69
 i diverge strongly from such approaches, retaining instead the dis-
tinct difference between the object (the work of art) and the human other 
and engaging with the ways that prose fiction and paintings are not 
like persons. i don’t mean to deny that readers or viewers engage with 
texts or images as if they did have “lives of their own,” to use W. J. T. 
Mitchell’s phrase.70 and haney is not unique in demonstrating the pro-
pensity to regard an artwork as an other. Social formalism, particularly 
as defined by Dorothy hale, depends on a conception of the novel as a 
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unique form that allows readers to access alterity. The novel functions 
as a way to mitigate the “radical relativism” of pure subjectivity because 
it can “instantiate both the identity of its author and the identity of the 
subject the author seeks to represent.” By reading a novel, readers can 
“come to know sympathetically persons who are substantially different 
from themselves” because the novel functions as that other, “instantiat-
ing” both author and subjects.71 When hale wonders how much weight 
to grant “the supposition that the novel as a genre is specially able to 
represent alterity,” it is with the hope of clarifying the longstanding 
theoretical assumptions that define social formalism. yet neither she 
nor haney recognizes that the very way a novel or a painting can best 
describe radical alterity is by demonstrating that the formal qualities of 
art inhibit alterity on all levels. Their readings demonstrate the power 
of the desire to know the other and to overcome the alterity of the other, 
and they therefore demonstrate the difficulty that the realist text and 
image is up against.
 My turn to Levinas should not be construed as an unqualified 
endorsement of his phenomenology, nor can his phenomenology explain 
the full impact of the realist work (as i discuss below, the artwork tells 
us something about the recognition of alterity that Levinas’s philoso-
phy cannot). Simply put, Levinas’s work presents a way to reconcile 
two seemingly opposing currents in realist works: the insistence on 
representing the limits of knowledge and the limitation of knowledge 
embodied in the individual other, and the working toward (the aspira-
tion to) that knowledge. The ultimate end of that aspiration does exist, in 
a sense, but true knowledge—the hard-learned lesson—is precisely the 
truism that one cannot know the other. These works teach us, as it were, 
not how to overcome the alienation of the radical alterity of the other, 
but rather that we cannot overcome that alterity. it is a lesson, it seems, 
that we resist as readers and indeed as critics, and if the formulation 
seems reductive, i can only insist that what may be so simply stated 
is not nearly—to judge from our reading and critical practices—easily 
learned. Levinas’s staunch devotion to the belief that the artwork cannot 
function as other articulates a dynamic that these victorian artists were 
constructing.
 To the degree that these works depict unknowable human charac-
ters, the works themselves are emphatically knowable. Further, the very 
form of these works insists that the artwork is not the other. For while 
analysis of the text might expand the power of a narrative beyond the 
structures of the novel, each iteration of a novel remains permanently 
static. it can be held and sold. The same is true for a painting. These 
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finite objects may offer the means to access structures or ideas beyond 
their boundaries, but they must not be regarded as an other. This is 
not to say that realist works cannot do the work so often ascribed to 
them—increasing other-awareness or expanding the extension of sym-
pathy—but rather that their insistence on the unknowability of the other 
is elemental to that work. Within the novels, characters’ stories can be 
learned and manipulated, comprehended and misunderstood, adopted 
or rejected. While characters may be unknown to other characters within 
the diegesis of text or image, that relationship is not analogous to the 
relationship between the reader or viewer and the artwork. The story 
of a character is not the same as the character herself, just as a painting 
of a subject is not the same as the subject herself. Though novels might 
represent the wages of alterity between the actors within its covers, or 
paintings might depict alienation, those are only representations of an 
encounter with alterity, not the encounter itself. The character within a 
book may be an other only to other characters within that book, never 
to the reader. To the reader, those characters are “beings that are shut 
up, prisoners.”72
 in my analysis of the novels and paintings, this distinction between 
a human and his/her story is critical, as the works that i examine attest 
repeatedly that knowledge of another’s story does not ensure apprecia-
tion of his or her alterity. The failure to make that distinction leads to 
interpersonal difficulties. according to Levinas’s descriptions of inter-
personal ethics, the asymmetrical relationship between self and other 
need not be learned; it simply is. human existence is already obligated, 
and that obligation “places the center of gravitation of a being outside 
of that being.”73 and here is where the victorian works demonstrate the 
limitation of Levinas’s formulation of interpersonal ethics: as repeatedly 
demonstrated by the subjects of realist works, apprehending the other 
(as described in Levinas’s phenomenology) seems more often not to 
precede interaction with others. if it is a truth, it nevertheless requires 
discovery. This process of developing the discernment—and indeed it is 
a process, born of trial and error, mistakes and missteps—bears much in 
common with the process of learning.
 in light of that process, and in light of the frequency with which these 
works utilize learning to read as a parallel model for the movement 
into understanding the other’s alterity, i turn to the ideas of “learning” 
and “literacy” as a way to describe the process of becoming aware of 
the limits of the self and the resulting awareness. These terms capture 
the sense of moving-toward that is modeled in the aspirational gestures 
of the realist works this book considers. The paintings and novels that 
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describe or represent the limits of knowledge through their devotion to 
accuracy and comprehensiveness parallel the efforts of their viewers or 
readers, moving into a knowledge whose ultimate goal is the realization 
of the limits of that knowledge.
i OPeneD this introduction with the words of Miss Betsey Trotwood 
and Turner. Trotwood insisted to her nephew that he did not know 
what or whom he was seeing, and Turner encouraged his students to 
adjust their focus so they might learn from what they see. These two 
moments serve as touchstones for the study that follows: first recognize 
the limits of your vision, and then learn and work to adjust and improve 
that vision. The ethical relationship with the other is predicated on the 
recognition of alterity, though one’s focus might preclude that vision, 
in which case refocusing must take place. One must learn a new means 
of seeing or understanding. Similarly, shifting focus onto the limits of 
representation, empathy, and alterity in the novels and paintings that are 
the focus of this study, texts that have been discussed and analyzed by 
so many, reveals new ways of understanding them as well.
 Given Dickens’s extraordinary command of his characters, his remark 
early in A Tale of Two Cities that “every human creature is constituted 
to be that profound secret and mystery to every other” may seem to be 
unwarranted. i argue in chapter 1 that Dickens’s work demonstrates this 
truism with a kind of compulsion that belies his preoccupation with the 
idea, if not its veracity. That every other is a profound secret is not cause 
for misery, nor does it preclude effective relationships. A Tale of Two Cities 
peels back the layers of awareness within a family unit, showing that 
those closest to us may be most impenetrable. Dr. Manette’s case fur-
ther reminds readers that one may be a stranger even to himself, while 
Sydney Carton serves as an example of a most unknowable man who 
demonstrates the greatest acts of empathy in the novel. Great Expectations 
adds textual literacy as a paradigm for understanding other people. Pip 
and Joe both learn to read in the course of the novel, but their respective 
educational journeys serve as contrasts. Bleak House wraps identities and 
relationships in volumes of paper. Documents in Jarndyce versus Jarn-
dyce serve as a wedge to separate people, clouding judgment; Mrs. Jel-
lyby’s obsessive letter writing for africa shows that she has no empathic 
response to her own family (precisely because they are her own, and not 
foreign); recognition of handwriting unlocks Lady Dedlock’s long-held 
secrets; and Sir Leicester’s three-word message on a slate reveals a man 
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unknown to those who loved him best. Chapter 1 details Charles Dick-
ens’s construction of textual literacy as an ability that must be tempered 
with other versions of literacy: personal, interpersonal, and emotional.
 if Dickens’s works describe the unknowability of the other, in George 
eliot’s novels, characters proceed from that opacity toward a position of 
interdependence or even of recognition, with varying levels of success. 
The second chapter considers empathy in terms of difference, which 
allows for a radical reconsideration of some of eliot’s heroines. hetty Sor-
rel of Adam Bede—consistently labeled a narcissist in opposition to Dinah 
Morris’s altruistic and saintly goodness—is a prime example. Through 
her late recognition of her inability to “feel anything like” Dinah, hetty 
is in fact far more appreciative of the difference of the individual experi-
ence than even Dinah Morris. Like Dinah, Dorothea Brooke of Middle-
march treads a delicate line between self-abnegation and masochism, so 
thoroughly imagining herself into others that she fails to define herself 
as separate. in fact, both failed marriages in Middlemarch are the result 
of one partner’s (Lydgate, Dorothea) failure to realize the other (rosy, 
Casaubon) as having desires and priorities that are distinct from his or 
her own. in accordance with her heroines’ ambivalent empathy, eliot 
insists throughout her oeuvre that empathic extension is not merely 
ideal but essential to human community, and this chapter reconciles that 
empathy with eliot’s depictions of both narcissism and altruism.
 The third chapter turns to Thomas hardy’s works, which amplify 
the theme that was only suggested in Dickens’s and eliot’s works: that 
the split between the knowable text and the unknowable person exists 
not only for the reader of the novel but also within the novel itself. That 
is, one’s identity cannot be conflated with one’s story. While personal 
narratives can be learned, molded, told, and retold, the individual other 
is and must always be essentially out of reach. Tess Durbeyfield, for 
example, is separate from the story of her past: the facts of her story may 
be known, but she cannot be reduced to that narrative alone. Michael 
henchard, the Mayor of Casterbridge, cannot distinguish himself from 
his history once it becomes known, and he cannot trust others to make 
the distinction; this inability is his tragedy. an explicit consideration of 
Levinas is crucial to this reading, as his constructions illustrate that we 
cannot as readers regard the text as embodied or materialized humanity. 
Because of this, we cannot relate to the text in terms of its difference; 
there is no face-to-face with a novel, or—as to be seen in the fourth 
chapter—with an image.
 in the fourth chapter, i move from texts to the image plane to focus on 
the distinction between the object/surface and the subject depicted. The 
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narrative structure common to fiction helps to obfuscate the obstinate 
alterity of the human other; victorian narratives insist on teleology, sug-
gest movement toward resolution. Painting, however, does not necessar-
ily suggest movement at all, and Whistler’s canvases in particular insist 
on capturing and perpetuating the tension between subjects. Through 
aversion and obfuscation in landscape (a trope that connects Whistler’s 
landscapes to Turner’s landscapes) and through the use of profile in 
portraiture, James Mcneill Whistler paints images that force viewers to 
consider the lack of mutuality of their gaze. These methods were used 
by many realist artists, including Courbet and Manet in France, to cre-
ate a similar dynamic in their works and for their audience. While not 
reducing realism to pure convention, these pictorial strategies allow the 
painter to refuse the viewer access without undermining verisimilitude. 
Through this refusal, Whistler accomplishes a feat parallel to that of 
the realist authors: he depicts images of people and places that are pro-
foundly moving, yet profoundly unreachable, all the while emphasizing 
through form the necessity of connection.
 as part of their effort to depict life and its processes accurately, realist 
authors and painters recognize the limitations of their depictions. The 
author cannot make her characters something other than they are; the 
painter cannot represent every mystery hidden in his subjects. rather 
than being a flaw in the realist doctrine, these limits attest to the realities 
of life in community with others. That there are others outside of oneself, 
and that those others exist as the center of their own individual universe, 
are conclusions earned through experience. novels and paintings may 
be utterly knowable, but those they depict—as shown in the works i 
examine—cannot be completely understood by others within the works. 
Through their depictions of the appreciation of difference, nineteenth-
century British realist works demonstrate that empathic relationships are 
the result of an awareness of alterity, of the limitations of one’s subjectiv-
ity and the other’s lived experience that rests wholly outside, and not 
simply the result of identification or similarity. Because empathy may 
be seated in difference, these works show that it is possible for one to 
be empathic toward another without being altruistic. This is not a hope-
less state, for as the texts examined in Victorian Lessons in Empathy and 
Difference repeatedly show, inscribed in the very movement toward an 
appreciation of alterity are the seeds of mutuality.
By now, most people with even a limited familiarity with Charles Dick-
ens’s life are aware of the time he spent as a boy in a blacking factory 
while the rest of his family was confined in the Marshalsea; as rosemarie 
Bodenheimer notes, when it comes to Dickens’s biography, “all roads, it 
seems, lead back to Warren’s Blacking.”1 When John Forster’s biography 
of Dickens was first published, however, the details of that long-sup-
pressed episode in Dickens’s boyhood were new to most readers, largely 
because Dickens did not speak about it during his lifetime.2 Forster pres-
ents that period of Dickens’s life through an autobiographical fragment 
that Dickens himself had written, much of which had found its way into 
David Copperfield. Dickens wrote the description of his time spent in the 
factory from the perspective of a successful author famous for his com-
mand of character, yet the fragment is notable for its multiple iterations 
of uncertainty. Despite his almost painfully accurate memory of the time, 
and even though he writes about himself, Dickens repeatedly asserts his 
inability to articulate his own feelings, a tendency attributed variously 
to repression, to the effects of trauma, or to Dickens’s desire to head off 
doubters:3 “i am not clear [ . . . ] it is wonderful to me [ . . . ] it is wonderful 
to me [ . . . ]”; “no words can express the secret agony of my soul as i 
sunk into this companionship; compared these every-day associates with 
those of my happier childhood; and felt my early hopes of growing up 
to be a learned and distinguished man, crushed in my breast”; “That i 
suffered in secret, and that i suffered exquisitely, no one ever knew but 
i. how much i suffered, it is, as i have said already, utterly beyond my 
power to tell.”4
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 The final two phrases are repeated nearly verbatim in David Cop-
perfield, but similar phrases permeate his oeuvre and are not limited 
to the quasi-autobiographical. in Great Expectations, Pip admits to his 
“dear herbert” that “i cannot tell you how dependent and uncertain 
i feel, and how exposed to hundreds of chances.”5 Such uncertainty is 
at times due to Pip’s inability to assess his own feelings or motivation 
adequately or accurately: “What purpose i had in view when i was hot 
on tracing out and proving estella’s parentage, i cannot say” (408). But 
more common is the feeling of the inadequacy of words to communi-
cate his intended meaning, a meaning often felt, and felt keenly and felt 
specifically: “Words cannot tell what a sense i had, at the same time, of 
the dreadful mystery that he was to me” (338); “i was so humiliated, 
hurt, spurned, offended, angry, sorry—i cannot hit upon the right name 
for the smart—God knows what its name was—that tears started to 
my eyes” (62); “i tell this lightly, but it was no light thing to me. For, 
i cannot adequately express what pain it gave me to think that estella 
should show any favour to a contemptible, clumsy, sulky booby, so very 
far below the average” (309). These examples, like those from the auto-
biographical fragment, are not evidence of a young man who does not 
know himself, but evidence of a man who knows himself and realizes 
that to make that self known to another via language is, ultimately, an 
impossibility.6
 The prolificacy and scope of Charles Dickens’s work often oppugns 
ideas of limitation. Undercutting critiques of Dickens’s proclivity to a 
totalizing worldview, though not consciously anticipating them, is the 
regular refrain in Dickens’s writing that words are ultimately unable 
to capture a person, event, place, or feeling. in their very repetition, 
claims of ineffability become blunted, as the repetition itself is indicative 
of the effort to overcome the limitations of language. Such insistence 
on the inability of language to describe feeling or experience is not, i 
wish to suggest, merely a caveat intended to preclude criticism. nor 
is it a supremely personal tic born of Dickens’s intense suppression of 
his own past. This insistence is instead constructive, erecting a founda-
tional boundary that separates people from one another. This limitation 
inscribes alterity, as it insists that the self must always be a mystery to 
the other, and the other always a mystery to one’s self. yet that limit is 
in constant tension with the nearly compulsive drive to overcome it—a 
necessary urge to connect—that is evidenced through paradigms that 
offer the potential, or seem to offer the potential, to usurp the boundar-
ies themselves: familial relationships and the communicative exigency 
of reading and writing. Those paradigms are at work throughout Dick-
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ens’s oeuvre. here, i consider the relationships depicted within Dick-
ens’s work, outside of their potential influence on the reader’s altruistic 
response. i limit my focus to A Tale of Two Cities, Great Expectations, and 
Bleak House, novels in which Dickens inscribes alterity and the limits of 
the self by insisting on the limitations of reading and the limitations of 
the familial bond. always in the presence of those limitations, the often 
unbearable weight of the impossibility of connection, is an aspiration 
toward overcoming. These attempts afford the characters and their sto-
ries the hope that is reified through the potential of empathy.
The Mystery of a tale of two cities
early in A Tale of Two Cities, the narrator notes a “wonderful fact to reflect 
upon”: that “every human creature is constituted to be that profound 
secret and mystery to every other.”7 The narrator’s fascination is not 
shared by all of the novel’s characters. Many, in fact, seem confident 
that close friends or family members are perfectly transparent. no mys-
tery, and no secret. The noble Miss Pross, for example, is devoted to her 
brother Solomon, whose character is permanently and decidedly affixed 
in her mind and heart. her gross misjudgment of him is used to comic 
effect throughout the novel, even long before the terms of their relation-
ship are revealed to the reader. among its earliest incarnations is her 
protestation that “There never was, nor will be, but one man worthy of 
Ladybird and that was my brother Solomon, if he hadn’t made a mistake 
in life” (100). readers are informed that Solomon was actually “a heart-
less scoundrel who had stripped her of everything she possessed [ . . . ] 
and had abandoned her in her poverty for evermore, with no touch of 
compunction” (100). readers may thus reflect on the fact that Solomon 
is indeed a profound secret and mystery to his sister, but Miss Pross 
refuses to acknowledge the same.
 Miss Pross’s comic nature helps to hedge the significance of her ide-
alization of Solomon, though Mr. Lorry does regard her fidelity to her 
profligate brother as a character flaw. her loyalty is not, however, merely 
the optimistic devotion of the family member who chooses to see only 
the best in any of her kin. it is instead an instance of willed blindness, 
a commitment to one’s own vision of a person, in spite of any evidence 
to the contrary. She cannot, or does not, recognize Solomon’s existence 
independent of her own vision of him. She cannot grant him separate-
ness, independence from that vision, and in that refusal she confines 
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“him”—which is after all only her understanding of his reality—within 
her understanding of her reality.
 That the closeness of the familial bond can impede rather than facili-
tate the recognition of alterity is apparent in Miss Pross’s relationship 
with her brother. She is not always so blind to others’ true intentions. her 
encounter with another other in the novel functions as a useful counter-
point to her interactions with her brother. Thérèse Defarge represents the 
ultimate threat to those whom Pross holds dear. in the physical struggle 
that ends in Defarge’s death, Pross speaks english and Defarge speaks 
French; neither is able to understand the other. in this standoff, despite 
her determined refusal even to attempt to understand Defarge’s words, 
Pross nevertheless discerns the Frenchwoman’s intentions accurately, as 
she intuits Thérèse’s desire to kill Lucie. it is, given the circumstances 
and Mme. Defarge’s externalization of her emotion in the scene, not a 
difficult insight to discern. robert alter describes this scene as a “battle 
between pitiless French savagery and staunch english humanity,”8 a 
“symmetric” rendering of polar opposites. That struggle—like the strug-
gle defined by the novel’s title—is large in scale, scope, and importance. 
The entire relationship is predicated if not on a nuanced appreciation 
of alterity, then on a radicalized notion of opposition. The result is that 
Pross gets it correct while failing to apperceive Solomon’s true nature. 
Though her familiarity with him vastly exceeds her familiarity with 
Madame Defarge, she cannot see the real character of her brother, proved 
repeatedly to be a cad. Why the willed blindness? That magical pronoun 
“my,” which should indicate intimacy, instead erects barriers to vision.
 negotiating the spaces between binaries—family versus stranger, 
mine versus yours—is a task at the heart of the novel. From its opening 
sequence, the narrative of A Tale of Two Cities swings between the best 
and the worst, heaven and hell. But in addition to the extreme polarities 
of experience the novel also alternates its focus between the global and 
the personal, between the expansive vista of London and revolutionary 
France and the nearly claustrophobic confines of the Manette household. 
and to the extent that it is unable to contain the revolutionary period 
in its entirety (Dickens’s reliance on Carlyle notwithstanding), the novel 
contrasts the expansiveness of the revolution with the concentrated 
intensity of the family unit. The novel’s extremes are a suitable setting 
for the plot points that depend on a lack of discernment on the soci-
etal, familial, and interpersonal levels, for the novel is as much about 
confusion and recognition of identity as it is about revolution. The war 
was caused by extreme class divisions; Marie antoinette’s “let them eat 
cake”—reimagined in the novel through Foulon’s telling “the famished 
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people that they might eat grass” (231)—is the prototypical example of 
the wholesale blindness of one person to the plight of an entire people. 
Utterly unable to imagine the hunger of the poor, her solution is both 
ignorant (which could be ameliorated with education) and solipsis-
tic (which even education cannot undo)—she collapses the poor and 
their problems into her own indulged and rarefied existence. a similar 
dynamic is at work in the novel as it details the difficulty, on the most 
intimate level, of reconciling the other outside of one’s self without col-
lapsing him or them into a mere function of the self.
 it thus makes sense that the courtroom drama early in the novel 
exploits such a blurring between the self and the other—a coup that is 
repeated at the novel’s end, when Carton takes Darnay’s place at the 
guillotine. The two men look alike, but each relates differently to their 
shared appearance. Carton is effective as a lawyer because of his ability 
to understand the inability of those around him to distinguish between 
himself and Darnay, a difference that he deeply feels. Surely any novel 
that depends on mistaken identity or the doppelgänger may make this 
claim, and there are many. But what distinguishes A Tale of Two Cities 
is its amplification of the polarities of the proximity spectrum: it offers 
an explication of both the wages of refusing to recognize the other on a 
global or national scale and the wages of that refusal on a personal scale. 
The former is accessed through the revolution, through the French aris-
tocracy’s inability to apprehend the poor of their country, for example, 
while the latter is accessed even through the minor foibles of secondary 
characters, as in Miss Pross’s insistence on her brother’s goodness or the 
luckless lawyer Stryver’s inability to recognize that Lucie may not think 
him a prize husband.
 in A Tale of Two Cities, the family unit is fraught, serving as the bridge 
to connect the national or institutional with the personal, and inhibiting 
the apperception of the other regardless of whether one embraces or 
rejects kinship. Pross’s devotion to her estranged brother inhibits clear 
vision, but a complete rejection of the familial bond leads to equally 
problematic results, as demonstrated by Darnay’s attempt to distance 
himself from his familial legacy. in one light, his demission may be read 
as a recognition of alterity: Darnay chooses to separate himself from his 
family’s deeds and thus his rightful inheritance as heir, marking him as 
“other.” But even within that stance of disavowal, Charles remains unable 
to understand the implications of this choice for the community left in the 
countryside of his family seat. his ability to conceive of their experience as 
it exists independent of his own is feeble. he means well, collecting “but 
a small installment of taxes, and no rent at all” (242), and he believes he 
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acts on behalf of or for the peasant. Darnay clings to his intention: “he had 
oppressed no man, he had imprisoned no man; he was so far from having 
harshly exacted payment of his dues, that he had relinquished them of 
his own will” (251). yet his renunciation of wealth is seen by the people 
of France as an utter abdication—an abdication of his duty to die—and 
his intention, it turns out, holds no weight in the end.
 Darnay does not recognize the impotence or limitations of his view 
until he sees it defamiliarized, and his first salient encounter with a 
version of reality outside of his own comes not from those people of 
France but from Stryver, his ostensible friend. after Darnay admits that 
he knows the Monseigneur’s heir (though not admitting that he is that 
heir), Stryver replies, “i am sorry for it.” The reason? Says Stryver, “here 
is a fellow, who, infected by the most pestilent and blasphemous code 
of devilry that ever was known, abandoned his property to the vilest 
scum of the earth that ever did murder by wholesale” (249). This belief, 
that Darnay has “abandoned all his worldly goods and position to this 
butcherly mob,” comes as a crushing blow to Darnay, who had thought 
his actions benign, if not actively beneficent. yet even Stryver’s view is 
but one of many; it is the view of the British businessman. The French 
peasantry that calls for Darnay’s death among the deaths of all the émi-
grés and aristocracy has its own variation on that reality, wherein no 
repudiation can counter his bloodline.
 Familiality can inhibit the recognition of alterity because of the 
too-closeness of the bond, but also because family ties may be invoked 
as a means of assigning similarity to a group of individuals. Darnay’s 
predicament evinces the resiliency of the familial bond, as his belief 
that to renounce that bond is effectively to renounce all its concomitant 
problems is shown to be erroneous. his situation also demonstrates 
how brittle ties of loyalty can be. When Darnay functions metonymi-
cally as an instance of the cursed evrémonde race, as he does for 
Mme. Defarge, his death serves as a means to revenge. radicalizing 
the notion of family into race, and including Manette, Lucie, and her 
children among that race and thus destined for destruction, Mme. 
Defarge demonstrates the flaw of the mob mentality that marked much 
revolutionary violence. it also raises questions of class and the deli-
cate balance of recognizing individuality within a regime of wholesale 
blame. The Defarges’ desire for revenge is motivated by a genuine 
hurt, as her family was brutalized by the evrémonde family, and so 
the evrémonde family (its present incarnation being immaterial) must 
pay. Those original crimes committed by the evrémondes—rape, mur-
der, false imprisonment—were themselves the product of a regime 
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that reduced entire classes of people to objects. That tactic of wholesale 
alterity (the poor are inhuman, they lack the rights granted by divine 
intervention to the aristocracy, and thus may be treated as if they were 
animals) is replicated by the Defarges’ revolutionary zeal to eradicate 
the evrémonde race (all issue of the evrémondes are fruit of the evil 
tree, and therefore deserve death).
 among this landscape of ineffective engagement with difference, 
A Tale of Two Cities does depict examples of a more productive version 
of alterity, which leads to greater affective connection, if paradoxically 
through the insistence of alienation. Perhaps it makes sense that within 
the tangled web of unsatisfying or ineffectual familial bonds, two actors 
stand emphatically apart through their insistence on difference and 
refusal of familial bonds. These individuals—Lorry and Carton—share 
no blood relations with the novel’s other characters, yet through and 
because of their insistent self-alienation and refusal to be considered 
family are able to create affective bonds stronger than many of those of 
the novel’s blood relations.
 Lorry, saddled with the charge of relaying often painful information, 
twice frames that information in the form of hypotheticals, abstracting 
himself from the interaction, always unable to reconcile himself and his 
purpose to the affective charge so often caught up with it. in his earliest 
meeting with Lucie, when he must tell her that her father is still alive, he 
cannot articulate his mission. Lucie questions, “‘are you quite a stranger 
to me, sir?’ ‘am i not?’ Mr. Lorry opened his hands, and extended them 
outwards with an argumentative smile” (24). here, when his body lan-
guage indicates familiarity with his open, extended hands and smile, his 
words maintain the ambiguity and estrangement of his position. in these 
moments of declaration or revelation, Lorry reverts to the conditional or 
the interrogatory:
as i was saying; if Monsieur Manette had not died; if he had suddenly 
and silently disappeared; if he had been spirited away; if it had not been 
difficult to guess to what dreadful place, though no art could trace him; 
if he had an enemy in some compatriot who could exercise a privilege 
that i in my own time have known the boldest people afraid to speak 
of in a whisper, across the water there; for instance, the privilege of 
filling up blank forms for the consignment of any one to the oblivion 
of a prison for any length of time; if his wife had implored the king, 
the queen, the court, the clergy, for any tidings of him, and all quite in 
vain;—then the history of your father would have been the history of 
this unfortunate gentleman, the Doctor of Beauvais. (26; emphasis mine)
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The repetition of “if” draws attention to the unrelenting nature of Lorry’s 
abstraction. When feelings may prove too intense for Lorry’s comfort, 
he often employs such rhetorical flourishes to create distance or blunt 
the intensity of emotion. in another typical instance, when Manette 
has taken to cobbling after his daughter’s marriage, Lorry invokes a 
similar strategy to discuss with Manette the uncomfortable business 
of his recovery. Wishing to remove himself from the personal interac-
tion, Lorry prefaces the remarks, in which he poses a story of a man 
in Manette’s position to the doctor for his professional opinion, with 
extensive disclaimers: “i am a mere man of business, and unfit to cope 
with such intricate and difficult matters. i do not possess the kind of 
information necessary; i do not possess the kind of intelligence; i want 
guiding” (208). Only when he has sufficiently distanced himself from 
the uncomfortable reality at hand is Lorry able to move on to asking 
the questions that will illuminate Manette’s opinions on his own case. 
Some critics view Lorry’s insistence on the distinction between matters 
of business and matters of the heart as an instance of Dickens’s tendency 
to fragment the conflicting or ambivalent drives of any person into dis-
tinct characters; noting Lorry’s “fear of emotional involvement, a com-
fortableness with matters of the head rather than of the heart,” Barbara 
Lecker describes the businessman as a “man whose worldly experience 
has been solely limited to commercial dealings, and he finds himself 
disarmed by this new demand on untried capacities.”9
 But a reading that confines Lorry wholly to the world of business 
overlooks the valuable service of his efforts to abstract himself from 
“matters of the heart.” That abstraction ensures others’ comfort as well 
as his own, as Lorry also anticipates the pain that direct questions 
might cause; his detachment facilitates his productive anticipation of 
his friend’s anxieties. Lorry’s assumption is implied in his framing the 
interrogation in hypotheticals: Manette is unable to handle direct ques-
tioning. even though this conclusion is not necessarily dictated by the 
evidence on offer in the text, Lorry insists on it. “Tell me, how does this 
relapse come about?” he asks, with apparent concern, “is there danger of 
another? Could a repetition of it be prevented? how should a repetition 
of it be treated? how does it come about at all? What can i do for my 
friend?” (208).
 This move toward indirect revelation inserts distance between the 
members of the familial unit (in which i include Lorry) not only through 
the form of the interactions but also—and perhaps more evidently—
through Lorry’s repeated self-descriptions as being “merely” a machine 
of business.10 Through this insistence, Lorry manifests an anxiety that is 
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latent for the other characters, for in spite of their shared love, the rela-
tionships within the Manette/Darnay family are assailed from all sides: 
the mother is dead, the father’s pain is a mystery that nevertheless deter-
mines the family’s movements and moods, the husband’s background 
and real name are kept hidden from his wife, the brother is alienated 
from the sister. Often, characters work to repress or overcome those 
barriers, with little success. an interesting economy in the novel is that 
those who are most outside of the family, who insist on their alienation, 
detachment, and lack of ability to engage affectively, are those who act in 
ways that show extraordinary understanding of the needs and desires of 
other characters. Lorry is one of these to be sure, and the other is Sydney 
Carton.
 Carton’s embracing of his alienation from others, while tiresome for 
those around him, nevertheless underpins his position as the novel’s 
greatest empathic actor. Like Lorry, he often refuses to admit that he is 
like others, a caring, feeling person and not a machine. and yet it is in 
contrast to other characters that Carton’s own character becomes most 
clear, born of his embrace of alterity. Whereas Stryver serves as the foil 
that exposes Darnay to himself, Carton serves as Stryver’s foil. When 
Stryver acts like a blind idiot when seeking Lucie’s hand in marriage, 
Carton is able to see what Stryver cannot: Lucie would not regard the 
offer in the same generous light that Stryver does. Carton’s uncanny 
ability to recognize the limitations of others’ imagination is predicated 
on his understanding that you cannot know someone else. Others, Car-
ton knows, imagine that they do understand the intentions of those 
around them. his gift is not exactly that he knows what others think, but 
rather that he can identify when other people assume to know more than 
they do. The distinction is subtle; hence it becomes important to distin-
guish Carton’s behavior from others’ in the novel. if Darnay’s attempts 
to distance himself from his family are ineffectual, Carton’s insistence 
on utter alterity, the complete distancing of himself from those in his 
life, may seem overfraught or overdetermined. yet Carton’s behavior 
leads to the true beneficence that Darnay’s actions lacked. in Dickens’s 
telling, the distinction seems to rest on a keener appreciation of differ-
ence. it is this skill that renders Carton a “jackal” in the courtroom. he 
can recognize, and thus capitalize on, the prejudices and predilections 
of those around him, even if he does not share them. By insisting on the 
divisions between himself and others, insisting what he is not in relation 
to Lucie’s family and his own desire that is bound up with that fam-
ily, Carton nevertheless manages to eke out an empathic extension that 
exceeds that of most other characters.
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 What, then, does the novel endorse, if Darnay’s good intentions do 
not hold up, but the misanthropic, brooding alcoholic becomes heroic 
because of his profound insistence on not joining a family? if recognition 
of alterity is required before empathic extension can occur, a landscape 
devoid of appreciation of the sovereignty of the individual would likely 
indicate a limitation of empathy, especially altruistic empathy. indeed, 
the novel and the revolution itself are peppered with examples—the 
revolt of the French poor against the aristocracy provides an ideal land-
scape for the novel’s events not only because of the drama inherent in 
the historical events, but also because the sweeping historical move-
ment depended on a complicated relationship between the needs of 
entire classes and the needs of the individual. in the French sections of 
the novel, metonymic or synecdochical substitution of individuals for 
a class or type of person is treated with particular disdain.11 yet those 
who insist on their difference create a space in which they can act in full 
consideration or on behalf of the other.
The Lessons of Great expectations
in A Tale of Two Cities, forms of familial bonds frame much of the action 
of the plot as well as the variations of intersubjectivity depicted. The 
novel’s most heroic actors are explicitly not members of the central fam-
ily. These characters, including Lorry and Carton, work to evacuate the 
presumptions of knowledge engendered by the familial bond. From the 
first page of Great Expectations, family itself is evacuated of meaning and 
rendered essentially an invalid construction: mothers are solely mothers 
“by adoption”12 and fathers are practically nonexistent. yet the absence 
of family ties does not ease the burden of a learned engagement with 
alterity. One way that Great Expectations demonstrates the necessity for 
such engagement is, in fact, its emphasis on the process of learning. 
Learning to read serves as one paradigm of broader knowledge acquisi-
tion, as it shapes and determines the ways individuals can access the 
other. When no familial bond originates relationships, they are instead 
predicated on impression or expectation; forms of understanding that 
are dependent on the construction of meaning from the apprehension 
of the external.
 Learning to read is bound up with class and social awareness, but 
having one skill does not guarantee having the other. a disconnect 
between book learning and its practical application is an early and per-
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sistent theme (and a well-documented one13), and the novel insists that 
reading differs from the acquisition of careful discernment. Matthew 
Pocket, for example, whose home and family are perpetual disasters of 
disorder, was “a most delightful lecturer on domestic economy, and his 
treatises on the management of children and servants were considered 
the very best text-books on those themes” (271). That distinction is lost 
on Pip, who too easily merges education and class, seeing Joe’s illiteracy 
as “a pity,” thinking “when i came into my property and was able to do 
something for Joe, it would have been much more agreeable if he had 
been better qualified for a rise in station” (148). Pip’s self-centeredness 
is marked by premature assumptions that he understands. Unable to see 
the imprint of himself upon his readings of everyone else, he fails to 
recognize their independence from his existence: Pip does not pity Joe’s 
lack of education because of the limitations it means for Joe’s life, but 
rather because it renders Joe less fit for Pip’s desire.
 Distinctions between education, class, and status are made more 
difficult for Pip because his inculcation into gentlemanhood seems to 
coincide with the refinement of his education. yet while his taste for 
reading increases, his ability to discern or judge based on that reading 
does not. nor is he able to identify his passion within the many possi-
bilities that are now open to him. after he leaves Mr. Pocket’s tutelage, 
he notes, “notwithstanding my inability to settle to anything,—which 
i hope arose out of the restless and incomplete tenure on which i held 
my means,—i had a taste for reading, and read regularly so many hours 
a day” (312–13). in this way, he is very much like richard Carstone 
of Bleak House, whose most intense interactions with the law and its 
paperwork lend him no fuller comprehension of its mechanisms. These 
readers assign meaning to words on a page—reading in its most literal 
sense—but do not derive meaning from the pages in their entirety; they 
read lines, but cannot read between them.
 variegations in scrutability and education are continually bound up 
in the plot, making clear to the reader the difficulty of extricating one 
from the other. For example, upon arriving in London, Magwitch greets 
Pip with expectations of a performance of gentlemanly attributes, and 
foremost among them is the role of books in the apartment and in Pip’s 
life. Pip’s “fine and beautiful” linen and his dandy-making clothes are 
trumped by his books. Magwitch enthuses over the number of volumes 
Pip owns, “mounting up, on their shelves, by the hundreds,” but also 
over their difficulty and inaccessibility, signs that the convict reads 
as indicators of class. Comprehension is immaterial: “you shall read 
’em to me, dear boy! and if they’re in foreign languages wot i don’t 
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understand, i shall be just as proud as if i did” (320). But Magwitch’s 
relationship with reading cannot be reduced only to a signifier of social 
status, and in describing his own education, it becomes clear that read-
ing functions for him as more than a sign of class; it is also an indicator 
of humanity, allowing for the building of connections between people:
Tramping, begging, thieving, working sometimes when i could, [ . . . ] 
a bit of a poacher, a bit of a laborer, a bit of a wagoner, a bit of a hay-
maker, a bit of a hawker, a bit of most things that don’t pay and lead 
to trouble, i got to be a man. a deserting soldier in a Traveller’s rest, 
what lay hid up to the chin under a lot of taturs, learnt me to read; 
and a travelling Giant what signed his name at a penny a time learnt 
me to write. (347)14
Learning to read and write appear at the end of Magwitch’s narrative 
of his evolution, following a variety of odd jobs—a bit of this, a bit of 
that. This adaptability, learning trades enough to scrape by, is set in 
opposition to Pip’s scholarly pursuits, which render him essentially 
inflexible and filled with knowledge that has little practical application. 
Textual literacy becomes, for Pip, instead of a means to understanding, 
an impediment to the multiple kinds of reading he must learn to do. he 
must learn to adapt his book learning to situations where it might better 
enlighten or enrich his comprehension of events and people outside of 
books.
 Before he learns that lesson in adaptation effectively (and whether he 
does by the novel’s end is debatable), Pip’s ability to interpret nontextual 
signs and actions is notoriously limited. Miscommunications arise comi-
cally when Mrs. Joe is confined to her bed after she has been attacked. 
Without speech, she must make her desires known through a slate and 
Pip must interpret her intended meaning from her murky signifiers: 
“The administration of mutton instead of medicine, the substitution of 
Tea for Joe, and the baker for bacon, were among the mildest of my own 
mistakes” (122).15 These particular substitutions lead to mild mistakes 
indeed; but substitution also figures in Pip’s greatest mistakes, which 
arise from substituting himself in place of the other.
 interpretation, or rather misinterpretation, delivers its most dev-
astating consequences in Pip’s continual misreading of those around 
him, estella in particular. Pip regularly assesses a person or situation 
and draws incorrect conclusions: he believes Miss havisham to be his 
benefactor despite repeated reminders from Jaggers that the facts do not 
bear out the conclusion, and he is convinced Biddy (who, as an excellent, 
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“self-forgetful” reader, is the first to interpret accurately Mrs. Joe’s slate-
written symbols) is “grudging” and “envious” of his good fortune. Both 
mistakes have grave consequences; as is true throughout the writing of 
Dickens as well as eliot and hardy, misreading people is most debilitat-
ing when it results from a refusal to accord the other alterity.
 Pip seems to know that his interpretation of people depends on his 
relationship with them; when estella protests that Pip will forget her 
soon enough, he rejoins: “Out of my thoughts! you are a part of my 
existence, part of myself. you have been in every line i have ever read, 
since i first came here, the rough, common boy whose poor heart you 
wounded even then” (364). yet he cannot allow that the influence of his 
adoration of estella has a real effect on his ability to discern meaning 
from the signs—or direct statements—she offers. This is most clear in 
estella’s continual assertions that she is not what Pip believes her to be, 
and his refusal to take in that fact: “‘you must know,’ said estella, conde-
scending to me as a brilliant and beautiful woman might, ‘that i have no 
heart—if that has anything to do with my memory,’ i got through some 
jargon to the effect that i took the liberty of doubting that. That i knew 
better. That there could be no such beauty without it” (237). Pip insists 
that he knows estella better than she knows herself. The terseness of the 
last two sentences indicates the narrator’s distance. The older Pip, from a 
better-informed and reformed position, can see the folly of those conclu-
sions, but in Pip’s youth, his schooling did little to counter his predilec-
tion to believe in his idealized estella rather than the living, empirically 
existent woman who spoke to him. Despite her protestations, Pip can 
only stubbornly insist on his incorrect reading of her: “When should i 
awaken the heart within her, that was mute and sleeping now?” (244). 
here, Peter Brooks notes, Pip “is claiming natural authority for what is 
in fact conventional, arbitrary, and dependent on interpretation.”16 and 
Pip’s interpretation depends to its detriment on his desire. When Pip 
says, near the novel’s end, that his life’s been a “blind and a thankless 
one,” the blindness has been on display throughout the narrative: he 
refused to see what was in front of his eyes all along.
 it is worth a moment to detour from Pip’s centrality to consider how 
another character may be understood if one considers the recognition of 
the alterity of the other as a central motivation of empathic extension. 
estella’s insight, which Pip characterizes as condescension, can in that 
light be read as a compassionate attempt to grant Pip independence 
from her desire. Pip routinely mistakes estella’s feelings or meaning, 
but estella is able to assess Pip’s thoughts and motivations accurately, 
often attempting a corrective intervention. She does so on more than one 
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occasion (e.g., when Pip chides her for flirting with Drummle and not 
him, she asks him with a “fixed and serious” expression, “Do you want 
me, then, to deceive and entrap you?” [311]). What can account for this 
insight? One might argue that she demonstrates a Smithean imagination 
about Pip, understanding his desire by imagining what she might want 
in his position. But if estella demonstrates the mechanism of sympathy 
that Smith described, she also revives the predicate to sympathy that 
Smith described: she is more acutely aware of one’s ultimate inability to 
know “what other men feel.”17 estella was raised to function as a proxy 
for havisham’s thwarted desires, and her survival depended on her 
ability to carve out alterity under those circumstances, to individuate 
herself as a unique person even as she was aware that to do so explicitly 
would draw censure. Pip, on the other hand, was forced to feel as an 
other throughout his youth, and sought to overcome any innate sense of 
alterity rather than to engage it. Though she maintains a self-conscious 
distance about Miss havisham’s intentions for herself, estella appreci-
ates (through that very detachment) that Pip has willingly accepted the 
role Miss havisham designed for him. in this way, estella—much like 
Biddy—understands that Pip’s feelings for her are different from hers 
for him. Pip, unable to replicate that movement, dismisses estella’s 
comments too easily, reducing them to the work of the coquette, rather 
than realizing that estella is anticipating or attempting to mitigate Pip’s 
desire (a fact that is not undermined even if the cruelty of her comments 
indicates her own desire).
 When Pip asserts that estella had been in every line he’d ever read, 
it would have been more accurate to say that his desire had been in every 
line; he had been in every line. That tendency extends to his interactions 
with other characters, and is on particular display in two instances 
when Pip sees himself defamiliarized. in both scenes, Pip reacts with 
horror to the speech acts or revelations of the two father figures: Joe 
and Magwitch. But just as Pip (Philip Pirrup) is a version of his birth 
father (Philip Pirrup), he is also a version of each of these two fathers. 
Some read his responses to Joe as the shame of Joe’s persistent lowness 
and inability to adapt or change or learn, thus putting the onus on Joe’s 
innate inability.18 in fact, Pip’s response is more likely a transference of 
his own shame, as can be seen when Miss havisham makes Pip the gift 
of money to bind his apprenticeship. in this moment, Pip has been in 
her company for some time and has become accustomed to her pecu-
liarities and to the peculiarities of Satis house. Through this interaction 
with Miss havisham and with estella, he has altered his notions of 
propriety, politeness, and station, and concurrently developed a sense 
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of shame about himself, a sense he lacked prior to his introduction to 
Satis house. When Joe meets Miss havisham, it is near the end of Pip’s 
engagement with the residents of Satis house. Pip, now familiar with 
havisham’s ways, is mortified by Joe’s behavior toward the woman, 
behavior that is undoubtedly motivated by the shock of weirdness 
to which Pip is now accustomed. During this encounter, Pip is in a 
position to witness a repetition of his own first performance from the 
perspective of his relative enlightenment. his horror and shame arise, 
then, equally from recognizing the mistakes and awkwardness of his 
own first encounter at Satis house through more knowing eyes. Joe’s 
mistakes were Pip’s mistakes; Pip’s new viewpoint was then Miss hav-
isham’s and estella’s. Pip’s horror is thus a form of self-recognition, and 
suggests more about his self-conception than about Joe’s poor breeding 
or ill manners. if Pip hates Joe for his embarrassing behavior, it is a 
transference of self-hatred.
 The same relationship occurs during the scene when Magwitch 
reveals that he is Pip’s benefactor. Magwitch has sought to make Pip a 
gentleman through money he has given Pip anonymously; Pip is hor-
rified at the prospect that a low man believes he can, through the gift 
of money alone, buy status. Pip is shattered because his illusions of 
being intended for estella are shattered, but that discovery would lead 
to disappointment, not disgust and revulsion. his visceral response to 
Magwitch is more likely the result of Pip’s recognition of his own folly. 
he can now see, from his vantage of greater experience and exterior-
ized from the position of belief, how faulty Magwitch’s proposition is, 
how flawed the idea that any money, earned any way, may purchase 
station or class. But recognizing that fact in light of Magwitch’s pres-
ence illuminates the more piercing, personal truth: that Pip anxiously, 
readily, and joyfully accepted that same proposition. To then recognize 
that Magwitch made the same assumption implicates Pip in Magwitch’s 
image—not because of any obligation to the convict, and not because of 
any of Magwitch’s actions—but because Pip wanted to believe it to be 
true as much as Magwitch did. again, Pip’s recoil is the recoil at his own 
folly, as reflected in Magwitch.
 Pip thus accords a repulsive alterity to those who repulse him and 
refuses it to those who seduce him. Learning to overcome that tendency 
leads Pip to more productive relationships, with himself and with oth-
ers. Through the trope of literacy, Great Expectations explicates the role of 
the individual in recognizing alterity: it is a syntax that can be learned, 
but such learning requires a pupil willing to extricate himself from the 
textbook.
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The Invisibility of Text in Bleak House
apprehension and appreciation of the other are made difficult by the 
familial bond, as shown in A Tale of Two Cities. even in the absence of 
family ties, achieving fluency in such recognition is not easily gained, 
as shown in Great Expectations. Similar distillations are more difficult in 
Bleak House. it was written before A Tale of Two Cities and Great Expecta-
tions, and in it the terms of encounters with alterity are not so easily 
defined by blood or by faculty. in this “document about the interpreta-
tion of documents,”19 reading, writing, parentage, language, and fidelity 
are inextricable.20 The role of writing is unquestionably important in the 
novel, so much so that many suggest that Dickens’s point in Bleak House 
is to represent the distinction between the hard, mechanical world of 
the law and the potential of individual feeling to ameliorate the harm 
caused by the law. David Cowles argues that Dickens privileges “deeper 
human truths” as opposed to the world of facts defined by Chancery; 
these “inner, human truths,” Cowles argues, “make a character—and 
presumably the reader—a better person, that is, more sensitive to others’ 
needs, more loving.”21 if there is indeed a deeper human truth advo-
cated by the novel, it is—i argue—tied inextricably to the harm arising 
from the refusal to acknowledge alterity. This limitation is meted out by 
the novel’s very structure, where esther, though central to her own nar-
rative and the fabula, is never mentioned in the third-person narrative. 
She is “absent from half the book,”22 to put it one way—the third-person 
narration seems not to know esther at all. if Lady Dedlock’s fate offers 
a stark cautionary tale, it is because her character reveals what may be 
lost (what is lost to her, lacking the interference of a Carton or the time to 
grow allowed to Pip) when an individual is unable to grant a thorough 
separateness of feeling and experience to those around her. This fate, her 
fate, is bounded both by words and by her kindred.23
 as was the case in A Tale of Two Cities, Bleak House’s minor characters 
function as reductions of the more difficult and complex relationships at 
work elsewhere in the novel.24 Mrs. Jellyby famously serves as one such 
figure, her telescopic philanthropy showing her willingness to embrace 
the very different other, the african distanced physically and culturally 
from her. her own children’s desperate need of attention, affection, and 
care, however, goes unheeded. Mrs. Jellyby’s usual state is to be “very 
busy,” her “whole time” taken up with the african project: “it involves 
me in correspondence with public bodies and with private individuals 
anxious for the welfare of their species all over the country. i am happy 
to say it is advancing.”25 it is easy to see Jellyby’s characterization as 
an indictment of such philanthropic endeavors and the self-satisfaction 
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they inspire, due in large part to the protection against exposure to 
true pain, poverty, and hunger afforded by distance. But in terms of the 
novel, the critique of the effects of their mother’s devotion to her cause 
on Caddy, Peepy, and the other Jellybys is a much heartier indictment 
than the critique of the abstract notion of telescopic philanthropy itself, 
or the imperialism that encourages it. a mother who can “see nothing 
nearer than africa” (52) is sadly inattentive toward her own children 
and blind to the results of that neglect.26 Caddy is regularly covered 
in the ink of her mother’s enterprise, and must eke out an existence 
outside of that charity work; and she does, eschewing education or 
the educated in favor of a dance teacher whose father’s pretensions to 
aristocracy are as absurd as Mrs. Jellyby’s pretensions to humanitarian-
ism. Mrs. Jellyby can accommodate the radical difference of the masses 
of african poor rather than the individual other in her own family. as 
in A Tale of Two Cities, where the French aristocracy exhibited a willed 
blindness to the poor within their own country, Mrs. Jellyby embraces 
the plight of the very different while the needs of those in her own 
backyard, so to speak, are unnoticed and unmet. Bruce robbins, in his 
analysis of Jellyby’s “telescopic philanthropy,” suggests that esther’s 
version of philanthropy is the novel’s imperfect alternative to Jellyby’s 
distanced efforts; by accepting a face-to-face engagement with Jo, rob-
bins notes, esther “literally loses her face” to smallpox.27 in his reading, 
the enforced distance (what might also be called detachment) of Jarn-
dyce or even Skimpole is thus, in some ways, preferable to the direct 
intervention of esther.
 Proximity is not the only variable for such concern. i am interested 
more in the individual’s conception of intersubjectivity than with con-
ceptions of social responsibility or philanthropy engendered by percep-
tions of closeness and duty. Jellyby’s relationship to her african project 
is interesting because it illuminates her alienation from her own family: 
she is simultaneously too close to them and too detached from them. 
Lady Dedlock is consumed with one much closer to home, and her 
inability to conceive of her husband outside of her overdetermined self-
conception leads to results that are even more disastrous than the plights 
of the Jellyby children. Like Michael henchard in hardy’s Casterbridge, 
Lady Dedlock has so defined herself by her own history that she cannot 
imagine that others would respond to it differently than she does. To be 
sure, her self-definition is built upon a denial of her past, but the sheer 
affective charge of that denial ensures that the past is ever part of the 
present. That it is a site of misery and shame is, for her, an unalterable 
truth. This truth speaks to Lady Dedlock’s acceptance of shame as a part 
of her self-conception, but also as a readable, indisputable existent.
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 equally indisputable is the misery that this shame ultimately causes 
her. The novel suggests that her death was unnecessary; her husband 
forgave her and her daughter sought her, outcomes that were inconceiv-
able to her. Lady Dedlock’s internalized shame and the intense effort she 
musters to repress it seem to arise from a devotion to the propriety so 
prized by her husband and her own devotion to the image of dispas-
sionate cultivation that others associate with her character. Curiously, 
it also results in a meager, ungenerous view of those she loves, as she 
imagines that they would choose not to forgive her sins, should they be 
discovered. it is a view that demonstrates her entrapment in her own 
interiority. She cannot conceive that Sir Leicester, a man who loves her, 
would be able to forgive her what she cannot forgive herself. She can-
not imagine his conception of her being anything other than her self-
conception.
 Lady Dedlock’s actions are determined by her anticipation of what 
others will think, the narrative voice adopting her own anticipation: 
“her shame will be published—may be spreading while she thinks about 
it” (854). She is not wrong in her expectation. When her past becomes 
known, the gossipmongers do consume the news from her estate: she is, 
in town, “for several hours the topic of the age, the feature of the cen-
tury” (886). Dickens blunts the power of the intense focus by ironically 
emphasizing its brevity, showing that even major tempests blow over 
quickly. So while Lady Dedlock anticipates the intensity of the response, 
she cannot imagine that her shame, like all “features of the century,” will 
quickly blow over in the minds of others; in her mind, that shame has 
been hers eternally (“the thunderbolt so long foreseen by her” [854]), 
and she conceives of her public condemnation as having the same power 
and same duration as her private condemnation. in this moment, she too 
lacks the words to communicate her own fear and dread: “The horror 
that is upon her, is unutterable” (854). This Dickensian insistence on the 
ineffability of a feeling, that which cannot be communicated and thus 
cannot be understood, is shown to be the real horror of her situation: 
the problem is not that the horror itself is so strong, but that in feeling 
that it cannot be communicated, that no one could understand that 
horror and thus calm it or neutralize it. The speaker ceases to believe 
that communication is possible, that amelioration is possible, and that 
human connection is possible. and in this moment human connection is 
most desperately needed.28 To feel the impossibility of communication 
without making an effort to reach outside of herself, however futile, 
Lady Dedlock excludes all possibilities of response to her, and condemns 
herself: “There is no escape but in death. hunted, she flies” (855).
mysteries of Dickensian literacies  /   45
 Lady Dedlock’s flight demonstrates the hopelessness that defines 
her comprehension of her situation (which is not at all the same as her 
situation itself). as her life was built upon controlling the information 
others had about her, she is unable to recognize that the revelation of 
her unknown past could lead to any reaction other than the one she 
most fears: she cannot imagine that alterity can itself be predicate to a 
positive, enriching interpersonal engagement. This tangle is problematic 
throughout Bleak House, not only for the characters but also for readers 
who expect resolution through unification or integration. Carolyn Dever 
notes that the scene when esther is holding her dead mother “should 
be the most profoundly integrated moment of the novel,” but is instead 
“among the most disturbing” because of esther’s discomfort with being 
at once an “agent of forgiveness” but also at the mercy of the will of her 
dead mother.29 Why should this be a moment of integration? esther is 
discovering her mother, but also discovering that she is not her mother, a 
realization that might be painful but is ultimately necessary for esther’s 
movement into selfhood. The exclamation that Dever cites, “it frightened 
me to see her at my feet,” articulates esther’s sense of ambivalence: in 
the moment of discovering a connection she so longed for, esther must 
also be surprised by the impossibility of that connection.
 a great tragedy of Bleak House is that through Lady Dedlock’s 
attempts to control entirely the knowledge that others had about her-
self—a stance that depends on the belief that she can know entirely what 
others know—she renders moments of growth and affection impossible. 
Though some of Lady Dedlock’s anxiety about the reaction to the revela-
tion of her past was founded, for her husband, to whom she mattered 
most, her past mattered least, an outcome Lady Dedlock could never 
have imagined. Sir Leicester also recognizes what others think about 
his wife, but notes that response only in order to register his dissention 
from those points of view. Characterizing her departure as a mere “mis-
understanding” that “deprives” him of his “Lady’s society,” Leicester 
insists to those in witness that her standing in the household and in his 
heart stands unabated. his speech on the topic, all the more lucid for 
its following a period of shock-induced muteness, is—as the narrator 
notes—“honourable, manly, and true”:
i am on unaltered terms with Lady Dedlock. That i assert no cause 
whatever of complaint against her. That i have ever had the strongest 
affection for her, and that i retain it undiminished[ . . . ] My lady is too 
high in position, too handsome, too accomplished, too superior in most 
respects to the best of those by whom she is surrounded, not to have 
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her enemies and traducers, i dare say. Let it be known to them, as i 
make it known to you, that being of sound mind, memory, and under-
standing, i revoke no disposition i have made in her favour. i abridge 
nothing i have ever bestowed upon her. i am on unaltered terms with 
her and i recall—having the full power to do it if i were so disposed, 
as you see—no act i have done for her advantage and happiness. (895)
his speech is gallant in its elegance, but it is not the first example of 
Leicester’s attitude toward his wife after he has learned of her past. The 
first iteration of his response, while still inhibited by the fit that felled 
him, was a mere three words, written on a slate for inspector Bucket to 
see: “Full forgiveness. Find—” (858–59). here Sir Leicester, of all people, 
exhibits an ability to know precisely what Lady Dedlock’s fear will be: 
that she will be shamed and judged and that he will feel the thunderbolt 
“so unforeseen by him” (854) such that it will destroy his ability to love 
her. he immediately and correctly identifies this reaction and moves to 
forestall it, both in Lady Dedlock herself and in those around him who 
may expect otherwise from him.30
“It is wonderful to me”
Before concluding, i will take a moment to turn to one of Dickens’s 
works most associated with the production of active sympathy—and 
most associated with the potential for texts to encourage altruistic action 
resulting from readerly sympathy—his “Christmas Carol.”
 audrey Jaffe, following adam Smith, conceives of Dickens’s sym-
pathetic project in terms of the instantiation of spectacle. Describing “a 
Christmas Carol,” she notes, “as a model of socialization through spec-
tatorship, the narrative posits the visual as a means towards recapturing 
one’s lost or alienated self—and becoming one’s best self,” a process 
thoroughly grounded in the reader’s identification with the text: “That 
identification accounts for the story’s apparently limitless capacity for 
transformation.”31 Jaffe acknowledges that the transformative power 
of the story is connected to its ability to commodify its themes and its 
characters; she writes that the story “constitutes itself as an endlessly 
sympathetic commodity, its variable surface reflecting an unchanging 
reality to embody readers’ and spectators’ desires.”32
 if the power of the “Carol” is in the spectacle of the misery of the 
Cratchits, then that complete and easy commodification is what makes 
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“a Christmas Carol” more of a fairy tale and less of a realist text. The 
turning of person into spectacle, an act that fundamentally denies the 
human-ness of that person, is perhaps the last sympathetic act possible. 
To the extent that such spectacle encourages empathy, it’s a cheapened 
version, one predicated on the extension of one’s own desire or concern, 
and ameliorating it (as Scrooge does, as readers might) simply means 
shutting up the representation, turning the human other (and not the 
text or its theme) into an object of the self. But something more also hap-
pens within the “Carol,” and certainly within Dickens’s longer fiction. 
Paul Saint-amour offers a compelling reinterpretation of the affective 
power of the “Carol,” writing that the real moral crux of the tale occurs 
through Scrooge’s unwillingness and inability to look upon what might 
be his own corpse. The encounter awakening Scrooge’s sensibilities is 
not the consumable spectacle of the Cratchits as being his equal, his fel-
low travelers in life, but rather the encounter with the instantiation of 
himself outside of himself: the self defamiliarized, made other.33 it is a 
spectacle that Scrooge refuses, in doing so recognizing that as death is 
one unknowable instantiation of the self, so too is the human other. via 
his refusal to remove the veil covering the corpse, Saint-amour writes, 
Scrooge says, “Let me not pretend to domesticate my death; Let the 
future remain both unforeclosed and undisclosed, its face hidden; Let 
me recognize others, for all that they may be untranslatably alien, and 
for all that i may owe them a responsibility without limit, as ‘fellow-
passengers to the grave.’”34 it is this engagement, this realization of the 
things that cannot be commodified and which must remain insistently 
beyond identification, that defines Scrooge’s movement into action.
 in the works considered in this chapter, which are representative 
of Dickens’s oeuvre, a pattern emerges. The heroic actors surprise. The 
“wonder” that marked Dickens’s descriptions of his own life when 
it was most incomprehensible to him is revived in these characters, 
whose actions seem similarly inexplicable, and in many ways, wonder-
ful. Carton, Lorry, estella, Sir Leicester, Scrooge: those described by 
themselves or by the novels as worthless, mere machines, narcissistic, 
and proud, are nevertheless able to appreciate the fundamental and ulti-
mate difference of the other, an appreciation that allows for action. it is 
often imperfect action, not always altruistic (the young estella is a good 
example, knowing via their face-to-face encounter precisely how to most 
pain the young Pip), but their movements toward empathic extension 
suggest that their insistence on alterity is necessary to facilitate move-
ment outside of oneself. These characters’ encounters with the limits of 
themselves are reflected in Dickens’s writing: the compulsive insistence 
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on ineffability from a hand capable of producing voluminous words; the 
closest bonds of family shown to inhibit connection; the terms of reading 
shown to inhibit understanding; the master character-maker admitting 
that every man is a mystery to every other. Through such admissions 
and bindings, these texts replicate the working toward recognition that 
defines the struggles toward connection described within.
“Book Second” of Adam Bede (1859) begins and ends with depictions of 
reading and writing. its final chapter, “The night-School and the School-
master,” details both the promise and the difficulty that the people of 
hayslope face in their quest for education. in church, they do not hold 
prayer books because “not one of them could read,”2 but there is a 
palpable desire among the common workers to learn despite very basic 
challenges. Bartle Massey’s schoolhouse offers them the opportunity, in 
the evening and after long days of physically exhausting work. Learn-
ing to read is no less exhausting. Bill, a young stone-sawyer, “found a 
reading lesson in words of one syllable a harder matter to deal with than 
the hardest stone he had ever had to saw,” because he was unable to 
discern differences between letters, noting that they are so “‘uncommon 
alike, there was no tellin’ ’em one from another’” (253). But Bill, and 
others like him, continues to try, and the narrator identifies this slow 
process of becoming literate as a humanizing act: “it was,” the narrator 
remarks, “almost as if three rough animals were making humble efforts 
to learn how they might become human” (255). in the chapter that opens 
“Book Second,” “in Which the Story Pauses a Little,” the authorial voice 
famously interrupts the story to justify her creation, commanding that 
artists not exclude from their works the “common, coarse people” who 
populate the world. For art to portray that world more completely, art-
ists must change their subject choices, and readers and viewers must 
alter their expectations. in this extranarrative disquisition, eliot implores 
readers to be patient and charitable, to expand their understanding of 
art, and, by doing so, to expand their sympathies: “the way in which i 
have come to the conclusion that human nature is loveable,” she writes, 
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“has been by living a great deal among people more or less common-
place and vulgar” (201).
 The link between eliot’s entreaty and Bartle Massey’s work in the 
schoolroom may seem obvious: in eliot’s vision, readers of Adam Bede 
are like Massey’s pupils, who, through their efforts to read, are working 
to expand their own humanity. Adam Bede exposes readers to the “com-
monplace and vulgar,” and the exposure will expand their sympathies 
and make them more tolerant of their fellow men. That simple parallel 
may comfort some readers (who think that they are being edified merely 
by reading a novel) and frustrate critics (who protest eliot’s pedagogical 
or pedantic overtones). But surely such a conclusion is too simple, for 
it overlooks what eliot so strongly emphasizes throughout Adam Bede: 
learning is a difficult, mostly slow, and often painful process, made all 
the more difficult by instances in which readers are lulled into believing 
that meaning is self-evident. all versions of discernment, it seems, entail 
a learning curve. even “nature’s syntax,”3 which ought to precede any 
academic refinement, can be grossly misleading if read too hastily or 
without careful deliberation. Just ask adam Bede. adam’s misinterpreta-
tion of hetty Sorrel’s beauty is costly, but he is not the only poor reader 
of “nature’s syntax” in eliot’s oeuvre.
 Perhaps more so than any of the other writers addressed in this study, 
eliot describes literature’s potential to expand her readers’ largesse with-
in her prose, and the mechanisms for that growth into other-awareness 
are mirrored in the repetitions of narrative dynamics throughout her 
works. Focusing on Adam Bede and Middlemarch, this chapter addresses 
eliot’s approach to representing intersubjectivity, an approach typified in 
these novels (one early and one late) but one that is evident throughout 
her works. i am concerned with interpersonal relationships depicted 
within her novels and via their form, as opposed to readerly engagement 
with empathic extension. This focus distinguishes my readings from 
those of others who address the ways that eliot engages her reader in 
the empathic or sympathetic process, including those by rachel ablow, 
ellen argyros, and Suzanne Keen. Certainly eliot was concerned with 
the effect her novels might have on their audience, but if the edification 
is to occur through exposure, then surely it is important to understand 
how empathic process is depicted within the novels.
 Unlike Dickens’s depictions of other-awareness, eliot’s works empha-
size the process of becoming. Whereas Dickens’s characters often either 
are or are not other-aware, a distinction that seems to depend on an 
individual’s intrinsic nature, eliot’s depictions build on Dickens’s by 
rendering this awareness as the result of a process. eliot confirms not 
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only that the encounter with the radically different other is a startling, 
sometimes painful process, but also that it is not a static encounter. For 
eliot, engaging in the development of other-awareness offers the poten-
tial for growth; connection through language becomes possible only 
after the self recognizes the other as ultimately unknowable. To be sure, 
eliot’s plots are determined by the ability of characters to navigate their 
own identities, but they are also determined by their ability to navigate 
alterity. eliot’s oeuvre is populated by unfulfilled lovers, ignored family 
members, misunderstood and misunderstanding protagonists, each of 
whom undergoes a version of adam’s struggle to recognize hetty inde-
pendent of his idealized vision of her. essential to interpersonal literacy 
is learning one’s limits and understanding the limits of learning.
 The recognition of difference instantiates one such limit. as is the 
case in Adam Bede, eliot’s statements about the goals of art often stress 
the potential for expanding fellow feeling. These moments are undoubt-
edly well-trodden ground for the critic, but it is worth revisiting some—
if only briefly—to note that the emphasis might fall somewhere other 
than those places that garner most attention. eliot’s letter to Charles 
Bray in which she argues that art must “enlarge men’s sympathies,” 
for example, is remarkable for her insistence that the expansion occurs 
toward those who are not like oneself but instead differ from oneself, “in 
everything but the broad fact of being suffering, erring human beings.”4 
The distinction is important. Too often in art, comfortable idealizations 
intrude upon the actual, impeding the recognition of alterity rather than 
facilitating it. Such idealizations are built upon the familiar and the non-
threatening; they propose that what is known or desired is broadly rep-
resentative of what is. What must also be embraced is the possibility of 
the unknown. a lack of knowledge may be mitigated by learning based 
on what is apart-from-the-self, but for that to happen one must move 
beyond easy identifications or assumptions. J. hillis Miller astutely notes 
that in eliot’s works, those easy identifications or assumptions are often 
predicated on thinking of the other via analogy of the self, what Miller 
calls “figurative displacements,” along with the inherently solipsist posi-
tion of the self as the center of everything and everyone surrounding.5
 eliot’s most consistent means of representing the movement outside 
of identification into a perception of difference rest on describing the 
limitations of what is known or what is knowable; assume you know 
too much and risk misunderstanding or shutting down the possibility 
of genuine empathic response. Consider the opening of “The natural 
history of German Life.” eliot contrasts an individual having limited 
knowledge of the railways with someone who has an intimate familiarity; 
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their relative knowledge determines the richness of “the range of images” 
called up by the mention of the word “railways.” When human beings 
are the focus of concern, both individually and collectively, the stakes 
are much higher, and the epistemological certainty that one might have 
about the railways, for instance, is disrupted. yet the easy dependence 
on idealized versions of fellow man is tantalizing for artists and their 
audience precisely because it provides a sense of certainty—regardless 
of how unwarranted—and both groups embrace artistically influenced 
and often euphemistic ideals of the rural poor or other groups of people 
with whom they lack intimate familiarity.6 Understanding or interpret-
ing others is made more complicated when one cannot even see them 
clearly; art may thus cloud interpretation, rendering viewers less literate, 
less aware of the other’s lived experience:
Only a total absence of acquaintance and sympathy with our peasantry, 
would give a moment’s popularity to such a picture as “Cross Purposes” 
where we have a peasant girl who looks as if she knew L. e. L.’s poems 
by heart [ . . . ]. The notion that peasants are joyous, that the typical 
moment to represent a man in a smock-frock is when he is cracking a 
joke and showing a row of sound teeth, that cottage matrons are usually 
buxom, and village children necessarily rosy and merry, are prejudices 
difficult to dislodge from the artistic mind, which looks for its subjects 
in literature instead of life.7
That such poems or paintings (eliot also takes to task holman hunt’s 
The Hireling Shepherd) were popular supports eliot’s point that audiences 
prefer the trouble-free version of country life perpetuated by art. here 
and throughout “German Life,” eliot also emphasizes the difficulty of 
an artist rendering an image free of idealized virtue of the rural poor, 
given how engrained in the collective imagination and artistic conven-
tion those idealizations are; “falsehood is so easy, truth so difficult,” as 
she writes in Adam Bede. But the difficulty in rendering images that work 
against idealized notions of the other is a fact of reality and, in addition 
to bemoaning it, eliot works to include such myopic vision in her charac-
ters. For example, Middlemarch’s young, idealistic Dorothea Brooke, who 
seeks out suffering where others seek to avoid it, is disappointed when 
the curate of her new husband’s estate describes his peasants in terms 
similar to those of “Cross Purposes”:
everybody, he assured her, was well off in Lowick, not a cottager in 
those double cottages at a low rent but kept a pig, and the strips of 
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garden at the back were well tended. The small boys wore excellent 
corduroy, the girls went out as tidy servants, or did a little straw-plaiting 
at home: no looms here, no Dissent; and though the public disposition 
was rather towards laying by money than towards spirituality, there 
was not much vice.8
On the one hand, the passage is critical of the curate, who is unable or 
unwilling to describe the cottagers outside of an artificial veil of content-
ment. On the other hand, Dorothea does not question his assessment. 
While Dorothea is concerned with the welfare of others, she still imag-
ines others’ suffering in terms of herself; though she feels “ashamed,” 
she regrets there is not more suffering at Lowick, so that she would have 
a greater function there.9 Dorothea lacks curiosity beyond her interests, 
and both characters fail to reconcile these Lowick strangers with their 
own predilections or desires. These failures do not indicate a hopelessly 
flawed character; instead they demonstrate the thorough difficulty of 
accurately understanding the other, perceiving his position, reading his 
intentions.
 eliot’s writings, from Scenes of Clerical Life through Daniel Deronda, 
regularly depict such fissures in identification or recognition. eliot often 
details the impediments to interpersonal understanding through the 
inclusion of extreme reactions to alterity: solipsism, wherein one can-
not regard the other independently of one’s needs or desires, and self-
abnegation, wherein one desires to sacrifice the self entirely to the other. 
although these positions seem to sit at opposite ends of the spectrum 
of human interactions, both refuse to grant the other independence or 
autonomy. navigating the gulf between the two extremes requires a tem-
pering of self-regard in relation to that beyond the self—much like the 
tempering of metal, this requires an encounter with a force that might, 
in other circumstances, be debilitating. Such efforts are not always suc-
cessful, and the aspirants are not always the heroines of the novels, but 
eliot’s invocation of learning as the means to achieve the desired end 
validates efforts toward that tempered recognition and underscores the 
idea that appreciating alterity is a process and not an inherent quality.
Learning Not to Feel: Hetty Sorrel as Moralist
Since the publication of Adam Bede, reductive readings of the characters 
of both Dinah Morris and hetty Sorrel have persisted: Methodist preach-
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er Dinah is good, saintly, and selfless, while dairy maid hetty is flawed, 
deviant, and selfish. in her 1883 analysis of eliot’s works, Mathilde 
Blind invoked this formulation, describing Dinah as “a beautiful soul; 
whose spring of love is so abundant that it overflows the narrow limits 
of private affection, and blesses multitudes of toiling, suffering men and 
women with its wealth of pity, hope, and sympathy” and hetty as a 
“shallow, frivolous little soul” who hides a “hard little heart” under her 
“soft dimpling beauty.”10 Over one hundred years later, Judith Mitchell 
echoes this characterization, noting again that hetty’s “shallow, selfish 
nature”11 opposes Dinah’s benevolence. Mitchell further suggests that 
Dinah’s heroism is due not only to her selflessness but also to her beauty 
acting as a “true signifier” for her good soul, whereas hetty’s exterior 
beauty is a “false one.”12 By continually placing Dinah and hetty in 
such formulations—good/bad; selfless/selfish; true signifier/false sig-
nifier—much of the past scholarship on the novel only supports these 
bifurcated categories, when in fact the novel seeks to break up these 
easy formulations.13
 Adam Bede’s rural setting is a particularly apt environment in which 
to document the necessity of nuanced “readings” of people because 
judgments are admittedly made based solely on appearance. This 
community and the assessments its members make offer a version of 
judgments that readers are likely to make, and when the characters’ 
assumptions are proven incorrect, the critique applies to the metanar-
rative as well. Mrs. irwine, who insists that nature would not make “a 
ferret in the shape of a mastiff,” is a typical voice within hayslope. She 
declares: “[no one can ever] persuade me that i can’t tell what men are 
by their outsides” (72). not mere entitlement or snobbery, this attitude 
cuts across class lines; Mrs. Poyser frames a similar comment in terms 
she knows better, saying, “Some cheeses are made o’ skimmed milk and 
some o’ new milk, and it’s no matter what you call ’em, you may tell 
which is which by the look and the smell” (104). Mrs. irwine and Mrs. 
Poyser, as the novel shows, are wrong. nature may encode the body 
with messages about the soul, but they are neither explicit nor easily 
interpretable.14
 Common critiques that hetty is simply a soulless ego (her “van-
ity and selfishness,” one critic argued, lead not only to her own “ter-
rible crime and shame,” but to “misery for others!”15) overlook what is 
achieved by reducing others’ apprehension of her to pure surface: hetty 
becomes a kind of text to be interpreted, allowing the novel to function 
as a critique of the ways her exterior is read. hetty is above all a hard 
text to read, and the difficulty of reading her is emphasized precisely 
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because she seems to be such an easy text to read. Committed to enhanc-
ing her attractiveness, hetty furthers the readable distance between her 
interior and exterior.16 She presents—via her body, her expressions, and 
her actions—an obstacle to easy legibility, as her startling beauty leads 
others to form more generous opinions of her than actions support. 
Serving as an obstacle, forcing those around her to challenge their own 
interpretive skills in this way, hetty performs a valuable function for 
the community she otherwise defies. Further, she is shown to be able to 
recognize, finally, the limitations of her own interpretative powers. in 
these ways, hetty does far more work in the novel than playing the role 
of a hard-hearted beauty; hetty may just be the best teacher the novel 
has to offer.
 The relationship between hetty’s beauty and its message for others 
is linked to hetty’s lack of interiority, her simplicity of mind, and her 
inability to care for others in situations that normally generate a caring 
response. her limitations in this regard are often read as an indication of 
her narcissism. after Thias Bede’s funeral, for example, hetty meditates 
not on the family’s loss but on her many suitors and her power over 
them. eliot asks the reader, “in this state of mind, how could hetty give 
any feeling to adam’s troubles, or think much about poor old Thias 
being drowned?” (111). how could she indeed. hetty is aware of oth-
ers—aware of their presence insofar as it acknowledges her own pres-
ence. But to imagine them as being analogous to herself,17 to imagine 
their interiority, is beyond her powers because of her youth, her self-
centeredness, and the cocoon of leniency granted her as a consequence 
of her disarming looks: “young souls, in such pleasant delirium as hers, 
are as unsympathetic as butterflies sipping nectar; they are isolated from 
all appeals by a barrier of dreams—by invisible looks and impalpable 
arms” (111). her youth and capriciousness are important considerations 
if one is to appreciate hetty’s humanity and understand the limitations 
of empathy. here, as in other novels, eliot is determined that “the reader 
understand all the extenuating circumstances pleading for” her charac-
ters, a way to explain—if not excuse—their behaviors.18 Coming into 
awareness is, eliot insists, a process.
 Complicating a reciprocal understanding between herself and her 
community is hetty’s refusal to engage fully in the agreed-upon com-
munity order, a resistance seen as petulance and not individuation. She 
fails to recognize alterity because she fails to recognize those around 
her at all, one might say, except to the extent that they reflect her self-
conception. although aware that others judge her exterior, hetty at first 
does little to internalize that knowledge or apply it to her interactions 
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with them. This egoism is literalized through her inability to read texts. 
The narrator notes that she “had never read a novel: if she had ever seen 
one, i think the words would have been too hard for her” (148). her 
ignorance of novelistic romance left hetty without a frame in which to 
place her own experience, without “a shape for her expectations” (148). 
it also meant she lacked exposure to representations of another’s interior 
experience, the very possibility ostensibly presented by novels (such as 
Adam Bede) for their readers. her limitations in reading underlie broader 
difficulties in communicating and in living within a community. She 
is, for example, chronically late, either misreading clocks or unable to 
reconcile clocks set at different times. When scolded for arriving home 
late, she responds, “i did set out before eight, aunt [ . . . ] but this clock’s 
so much before the clock at the Chase, there’s no telling what time it’ll 
be when i get here” (158–59).19 Failing to negotiate the real difference 
between her family’s time and “gentlefolk’s time,” hetty is out of step 
with her household. Given her difficulty differentiating between the 
trappings of the life she has and those of the life she wants, it is not 
surprising that she has difficulty deciphering handwriting. When she 
attempts to read the letter in which arthur breaks off their relationship 
and dashes her hopes at marriage, instead of devouring it she can only 
read it slowly, despite the fact that “arthur had taken pains to write 
plainly” (361). The gentleman’s “handwriting” is meant both figura-
tively and literally. arthur believes (as he tells adam) that he had been 
explicit about his intentions with hetty—but not only can she not read 
his writing, she cannot discern his true intentions.
 The faults of hetty’s character—her egotism and inability to become 
part of a community—argue for the flatness and simplicity of her per-
sona. yet while hetty is a poor reader of novels and letters, she is 
felicitously aware that others constantly read her. it is this gift of insight 
that lifts her from being a purely one-dimensional character. her stud-
ied primping displays a vanity that is both controlling and controlled, 
through which she can affect the conclusions others draw about her. it 
is an extraordinary command; she constructs her visage and demeanor 
in such a way to ensure that her affair and her pregnancy are not dis-
covered. She is vain, to be sure, but early in the novel she merely seeks 
confirmation that her vanity is based on beauty perceivable to others. 
Once her circumstances change, she seeks confirmation that the changes 
in her body are not perceivable to others, and this requires consider-
able manipulation on her part. While readers are told that, “on hetty’s 
blooming health, it would take a great deal of such mental suffering 
as hers to leave any deep impress” (366), hetty becomes aware of the 
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necessity of controlling her countenance so that her pain cannot be 
read. rather than accentuating her charms, she must now enact charm to 
disguise her pain. She demonstrates a kind of active self-control that is 
new in her character, catalyzed by the shattering of her illusions: “She 
must not cry in the day-time: nobody should find out how miserable she 
was, nobody should know she was disappointed about anything; and 
the thought that the eyes of her aunt and uncle would be upon her, gave 
her the self-command which often accompanies a great dread” (366). at 
this point, she finds the self-command that is not told on her face, and 
her interiority changes though her exterior does not. By maintaining a 
veneer of her old self, hetty is able to manipulate the readings of many 
in her family and community, and those who never read past her sur-
face are sufficiently convinced by her (purely) superficial composure. By 
anticipating those reactions, hetty demonstrates an ability to recognize 
how others perceive her—how she appears from the outside. 
 More importantly, hetty’s active construction depends on the com-
plicity or inattention of those around her, since they must be poor readers 
to overlook the tale her body eventually tells against her will. The novel 
reminds its audience that reading is a two-way street; in hayslope, hetty 
can write her body but the community has to join in the reading. hetty’s 
work to manipulate others’ readings of herself is thus, for the most part, 
effective. Only the astute adam recognizes a change in her, noting that 
“there was something different in her eyes, in the expression of her face, 
in all her movements [ . . . ]—something harder, older, less child like” 
(383). While his love-induced blindness causes him to cast his observa-
tions in a most generous light, believing the best about his bride-to-be, 
not all of her community has such a compelling excuse to support their 
overlooking the obvious. Perhaps the greatest misreading of all is that 
no one in hayslope notices hetty’s pregnancy—the most visible, physi-
cal sign of hetty’s past actions and present anguish as well as a visible 
sign of the social upheaval caused by a landowner breaking rank to prey 
upon a dairy maid. it cannot be understood, however, that hetty was 
simply adept at hiding her pregnancy, because when she leaves hayslope 
to find arthur, her “condition” is immediately detected: “the stranger’s 
eye detects what the familiar unsuspecting eye leaves unnoticed” (408). 
Surrounded by the unchanging context of hayslope, changes that defy 
expectation or defy the community’s existing understanding of hetty are 
not read by her family or friends, and hetty’s pregnancy is not seen.
 hetty’s relationship with her community is then one of mutual, per-
haps even willed, misunderstanding. it is easy to place the blame com-
pletely on hetty. in his introduction to the novel, for example, Stephen 
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Gill concludes that hetty’s “tragedy” is that she has neither a “lively 
sense of others” nor “a feeling for [her] place in the present and past 
community.”20 Barbara hardy argues that hetty’s self-absorption and 
lack of sympathy in response to the death of adam’s father demonstrate 
her rejection and neglect of the community. hardy further suggests that 
“to be a deviant from the community is to be in serious danger, and 
ultimately to endanger and disturb the entire community.”21 hetty does 
deviate from the community, and the consequences of her actions are 
soon clearly wrought upon her and those she loves. her disgrace and 
her isolation are, however, not solely her fault. When confronted with 
the true weight of her actions—leaving—her illegitimate child to die—
residents of hayslope recognize the damage wrought by their failure at 
educating hetty or educating themselves about her.
 Of course, readers are privileged to information that hetty hides 
from those around her. readers know that beneath the dimpled exterior 
lies a narcissistic liar; the information readers can access serves as a cor-
rective to the misinformation hetty’s controlled face and manners pres-
ent to those around her. Those critics of hetty who insist she is the true 
inverse of Dinah are lulled by this impression that the novel provokes. 
yet eliot employs in her novel’s structure many of the same techniques 
that hetty used to her own advantage, and to the same end. The novel 
demonstrates that its audience, like those in hetty’s community, may 
be poor readers too: Adam Bede coaxes readers into thinking that we 
understand this girl, just as those in hayslope think they understand 
her. hayslopians think she’s a sweet dear thing; readers of the novel 
think she’s rotten to the core, but both conclusions are incomplete. eliot’s 
plot insists that hetty can fool her community, that impressions-based 
assumptions of knowledge are dubious at best: those in hayslope think 
they can see her and that therefore they know her, and novel readers also 
believe they can read her accurately. But surely the novel insists that our 
satisfaction in understanding hetty is, like her community’s, unwar-
ranted. The novel encourages in readers the same self-smug belief that 
adam and Dinah share, establishing a level of comfortable certitude, 
which is then challenged.22
 eventually, hetty’s community learns what readers have known (her 
affair with arthur; her narcissism), and if we may judge by the voice of 
critics, both object to her egotism and to her crime. Because loveliness 
is celebrated, because it is naturalized as good, hetty’s moral ground-
ing is expected to be equal to her physical beauty. Falling short of that 
overreaching expectation, hetty is denounced harshly by much of her 
community and by many readers.
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 But while those around her may be grossly disappointed in her, 
hetty shows herself to be cannily aware of her own limitations. When 
in jail and Dinah tries to convince her to repent, hetty responds, “i can’t 
feel anything like you” (489). This line is not evidence of hetty’s selfish-
ness; it is instead a crucial moment that establishes hetty’s awareness of 
Dinah’s alterity. hetty’s self-centeredness makes her weirdly better able 
to maintain the gulf between herself and the other. This moment is essen-
tial because hetty grasps that others remain unknown and unknowable 
to her. Though the admission is in one sense condemning, it also shows 
that hetty understands herself in relation to those around her.
 hetty is able, in this most fraught moment, to realize something that 
even the pious Dinah cannot: hetty acknowledges the fundamental differ-
ences between her reality and the expectations of her community. in this 
encounter, Dinah tries through the only means she knows to bring hetty 
to confess, an evangelical argument, replete with promises of release from 
pain and promises of eternal comfort after death. in her sermon on the 
green, which introduces Dinah to hayslope and to the novel, she seized 
upon Chad’s Bess’s vanity, threatening Bess with damnation should she 
fail to repent and calling Bess a “poor blind child” (36). now, in hetty’s 
cell, Dinah calls upon the same strategies, framing hetty as a blind child 
whom Dinah must lead to the Lord and his forgiveness. hetty—let’s not 
forget—is imprisoned for the murder of her child, whom she bore to a 
man she loved and a man she thought loved her, after her hopeless jour-
ney seeking that man. Dinah, who consistently seeks pain and suffering 
and seems, in fact, to derive a kind of pleasure from it, speaks to hetty 
as if she is personally aware of the devastation hetty feels: Dinah asks 
hetty, “But isn’t the suffering less hard when you have somebody with 
you, that feels for you—that you can speak to, and say what’s in your 
heart? . . . ” The ellipsis seems to indicate that hetty is silent, and Dinah 
waits. Then it is Dinah who answers her own question: “yes, hetty” 
(488). What eventually sways hetty to confess is the same fear that sways 
Chad’s Bess. it is not a movement into love, but a giving in to the fear 
that Dinah has cultivated—a fear of the unknown that she promises to 
ease through her religious certainty. What hetty does say indicates her 
awareness that Dinah’s engagement with the spiritual realm is beyond her 
comprehension: “i can’t know anything about it”; “i can’t feel anything 
like you” (488–89). When has Dinah admitted that her knowledge of the 
other—others’ needs, others’ feelings, others’ priorities—is limited? She 
cannot even acknowledge that she does not fully know herself.23
 The moment recalls another in “The Two Bed-Chambers” chapter, 
wherein hetty and Dinah are contrasted: the one self-centered, gazing 
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into her mirror, and the other focused on everyone but herself, looking 
out her window. in that moment, Dinah rushes to hetty, seeking to offer 
her services as confidante or confessor, pleading with hetty until she 
finally begins to cry. Lest the reader regard this scene as one of good, 
selflessness triumphing over cold-hearted egotism, the narrator inter-
venes:
it is our habit to say that while the lower nature can never understand 
the higher, the higher nature commands a complete view of the lower. 
But i think the higher nature has to learn this comprehension, as we 
learn the art of vision, by a good deal of hard experience, often with 
bruises and gashes incurred in taking things up by the wrong end, and 
fancying our space wider than it is. (175)
Later, when in jail, Dinah reminds hetty of her offer of friendship that 
night at the hall Farm. Then, instead of the narrator providing the 
corrective, it is up to hetty to do what she can to call Dinah into the 
realization that she has not yet learned to comprehend hetty. hetty’s 
corrective to Dinah’s imploring—“i can’t feel anything like you”—is a 
corrective to the reader as well. For the reader in this moment, hetty 
insists on the insurmountable difference between herself and Dinah, and 
in her simplicity and even her selfishness, she gives way to an aware-
ness of difference that Dinah works so hard to elide. The reader can in 
this moment see what Dinah cannot: hetty’s insistence on alterity, that 
the human other must never be foreclosed, is one of the novel’s great 
lessons; the novel presents through its omniscient narration the ability to 
see what is at that time unknown to Dinah. Dinah, at the end, moves into 
a more nuanced understanding of herself, which requires her opening 
up a space for what she had thought impossible—that she could marry 
someone she loved. She must allow herself to be surprised, a movement 
that comes in the novel after her encounter with hetty and (moreover) 
her colliding with her own desire that was itself a surprise, and not 
always a welcome surprise.
Learning Not to Help: Dorothea as Masochist
Like Dinah, Dorothea Brooke of Middlemarch (1871–72) treads a delicate 
line between self-abnegation and masochism, so thoroughly imagining 
herself into others that she fails to realize a distinct separation between 
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herself and them. her marriage to Casaubon is the central example of 
this dynamic. She bases her actions and choices in response to Casaubon 
on an idea of him; unfortunately, that idea/ideal is itself based upon 
her misinterpretations of his desires.24 in fact, both failed marriages in 
Middlemarch are the result of one partner’s (Lydgate’s, Dorothea’s) fail-
ure to realize the other (rosamond, Casaubon) as having desires and 
priorities that are distinct from his or her own. if these are models of 
empathic extension, the results are hardly encouraging. Through its mul-
tiplotted structure, Middlemarch features multiple characters engaged in 
relationship dynamics that are not unlike those in Adam Bede. Whereas 
my analysis of Adam Bede focused on hetty as a misread individual, in 
Middlemarch i first turn my attention to she who misreads: Dorothea. 
as in Adam Bede, in Middlemarch the novel’s very form encourages the 
apperception of limitations. an omniscient narration lends a feeling of 
comprehensive understanding to the text. it is a feeling Dorothea shares: 
she believes in her ability to cut through communal fallacies to the truth 
of a situation or idea, she believes that she has access to a higher purpose 
and understanding hidden from others. That belief, as we will see, is 
tempered. and just as Dorothea is surprised, other characters surprise as 
well. a Casaubon, a rosamond vincy may seem to be eminently know-
able to other residents of Middlemarch, but as Dorothea comes to learn, 
those easy conclusions are often shown to be false, and if not false, at 
least based on a projection of the self.
 Dorothea’s evolution from a self-sacrificing helpmate, both unsatis-
fied and unsatisfying, to something else has long attracted attention 
of those who attempt to situate her behavior with regard to eliot’s 
intended instruction.25 eliot’s famous metaphor of the pier glass offers a 
basis for one interpretation, extolling the reader to remember that every 
individual is the center of her own universe, and that around her center 
all others serve merely as constellations. Characters in the novel exhibit 
such awareness with varying degrees of success. The novel too works 
toward this end, forcing the reader to switch perspectives, as when it 
poses that self-reflexive question “Why always Dorothea?” (278).
 yet Dorothea is interesting because she seems from the novel’s open-
ing to insist on her alterity, to insist that she is unlike all others. The 
novel supports Dorothea’s fundamental difference from those around 
her by pairing her actions or responses with those of another character: 
her reaction to Sir James with Celia’s reaction, her ambitions to Lydgate’s 
ambitions, and her relationship with Ladislaw versus rosamond’s. in 
part, she becomes complacent in her perceived radical alterity and thus 
cannot negotiate herself among the others around her, and this compla-
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cency poses an obstacle to richly mutual relationships with her friends, 
family, and neighbors. By grouping all of those people into a massive 
“other” and asserting herself in opposition to them, Dorothea nurses a 
self-righteousness that is destructive. She, like the omniscient narrator, 
affects knowledge of all. Dorothea is committed to working against the 
conventional, and although the young woman might believe that she 
accords independence to others as to herself, the novel demonstrates 
that she has instead constructed the collective other purely out of her 
self. Their ostensible alterity is instead an inversion of Dorothea’s dearly 
held opinions and beliefs.
 To Dorothea, her sister Celia seems to be a representative of con-
ventionality. But Celia actually exhibits a corrective moderation to 
Dorothea’s earnestness. even Celia’s nickname for her sister, “Dodo,” 
indicates the contrast between the sisters: to Celia, Dorothea seems both 
as antiquated as the extinct bird and as foolish as the word has come to 
imply.26 Celia sees plainly what Dorothea often refuses to acknowledge, 
and she informs Dorothea of this difference, telling her sister that “you 
always see what nobody else sees; it is impossible to satisfy you; yet you 
never see what is quite plain” (36). Celia relishes the moments when she 
can prick the soap bubble of Dorothea’s mind: “She dared not confess 
it to her sister in any direct statement, for that would be laying herself 
open to a demonstration that she was somehow or other at war with all 
goodness. But on safe opportunities, she had an indirect mode of making 
her negative wisdom tell upon Dorothea, and calling her down from her 
rhapsodic mood by reminding her that people were staring, not listen-
ing” (32). a further reminder of the disconnect between what people 
actually thought of Dorothea and what she imagined they thought is 
communicated in Celia’s understanding that to contradict Dorothea 
would be to declare “war with all goodness.”
 The distinction between staring and listening is a subtle one to rec-
ognize or understand, and here Celia demonstrates an awareness and 
command of life in society with others that Dorothea cannot. it recalls 
the relationship between hetty and Dinah. Though regarded as the less 
serious of the two, hetty has a more sensible grasp of the community 
than Dinah does. and Dorothea, like Dinah, exists on aspirations that 
ennoble her and set her apart from that community. But that imposed 
separation ultimately inhibits the connection she so longs for. Dinah 
wants to touch others through religion, and Dorothea through good 
works, but neither can effect her desired result in part because of their 
overdetermined, insistent self-differentiation. Theirs are not genuine 
encounters with radical alterity, but rather inverted projections of the 
self onto the wholesale “other.”
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 Dorothea is only one of many perpetrators of this version of self-
centered-ness. her uncle reads Dorothea in light of his own critique of 
her ideology: she is too religious, and thus when “She was an image of 
sorrow,” her uncle “at once concluded Dorothea’s tears to have their 
origin in her excessive religiousness” (37) without curiosity about their 
true origin. and the good Sir James also misreads Dorothea, interpreting 
her reactions according to his own predilections and preference: “her 
roused temper made her colour deeply, as she returned his greeting with 
some haughtiness. Sir James interpreted the heightened colour in the 
way most gratifying to himself, and thought he never saw Miss Brooke 
looking so handsome” (30). So Dorothea is not wrong to object to such 
characterizations, which are to her indicative of communal views in 
general, though she regards herself as immune to such solipsism.
 and thus Dorothea works diligently to set herself apart from the 
vague plural others, and in some cases her contrariness is simply that. 
When Dorothea is in rome on her honeymoon, Will Ladislaw is aston-
ished by her unwillingness to enjoy or even appreciate the city’s rich 
artistic offerings. and when she comments on his own artwork, find-
ing it uninspiring, she offers as a consolation: “i never could see any 
beauty in the pictures which my uncle told me all judges thought very 
fine” (206). Whom does she deprecate with this statement? any humility 
about her inability to appreciate art is undercut by the implicit critique 
of her uncle and, by extension, “all judges.” hers is truly a remonstrance 
against all who are not her, or all who do not share her unique perspec-
tive. at this point in the novel she is only beginning to recognize that her 
husband, the one man whom she has given her approval (and her sub-
mission), differs from her imagined version of him. it takes considerably 
longer for her realization to spread to others: if she had misunderstood 
Casaubon, might she have similarly misjudged “all judges” whose ideas 
she had rejected?
 is Dorothea thus the only one out of balance in an otherwise sane 
world? is the mob necessarily correct? The narrative voice seems to 
indicate not: in some cases, Dorothea’s peculiarity seems as such only in 
relation to others, and others, the narrator reminds, might actually be the 
odd ones after all: “She would perhaps be hardly characterized enough 
if it were omitted that she wore her brown hair flatly braided and coiled 
behind [ . . . ] at a time when public feeling required the meagerness of 
nature to be dissimulated by tall barricades of frizzed curls and bows, 
never surpassed by any great race except the Feejeean” (27). yet even 
in this seeming defense of Dorothea, who rails against the unnatural 
fashions of her day, the narrator struggles to articulate the description: 
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the phrasing “would perhaps be hardly characterized enough if it were 
omitted that” is remarkable for its murkiness.
 if Dorothea represents the complexities of adapting self-abnegation 
to a relationship with others, Middlemarch’s rosamond vincy offers 
an alternate model of the complications facing the individual-in-
community. rosamond vincy shares with hetty Sorrel distractingly 
good looks, family and friends who indulge her whims, a solipsistic 
worldview, and—in the end—a moment in which she escapes, perhaps 
surprisingly and fleetingly, from that solipsism. Both women are also 
mischaracterized by others, who often believe that a pliant and sweet 
exterior indicates a similar disposition. The novel’s development of 
rosy’s relationship with Lydgate provides a basis for development that 
hetty lacked: their interaction offers the reader examples of mutual 
oversight and misunderstanding nearly equal in their depth and fre-
quency. Such misunderstandings are not, the novel emphasizes, due 
to a lack of concern or due to neglect: “Between him and her indeed 
there was that total missing of each other’s mental track, which is too 
evidently possible even between persons who are continually thinking 
of each other” (587). Thinking of the other does not ensure thinking as 
the other or thinking like the other. Their problem is not simply one of 
missed mental tracks, an image that suggests each recognizes that the 
other has a separate mental track and might look for it only to miss 
it—overlook it, jump it, and so forth. instead, both Lydgate and rosa-
mond are bound to their own mental tracks, and each has configured 
the other in terms of him- or herself—they lack an appreciation of 
genuine, or radical, alterity.
 Lydgate’s vision of rosamond and his expectations of her as a wife 
are so self-centered and self-indulgent that the narrator marks them as 
fantasy; his early vision of her existed in a “dreamland” wherein she 
“appeared to be that perfect piece of womanhood who would reverence 
her husband’s mind after the fashion of an accomplished mermaid, using 
her comb and looking-glass and singing her song for the relaxation of 
his adored wisdom alone” (583). even before their marriage, then, rosy 
functioned for Lydgate as an example of an imagined perfection, and his 
vision required a wife to revere and adore her husband exclusively. She 
was a type, an ideal, and a type of mermaid, not even human.
 Tertius Lydgate is not alone in this vision, as rosy’s unrealistic expec-
tations and imagination matched his before their marriage and received 
an equally harsh blow from reality: “The Lydgate with whom she had 
been in love had been a group of airy conditions for her, most of which 
had disappeared, while their place had been taken by everyday details 
which must be lived through slowly from hour to hour” (661). So each 
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partner indulged in nearsighted fantasies about the other, and they 
built a marriage upon unuttered expectations that were, from the start, 
impossible to fulfill. Throughout the novel, though, rosamond’s view of 
Lydgate is shown to be no momentary lapse in an otherwise thoughtful, 
rational, expansive mind, but rather a natural by-product of a soul who 
valued her own circumstances to the exclusion of all others:
in fact there was but one person in rosamond’s world whom she did 
not regard as blameworthy, and that was the graceful creature with 
blond plaits and with little hands crossed before her, who had never 
expressed herself unbecomingly, and had always acted for the best—the 
best naturally being what she best liked. (665)
rosamond’s eventual turn outside of herself is thus both unexpected 
and hard-earned. She was not used to recognizing the desire, or even 
the existence, of the other, “except as a material cut into shape by her 
own wishes” (777), and so the encounter with a person and experience 
profoundly different from her own is a painful process, described in 
one instance as the other’s feeling being “burnt and bitten into her con-
sciousness” (779).
 The coming together of rosamond and Dorothea stages a meeting 
of those two kinds of self-centeredness in eliot’s fiction—one who 
sacrifices herself at all costs and the other who promotes herself at all 
costs, and achieving an accurate mutual understanding is both com-
plex and shocking:
it was a newer crisis in rosamond’s experience than even Dorothea 
could imagine: she was under the first great shock that had shattered 
her dream-world in which she had been easily confident of herself and 
critical of others; and this strange unexpected manifestation of feeling 
in a woman whom she had approached with a shrinking aversion and 
dread, as one who must necessarily have a jealous hatred toward her, 
made her soul totter all the more with a sense that she had been walk-
ing in an unknown world which had just broken in upon her. (796)
it is the harsh reality that intrudes violently upon rosamond’s con-
sciousness. She experiences a “great shock,” her “dream-world” is 
“shattered,” and the realization “breaks” upon her. One source of this 
intense intrusion of an alternate reality into rosy’s mind is the real-
ization that her previous assumption about Dorothea’s character was 
false. The alternate understanding of Dorothea that “shatters” rosy’s 
previous opinion, described as it is in negative and even violent terms, 
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is a less antagonistic, more positive view of Dorothea. That is, rosy 
recognizes that Dorothea does not, in fact, “necessarily have a jealous 
hatred towards her.” While that information may be comforting, while 
it may render Dorothea more friendly or approachable in rosamond’s 
eyes and perhaps allow for the generous turn of rosamond’s actions, 
the realization of her alterity is not easy for rosamond because it 
requires freeing Dorothea from the long-held internal definition rosa-
mond maintained.
 negotiating the self in relation to the other, whether an individual 
or a collective, depends on accepting the limitations of the self rather 
than acknowledging empirical reality, a distinction that is mirrored in 
the shape of the realist novel. Seen in this light, the scene in which 
Mrs. Cadwallader encourages Dorothea to “exert” herself “a little to 
keep sane, and call things by the same names as other people call them 
by” (537) appears to be less about the pressures of the bland majority 
of Middlemarch forcing Dorothea into a state of conformity than it is 
about Dorothea’s difficulty reconciling her version of reality to those 
versions experienced by others. her “stout” response to Mrs. Cadwal-
lader, “i never called everything by the same name that all the people 
about me did” (537), demonstrates her persistent clinging to her per-
sonal vision even if it leaves her woefully out of step with others. Theirs 
is a conversation about language, about the naming of objects. if we 
believe that language serves as the basis of the ethical relationship,27 to 
refuse to communicate is to shut down the possibility of ethical commu-
nion—curiously, something flatly at odds with Dorothea’s stated desires. 
Further, Middlemarch’s parochial social scene is genuinely chafing to 
Dorothea’s temperament. Middlemarch is described early in the novel as 
a place where “sane people did what their neighbors did, so that if any 
lunatics were at large, one might know how to avoid them” (9). and yet 
Dorothea’s uncle, who is undeniably a game neighbor, and who ensures 
his sanity according to the status quo, nevertheless implores Dorothea to 
reconsider her marriage plans, which he views as conforming too rigidly 
to her set expectations: “But there are oddities in things,” he argues, 
“Life isn’t cast in a mould—not cut out by rule and line, and that sort of 
thing” (41). She struggles “in the bands of a narrow teaching, hemmed 
in by a social life which seemed nothing but a labyrinth of petty courses, 
a walled-in maze of paths that led no wither” (29). But Dorothea works 
through that struggle, learning her way through the maze; eliot’s real-
ism depends upon her depiction of that negotiation, that process of 
learning the stakes of living in relation.
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Altruism and the Affect of Learning
recognizing that not everyone operates in the same manner as oneself 
is—as depicted in eliot’s fiction—a difficult, though learnable, proposi-
tion. Despite the difficulty of that recognition, and despite the very real 
possibility that one may never reach perfect insight, working toward this 
realization is imperative and contains the promise of the kind of empath-
ic extension the author endorses. it is through this working-toward that 
humanity proves itself. The impossibility of reaching the ultimate real-
ization is no deterrent. Such aspiration resonates with the realist goal: to 
describe accurately and comprehensively the human condition may be 
an impossibility, but as a goal the desire elicits no bad faith.
 in eliot’s fiction, that impossibility is rendered through tropes of 
illegibility and illiteracy. Those who read others often draw mistaken 
conclusions; those who are read are often read incorrectly. a shared 
unwillingness to recognize this possibility of misreading or being mis-
read demonstrates why characters such as hetty are such a problem—it 
is not because they are inherently bad, but because they are too eas-
ily misread. They present cases where others’ assumptions are wrong; 
they embody the realist doctrine of unknowability. Within their plots, 
both hetty and rosamond are sacrificed—hetty to death in ameri-
ca, and rosamond to a life of banality—but both present the obstacle 
that another must encounter on the way to growth, serving as a check 
on easy assumptions. Such characters instantiate the knowledge that 
the insurmountable difference between individuals is not due to beau-
ty, ignorance, or any other particular physical or personal trait. The 
unknowability of the other is instead inherent and universal. eliot’s 
narrative voice is complicit in this lesson, as its tone is one of certainty, 
and the narrator affects an accurate omniscient comprehensiveness that 
individuals must necessarily lack.
 With her focus on learning, eliot forestalls the ease of immediate 
access, a point supported through her portrayal of both extremes: the 
narcissist whose beauty (for example) leads to her being misread, and 
the self-abnegating characters, whose inborn or ingrained desire to help 
others still requires a movement into genuine awareness of alterity 
before their good intentions can be fulfilled. That awareness must not be 
a function of insisting that oneself is different from everyone else—the 
kind of wholesale alterity that marks Dorothea and Dinah. They are 
confusing to their communities. They are misunderstood. Unfortunately, 
both women insist upon this difference as a matter of point, and yet in 
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doing so end up denying the kind of unique sovereignty to those who 
make up their community as well as to themselves.28 even the seemingly 
most understanding, most compassionate person must learn.
 The importance of that process is made evident in eliot’s The Lifted 
Veil,29 whose main character, Latimer, has the ability to experience oth-
ers’ consciousness, and with that ability he ought to be perfectly suited 
to life within eliot’s universe. There seems to be no greater human 
facility within eliot’s oeuvre; as Sally Shuttleworth puts it, “Latimer is 
granted the gifts George eliot deemed crucial to narrative art: an ability 
to enter into the minds of others, and the power to foresee the future.”30 
Latimer’s “previsions” or “presentiments” do not, however, ensure pro-
ductive affective relationships, but rather the opposite. his is a miser-
able and lonely life, and his only sustained interest in another human 
being was directed at a woman who presented “the only exception” to 
Latimer’s “unhappy gift of insight.” about his future wife, Bertha, and 
Bertha alone, he was “always in a state of uncertainty.” Such uncertainty 
is tantalizing, even if only to the extent that it allows Latimer to maintain 
his fantasy that his future wife might think fondly of him; he is “unable 
to imagine the total negation in another mind of the emotions that are 
stirring in his own.”31 if this is what life looks like when one has genuine 
empathy for others—when one can truly feel what it is to be another—
why should we encourage empathy? in seeking to explain this fissure, 
some point to eliot’s biography, insisting that the novella was written 
in a moment of personal crises. But more recently, critics have begun to 
take on questions of the relationship between knowledge and sympathy 
more directly. Kate Flint asks, “if sympathy toward others is a desirable 
thing, is it only possible to express this sympathy when we do not know 
as much as it would be possible to know about the other person?”32 Flint 
concludes by noting that in The Lifted Veil, eliot counters the victorian 
desire of making all things visible by instead “arguing that we perhaps 
would not want to see where we might be able to see,” privileging the 
imagination over the scientific eye.33 rae Greiner and Thomas albrecht 
follow Flint by adding shades to the conclusion that eliot’s depiction 
of sympathetic extension in The Lifted Veil is in line with, and not in 
opposition to, her larger ethical project. albrecht suggests that through 
a complex treatment of characters, the invocation of visual metaphors 
for other-awareness, and its indictment of Latimer’s solipsism, The Lifted 
Veil is consistent with eliot’s broader conception of ethical engagement, 
an engagement predicated on the apprehension of difference.34 i would 
go further to suggest that The Lifted Veil not only champions a self-
less apprehension of alterity (an ability that, as albrecht notes, Latimer 
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lacks) but also places grave importance on learning.35 it is too easy for 
Latimer, who gains his ability to see others’ thoughts as a result of an 
illness. he thus assumes access to others in ways they cannot contradict, 
shutting down any possibility for surprise, and ensuring that even his 
engagement with a supernatural ability to experience another’s reality 
is ultimately rendered a function of himself.
 The recognition of radical alterity that eliot endorses must be predi-
cated on hard work: the hard work of earning literacy, and the pain of 
bumping up against the other’s desires, experience, and consciousness. 
The ability always to anticipate the other precludes that collision. This is 
true of eliot’s characters just as it is true of eliot’s readers, and the glory 
of eliot’s work is that it shows a movement into that kind of awareness-
of-limits which must precede intersubjectivity. That movement is not 
sufficient, but merely necessary, as some actors (hetty, rosamond) will 
retreat from their encounter with alterity and resume life—or death—
as it had been. But others are able to effectively incorporate a newly 
nuanced understanding of the other into their lives—this is the work 
that enables adam, Dinah, and Dorothea to end the novels facing a 
promising vista of potentiality.
The Knowable and the Unknowable: Text and Character
What must a character do to deserve the label “the nastiest little bitch in 
english Literature”?1 Sue Bridehead, in Jude the Obscure (1895), earned 
the distinction by, among other things, railing against social institutions 
of marriage and religion, refusing to be defined by conventional gender 
roles, and thwarting Jude Fawley’s desire for her. But she is remarkable 
not only for her defiant posture; Sue’s character actually upsets the nar-
rative structure of Jude the Obscure by frustrating readerly expectations, 
expectations that are often aligned with Jude’s. She usurps the title 
character of his central position, and she replaces that stable central role 
with her slippery, irreducible persona. Jude cannot understand or know 
her, but neither—it seems—can the novel. hardy’s well-documented 
fascination with Sue demonstrates his investment in the mystery that 
defines her character.2 The mystery, in fact, generates the novel’s driving 
desires: the wish to be heard and to understand is as powerful as the 
wish to tell and to be understood, both of which, as notes Peter Brooks, 
are “never wholly satisfied or indeed satisfiable.”3 Sue’s character, and 
its articulation in Jude, coalesce a trend present throughout hardy’s fic-
tion: her “inconsistency and elusiveness” mirror the formal idiosyncra-
sies of his texts.4
 Sue is but one of hardy’s many inscrutable characters, but she in 
particular provokes intense critical scrutiny. her elusive nature has led 
innumerous critics to pin her down, to make her consistent if only 
by explaining the source of her inconsistency.5 Some suggest that the 
ambivalence of women’s position in victorian society is reflected in 
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Sue’s emotional ambivalence and uncertain social status. rather than an 
instance of incomplete or inconsistent characterization on hardy’s part, 
his inclusion of uncertainty surrounding Sue’s character indicates the 
author’s embrace of and grappling with those ambivalent social expec-
tations. hardy documents Sue’s weirdness. he can, and does, describe 
her actions, but he also documents other characters’ frustrations with 
her. She does confounding things, and not only do other characters 
remain confounded by her, but the omniscient narrator—ostensibly able 
to clarify Sue’s motivations or intentions—further fails to offer clarifica-
tion. Perhaps critical frustration is due to the sense that readers do not 
know more about Sue than Jude or Philloston know, thus complicat-
ing readerly pleasure. The described instability of Sue’s character, her 
inscrutability, reifies a sentiment, an approach that pervades hardy’s 
fiction. Characters’ scrutability is often contested within his novels, and 
it is precisely within the novels that hardy establishes the difference 
between a character and the story of his or her life: the split between the 
knowable text and the unknowable person exists not only for the reader 
of the novel but also within the novel itself. That is, for hardy’s char-
acters, one’s self cannot be conflated with one’s story. While personal 
narratives can be learned, molded, told, and retold, the individual other 
is and must always be essentially out of reach.
 in Jude the Obscure, hardy’s final novel, Jude Fawley knowingly 
grapples with the impossibility of reconciling the mutability of Sue’s 
character with his own desire for stability and sureness, but it is a 
maddening task. even so, Jude views Sue’s variability as one of her 
charms, at least in the beginning of their acquaintance and even as his 
personal delight in her borders on possessiveness: “his Sue’s conduct 
was one lovely conundrum to him” upon their first outing together in 
Melchester, when he also thinks himself lucky that “only himself knew 
the charms” that her plain dress kept hidden.6 he acknowledges that 
she is a “conundrum,” but still relishes his ownership of knowledge of 
her that others do not or cannot share—Sue is “his Sue.” Jude is thus 
ambivalent, but the fact that he even attempts to appreciate Sue’s own 
ambivalence makes him unique among hardy’s leading men. Characters 
in hardy’s universe more often refuse to apperceive the instability of 
the other, clinging instead to a stable narrative about the other that they 
have constructed. angel Clare, for example, develops an understanding 
of Tess that becomes concretized. When she reveals her past, he feels it 
as a violation not because she has wronged him, but because her narra-
tive contradicts his narrative of her.
 not surprisingly, because these misunderstandings often occur 
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between couples, much of the analysis of intersubjectivity in hardy’s 
fiction focuses on the ways that characters function as platforms for gen-
der constructions. From attempts to define the author’s apprehension of 
gender roles, wholesale pronouncements emerge: John Kucich, for exam-
ple, concludes that hardy’s works show “a more negative interpretation 
of the inflexibility of female dishonesty in desire, or an excessively stark 
delineation of feminine dishonesty,” while his male characters act as a 
“theater of charged moral ambivalence that can lead to resurgent moral 
purity, either through self-resistance or through resistance of the devi-
ant examples of other, vilified men or of unregenerate women.”7 With 
such readings, immutable gender differences become a way to organize 
hardy’s characterizations, when in fact they are inherently fluid. Gender 
binaries can in these readings overwhelm the more subtle distinctions 
that hardy draws between and among his characters. Gender cannot be 
set aside in any consideration of the relationship dynamics in hardy’s 
fiction, but refocusing on the way characters engage with alterity, it 
becomes clear that relationships with narrative, as opposed to fixed 
gender differences, determine intersubjectivity. The reader’s desire to 
cotton on to definitive gender roles in his fiction is indicative of anxiet-
ies generated by the general instability of the hardy narrative, wherein 
even those aspects of life that seem ultimately concrete are instead open 
for interpretation or alteration—gender, parenthood, family, religion, 
and inherent morality may all be unstable.8 even the past itself cannot 
be depended on, but is open for revision, interpretation, and reinterpre-
tation.9 as we will see in this chapter, one reason for this instability is 
that hardy sets the novel in tension with characters’ desire to view the 
past as solidified and booklike.
 in this chapter, i focus primarily on two of hardy’s novels, The Mayor 
of Casterbridge (1886) and Tess of the d’Urbervilles (1891), to explore the 
ways that his works delineate those objects that can be appropriated 
by the self from objects that cannot be appropriated. Those that can-
not are other individuals; instances of radical alterity can only arise, 
and necessarily arise, in one’s encounter with another person. a story, 
much like a book, can be appropriated and is eminently knowable—the 
human other cannot be appropriated and is not ultimately knowable. 
By entrapping fellow creatures in static narratives, hardy’s characters 
defy that logic, essentializing fellow creatures and denying them sov-
ereignty. The inability to engage in mutual or productive relationships, 
a sad circumstance so often featured in hardy’s stories, arises from a 
denial of alterity, a consequence of turning the unknowable other into 
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a knowable narrative. This distinction is different from the recognition 
of a disparity between reality and a story that a character believes; such 
distance between lived experience and a dream world no doubt figures 
prominently in realist fiction, but it cannot account for the alterity of the 
other. hardy goes beyond merely exposing the “discrepancy between 
the inner narrative and the novel” by insisting that neither an individual 
character’s construction of reality nor the novel itself can adequately con-
tain the other;10 he uses stories to point toward the distinction between 
narratives and the people they describe.11
 in this way, hardy’s novels demonstrate a truism at the heart of 
Levinasian ethical philosophy: the other is always unknowable, and rec-
ognizing that limitation is necessary to positive affective relationships. 
What’s more, as the human other is the ultimate limit of knowledge, 
all other things—including narrative—are fungible, assimilable. This 
construction works against the desire of so many literary critics to make 
the object of their study—the text—an ethical agent on the order of the 
human. Teasing apart these manifestations (the fictional character from 
the material novel) is difficult even for critics devoted to ethical criticism. 
in her Levinasian readings of victorian literature, Jil Larson falls back 
on an all-too-common movement of ethical literary critics: “The act of 
reading a literary character, of experiencing literary art, is fraught with 
some of the very same paradoxes and difficulties of establishing a just 
and loving relationship with another human being, and that is why art’s 
potential to be ethically instructive is as strong as its potential to shelter 
us from the real and the ethical.”12 Levinas in particular explicitly cau-
tions against this collapse.13 hardy’s works help to provide a corrective 
against that collapse by insisting on the difference between story and self. 
his novels exploit this disconnection to great effect: showing always that 
when people make the same mistake critics do, assuming that a person’s 
story is somehow analogous to the person herself, no real apprehension 
of alterity can ensue. again, this is an impulse routinely modeled in 
realist fiction: the text, the aesthetic object, is fixed and appropriable (as 
much as a novel might depict the exigencies of ethical dilemmas and 
decisions, it offers only that representation). it is explicitly not the other. 
hardy echoes this distinction within his novels; some of his characters 
continually rail against aligning themselves with the permanence of text 
and are instead fluid, mutable, capricious, and mercurial, while others 
embrace the stable narrative too fully, refusing to accept or acknowledge 
inherent mutability, often to disastrous effect. Men and women, hardy 
reminds us, are not books.
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the mayor of casterbridge: Reading the Past
The human inclination to cling too tightly to the stability of a fixed 
narrative is fleshed out in The Mayor of Casterbridge (1886). Michael 
henchard’s obstinate embrace of the past dooms his business and per-
sonal relationships with men and with women; his is not only a portrait 
of hubris or chauvinism but also a portrait of a stilted reading and poor 
interpretation. a fundamental lack of human control underlies many of 
the events of the novel, which depend as much on the vicissitudes of 
the (nature-controlled) grain harvest as they do on the actions of any 
character.14 To whatever extent The Mayor of Casterbridge is a document 
of rural Wessex farm and labor culture, it is also a portrait of the indi-
vidual’s ability to negotiate with the more abstract powers that control 
his life, and the desire to seize upon other humans as powers that may 
be controlled.
 Michael henchard owns a past that is condemnable. Whereas Tess 
will be guiltless or at least guileless in her seduction by alec d’Urberville, 
henchard bears full responsibility for selling his wife and young daugh-
ter at a country fair. he was drunk, but that drunkenness is represented 
not as an excuse for his actions, but as merely one in a series of ill-
advised choices. henchard’s decision sets into motion a plot that seems 
at first to endorse the possibility of change, as henchard repents of his 
actions and the drunkenness that contributed to those actions and starts 
anew; he rises successfully to become the mayor of Casterbridge after 
abandoning his past life.
 hardy signals the obstacles that change will play in the narrative by 
first placing the reader in a position that, like henchard’s, is challenged 
by change. he opens the novel with henchard’s most shocking act—the 
auctioning of his wife—with little background to contextualize the action. 
The reader is thus immediately confronted with henchard’s least likeable 
qualities: his coldness, his drunkenness, and his impulsivity lead to an 
impression that is difficult to shake. So while the novel presents a story of 
change, henchard (like the reader) only experiences the new movements 
of his life against the backdrop of his unshakeable belief in the perma-
nence, the petrifaction of his story. That dependence, that clinging to a 
narrative even in the face of evidence that life choices might redirect the 
narrative in all directions, decides henchard’s fate. even while disavow-
ing his past, he grants it a permanent place in his mind; believing his 
success to depend on the complete repression of the life he led, he ensures 
that the past is always with him. his sobriety is itself only a respite from 
his default of drinking, a temporary bandage on a permanent affliction, 
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as henchard returns to drink once he completes the twenty years he had 
pledged to sobriety as penance for his actions. When confronted with the 
irrepressible physical reality of his wife and daughter, he tells no one of 
their shared past, refusing to believe that anyone would hear this story 
and not render the same scathing judgment that he renders himself. his 
desire to be unknown even in death confirms this intractability regarding 
the past. henchard is doomed by his dedication to a narrative that need 
not have been the defining feature of his life; he is doomed by his staunch 
belief that the story makes the man.
 henchard’s rigid conception of the life story is seen in his own life, 
but it is in relation to others that it becomes clear that he grants no one 
else the flexibility or forgiveness that he denies himself. his relationship 
with Farfrae held the promise of business success and friendship, but 
the specter of henchard’s past overwhelms that possibility. The wages of 
stolidity are even more pronounced in his relationship with his presumed 
daughter elizabeth-Jane, which held the promise of shared affection and 
even devotion, though he proves unable to enter into that mutuality. 
She would willingly have devoted herself to him, yet he remains “the 
bitterest critic the fair girl could possibly have had.”15 among the many 
differences between elizabeth and henchard is the way each understands 
the past. For much of the novel, henchard knows elizabeth’s past when 
even she does not, a fact that he attempts to exploit. elizabeth must then 
reconcile multiple versions of her life story throughout the course of the 
novel, first believing herself the daughter of richard newson, then the 
daughter of henchard, and then back to newson.
 Concerned as henchard is that others might uncover or discover his 
past, it is not surprising that the terms that define his relationship with 
elizabeth are terms of reading: handwriting, books, and reading faces, 
all of which henchard views as interpretable clues of a fixed reality. he 
is keenly attuned to reading features, as are many in hardy’s oeuvre, 
where, as Jonathan Wike concludes, “the face is the natural point of 
convergence of the symbolic and the existential, the meeting place of 
the man behind it and the world beyond it.”16 henchard’s appraisal of 
elizabeth-Jane while she sleeps offers certainty that he is not her father 
but rather that richard newson (the man who purchased elizabeth’s 
mother) is, and the information is unbearable:
he steadfastly regarded her features. They were fair: his were dark. 
But this was an unimportant preliminary. in sleep there come to the 
surface buried genealogical facts, ancestral curves, dead men’s traits, 
which the mobility of daytime animation screens and overwhelms. in 
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the present statuesque repose of the young girl’s countenance richard 
newson’s was unmistakably reflected. he could not endure the sight 
of her, and hastened away. (124)
and so he can see “unmistakable” evidence of her background. Why 
should his past be any less readable? More important, in this scene 
henchard offers the readers evidence of his inability to escape himself. 
his response to elizabeth is negative; if others might read his trans-
gressions as easily as he reads her parentage, would their responses be 
any less negative?17 he forecloses the possibility that the other might 
surprise.
 elizabeth-Jane, the subject of henchard’s scrutiny and the recipient of 
one act of astute “reading” on his part, serves as a useful counterpoint 
to his rigid intellect and self-conception. her mother was introduced as 
having a singular attraction—the “mobility” of her face (4). it is hardly a 
conventional compliment, yet in hardy’s oeuvre, there are few physical 
commendations greater than mobility. Sue Bridehead’s eyes are “liquid,” 
her face “mobile, living” (89, 90); Tess Durbeyfield has a “mobile peony 
mouth,” angel’s face and mouth are “mobile” as well.18 elizabeth-Jane 
is her mother’s daughter (though expressly not henchard’s), and she 
is gifted with a quick and flexible mind to match the “mobility” of her 
expression.19 in the quotation above, it is clear that henchard views such 
mobility as a “screen” that “overwhelms” the genealogical facts of the 
face, which are more like geological facts to henchard, evidentiary, fixed, 
and interpretable.
 While henchard interprets elizabeth-Jane’s physical features in order 
to conclude that he was not her father—a version of reading nature’s 
syntax not unlike those detailed in George eliot’s fiction—hardy com-
plicates the theme of literacy to distinguish between the father and 
daughter. Despite his accurate interpretation of elizabeth-Jane’s face, 
henchard’s interpretive powers are otherwise inferior to hers. Partly 
because elizabeth sees literacy as a means to effect change, her interpre-
tative ability creates a space for mutability and, through the practice of 
learning, the recognition of the limitations of her comprehension. eliza-
beth’s literacy not only marks her as newson’s daughter as opposed to 
henchard’s (she uses her father’s money, after all, to purchase books), but 
it calls attention to the greater, nongenetic, differences between her and 
henchard. in henchard’s harsh critiques of the girl, the split between the 
two becomes clear, and hardy’s narration counters henchard’s assess-
ment through more positive diction. For example, henchard, consider-
ing himself a member of the “truly genteel,” regards elizabeth’s use of 
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dialect as a “mark of the beast,” while the narrator describes her use 
of dialect as “occasional,” “pretty,” and “picturesque” (127). in one 
episode, described as “a gratuitous ordeal,” elizabeth is made to write 
out a contract agreement for henchard and a visitor. in this passage, 
language, reading, and writing become inextricably linked with personal 
identity—elizabeth-Jane is an “omnivorous reader,” yet for henchard, 
her handwriting (like her dialect) serves as another undeniable, legible 
sign of her inferiority to henchard, the man she believed to be her father. 
her script, described by the narrator as “a splendid round, bold hand 
of her own conception, a style that would have stamped a woman as 
Minerva’s own in more recent days,” is considered by her father to be a 
“line of chain-shot and sand-bags” (127). he becomes embarrassed and, 
“in angry shame,” decides to write the agreement himself (128). This 
is not hardy’s only invocation of Minerva, the goddess of wisdom, in 
relation to elizabeth-Jane; she is later described as having an “incipient 
matronly dignity, which the serene Minerva-eyes of one ‘whose ges-
tures beamed with mind’ made easy” (318). yet henchard is fixated on 
a past that expected something else from a woman’s pen; his focus on 
the historical past blinds him to the possibility of change in the pres-
ent. Further, he “believed that bristling characters were as innate and 
inseparable a part of refined womanhood as sex itself” (that recalcitrant 
gender definition, one way that he traps elizabeth-Jane in an unalterable 
narrative) and instead of being proud or recognizing elizabeth’s value, 
he “reddened in angry shame for her” and dismisses her from the room 
(128). henchard may hew to strict gender roles, but that does not mean 
that hardy does, a distinction that is missed if henchard’s behavior is 
put down entirely to his being a man during a certain historical moment.
 elizabeth-Jane’s reading and writing indicate her ability to under-
stand what others cannot, and she is thus able to make links between the 
parts of stories that others miss, a fact that comes to bear most signifi-
cantly in her relationship with Lucetta Templeman, henchard’s fiancée. 
Lucetta, like hetty Sorrel, understands that she is read by others around 
her, and seeks to control her countenance in order to control their read-
ings: she asks a mirror, “how do i appear to people?” (173). yet even 
Lucetta’s awareness does not mean that she can completely control the 
ways she is perceived—proper “reading” depends as much on the skill 
of the actor as on the skill of the interpreter (think, for example, that 
Michael henchard is able to discern accurately elizabeth-Jane’s parent-
age only when she is asleep, and thus has no control over her expres-
sion), and elizabeth proves to be a discerning interpreter of Lucetta’s 
desires: “The rencounter with Farfrae and his bearing towards Lucetta 
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had made the reflective elizabeth more observant of her brilliant and 
amiable companion.[ . . . ] [S]he somehow knew that Miss Templeman 
was nourishing a hope of seeing the attractive Scotchman. The fact was 
printed all over Lucetta’s cheeks and eyes to any one who read her as 
elizabeth-Jane was beginning to do” (170).
 elizabeth-Jane’s mode of interpersonal engagement is one of two ver-
sions established in The Mayor of Casterbridge. Both require interpretation 
and comprehension of signs, symbols, texts, and stories; but whereas 
elizabeth-Jane leverages her literacy to create new spaces for intellectual 
growth or deepening awareness of those around her and to undermine 
the fixed narratives in which she finds herself, henchard is fixated and 
fixed with regard to others as well as himself. The ways that each indi-
vidual negotiates the past is reflected in the ways that each negotiates 
those present others. Living in constant fear of his own past, a narrative 
that threatens his present only because of the power he invests in it, 
henchard applies a similarly rigid mode of reading to others. it takes in 
little, and in its fixity, views others in terms of fixedness, conflating story 
with identity, eliding potential in favor of conventional expectations. 
elizabeth-Jane’s fluid mind, much like the mobility of her expression, 
grants to others a similar fluidity. Though both she and her father do, 
in places, discern others accurately, elizabeth-Jane uses her interpersonal 
literacy to distinguish between the individual and the story. henchard’s 
insistent fixity follows him to his very grave. he attempts to determine, 
through writing, the ways others will view him even after death, stipu-
lating in his will that “no man remember me” (321).
 in The Mayor of Casterbridge, these two approaches to understand-
ing one’s story—as fixed permanence or as a narrative always under 
construction—lead to very different results. it’s curious that henchard 
does end up miserable, dead, alone, which might be precisely the end 
one could anticipate given his uninspiring opening gambit. Between the 
novel’s beginning and end, hardy shows readers that henchard’s end is 
a consequence of closing down the other, trapping him in a fixed, impen-
etrable narrative. Those same lessons evolve in Tess of the d’Urbervilles.
Faithful Representation: tess of the d’Urbervilles
From the first page of Tess of the d’Urbervilles, the nature and function 
of stories and storytelling are questioned; the novel opens with Parson 
Tringham telling John Durbeyfield the story of his aristocratic ancestry. 
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The novel’s dynamics seem to be determined by the retelling of that 
tale: Tess tells it when attempting, at her family’s insistence, to “claim 
kin” with the d’Urbervilles; she hides it while working at the dairy; and 
she does, finally, tell it to angel Clare. and the provenance of the Dur-
beyfield name is only one of the narratives of Tess’s life. To tell or not 
to tell becomes a central concern of the novel, and Tess herself becomes 
defined, to large degree, by the version of her life’s story people believe 
about her. Within the novel, there is no stable version of reality, but 
always multiple stories, multiple iterations, multiple renderings. and as 
the actions that unfold depend on which variation of the past is known, 
and often with little regard to an empirical notion of truth and reality, 
the novel seems to suggest that what matters—the thing that determines 
actions and reactions—is the story or stories that one believes. That story 
may be learned and is knowable, while the characters that inhabit the 
story remain always elusive. here, then, the acts of reading, interpreting, 
and understanding narrative collide directly with the empathic project 
of reading, interpreting, and understanding the other: they are not, 
hardy consistently reminds his readers, the same project.
 One version of Tess’s story is the one “told” by her body, a natural 
story of beauty, youth, and purity that seems to contradict her experi-
ences of, for example, the shame of rape and stigma of unwed mother-
hood. The novel’s subtitle, “a Pure Woman,” calls into question that 
physical narrative. On one hand, her body does tell the story of her 
purity; on the other, it is also that body that was seduced, that killed, 
and that bore a child. The seeming contrast between her body and her 
life leads to others in the novel reaching “contradictory and deceptive 
readings” about Tess’s character.20 her body is, throughout the story, 
read as one thing when it is really another; she is read as older and 
more mature when she is in fact young and immature, and it is read as 
virginal when she has already given birth to alec’s child. Must only one 
reading be correct? nature might seem to be an author that one cannot 
refute, but in fact it too offers no single, accurate reading. When Tess is 
young and truly an innocent to the ways of the world, her voluptuous-
ness renders her appearance like that of a woman far older and far more 
experienced than she is. This fact can be manipulated, as Mrs. Durbey-
field does when dressing Tess for her journey to meet the d’Urbervilles. 
notably, Tess does not dress herself, but is a passive participant in the 
process: Mrs. Durbeyfield washed and brushed Tess’s hair, adorning it 
with a “broader pink ribbon than usual”21 and “put upon” Tess a dress 
that “imparted to her developing figure an amplitude which belied her 
age, and might cause her to be estimated as a woman when she was not 
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much more than a child” (49). Such social signals rely, as Joan Durbey-
field does, on all viewers understanding what she intends. Clothing Tess 
in ribbons and mature dresses, Joan co-opts nature’s syntax.
 if Tess’s body tells changing stories, it is only right that her readings 
of others or of situations are similarly whimsical. Flexibility, mutability, 
capriciousness are not, it must be noted, uniquely positive qualities, a 
fact that makes Tess of the d’Urbervilles a progression from The Mayor 
of Casterbridge. Tess’s flightiness does not always serve her well. For 
Tess, in spite of her relative innocence, is aware that she has become 
the object of the gaze of others (her mother’s being a relatively benign 
instance), a prospect that at times she intuitively guards against. Know-
ing not only that she is stared at but the implicit danger in such stares, 
“though sometimes her journey to the town was made independently, 
she always searched for her fellows at nightfall, to have the protection 
of their companionship homeward” (64). here, Tess takes the active 
position of working to safeguard her body, aware that it is interesting 
and “graceful” (64) and, moreover, young. Tess is not always so active, 
and other times she abdicates her agency to the whims of her mother 
and—perhaps as a result—she blames Joan Durbeyfield for the results 
of that abdication. Though she will not walk home alone at night, Tess 
does not know to seek protection against alec; or, rather, does not seek 
that protection. her decision seems at first to be warranted, as Tess is 
described as being “mentally older than her mother,” and she dismisses 
Joan’s plans for her marriage to alec as meaningless. yet Tess later 
admonishes her mother for not informing her about the potential con-
sequences of visiting the d’Urbervilles: “Why didn’t you tell me there 
was danger in men-folk? Why didn’t you warn me? Ladies know what 
to fend hands against, because they read novels that tell them of these 
tricks; but i never had the chance o’ learning in that way, and you did 
not help me!” (82).22 Joan has no response equal to Tess’s accusations, 
but is only “subdued.”
 The relationship between Tess’s character, as defined by the choices 
she makes and her experience of those choices, and the version of her 
character as it is understood by her family, co-workers, or lovers, is 
unstable at best. in some cases, as in the example above, Tess accurately 
reads the intentions of men who leer at her from dark corners, and steels 
herself accordingly. in other instances, as in her encounter with alec, she 
is either unaware of the consequences of her choices or knowingly puts 
herself in danger and then protests her ignorance. in still other instances, 
she overanticipates others’ response to herself, believing that she is 
being harshly critiqued by her fellow townspeople when she is not. in 
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fact, hardy writes, her worries are “founded on an illusion” that others 
scrutinize her when, in fact, “She was not an existence, an experience, a 
passion, a structure of sensations, to anybody but herself.” The fear that 
generates “misery” is due to her cultivation of the “conventional aspect” 
as opposed to “her innate sensations” (91). at times she interprets accu-
rately, at times she interprets inaccurately, and at times she does not 
interpret at all. Tess’s varying acuity this area argues against Tess’s being 
“constructed” solely by or through the gaze of others; not only are her 
interpretations inconsistent, she is in no position to judge the relative 
accuracy of her interpretations. Tess’s other-construction is limited by 
her apprehension of others, just as others’ constructions of Tess are lim-
ited by their own apprehension of her. Despite or perhaps because of the 
intense attention paid to Tess’s physical beauty by both the novel and 
its characters, she remains curiously strange. Kaja Silverman frames the 
problem nicely: “the very density of this representational activity attests 
to the difficulties of containment—to a certain slippage of Tess out of the 
paradigms that structure her.”23
 Tess’s ambivalent relationship to her family’s history mirrors the 
multiplicity of her physical narrative. at times, she works against the 
claim to ancestry that led her to alec, having “no admiration” for her 
ancestors, and instead “almost [hating] them for the dance they had led 
her” (102). (One of her finest qualities is her beauty, and the narrator 
notes that it obviously comes from her mother and is “therefore unk-
nightly, unhistorical” [20].) Tess worries that a single, definite version 
of her history—such as that defined by genealogy—will rob her of her 
individuality and remind her that her nature and “past doings” “have 
been just like thousands’ and thousands’”(126) that came before her. 
Tellingly, Tess describes this concern by calling to mind the fixed, perma-
nent narrative of a book: “What’s the use,” she asks angel, “of learning 
that i am one of a long row only—finding out that there is set down in 
some old book somebody just like me, and to know that i shall only act 
her part; making me sad, that’s all” (126). The fixed narratives of books 
limit the potential for change and preclude mutability. Wishing not to 
be “set down in some book,” she disavows her own history. instead, 
she creates another, alternative narrative, equally tantalizing to Clare. 
realizing that his interest in her was “largely owing to her supposed 
untraditional newness” (128), she cultivates a lack of tradition, a lack 
of convention, essentially a pastless, storyless existence that is expressly 
counter to those made permanent by writing.
 in this way, hardy uses the novel form to underscore the discon-
nection between its solid permanence and the fluidity of the people 
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described therein. Tess, like most of hardy’s longer narrative fiction, 
leverages the most rigid formal qualities of the novel. hardy’s difficulty 
in choosing the title for Tess is a telling example of his concern: he 
rejected numerous versions before alighting on his final choice, and the 
oscillation shows a hyperconcern that it be right.24 Chaptered, titled, 
chronological, the novel’s plot and structure buttress Tess’s accounts of 
the fixedness of books.25 By allowing Tess, whose survival depends on 
her ability to control her own narrative, to critique the unbending stabil-
ity of the written word, hardy demonstrates the ambivalence afforded 
by his position as author: he is on the one hand the person who makes 
narrative permanent, and on the other hand the person who may attest 
to the impossibility of fully concretizing a person.26
 The tension between story and experience—between the fixed and 
the in-process—is most vividly rendered in hardy’s depictions of lov-
ers. J. hillis Miller described romantic relationships in hardy’s oeuvre 
as “loss of self-possession”;27 lovers’ “ceaseless moments of longing” 
are driven not by “simple desire for possession of another” but, he 
suggests, by a “desire for something else which seems to be accessible 
by way of the beloved.”28 Miller argues that hardy’s characters seek 
self-fulfillment through the beloved,29 but this result is often thwarted 
through a character’s “failure to obtain the woman he loves” or “by 
his discovery that he does not have what he wants when he possesses 
her.”30 i argue that the relationships are doomed because the desire is, 
from its inception, solipsistic. Clare, perhaps a typical hardian male, 
understands the beloved not as a separate being whose presence would 
complement his own, but instead as always already a construction of 
himself. another hardy protagonist, edred Fitzpiers of The Woodlanders, 
acknowledges this limit when he admits to Winterbourne, “i am in love 
with something in my own head, and no thing-in-itself outside it at all” 
(115). and the most extreme example in hardy’s oeuvre is Jocelyn Pier-
ston from The Well-Beloved (1897), a sculptor on a quest to find the living 
female incarnation of his personal and artistic ideal.31 angel Clare—like 
these men—discovers not, as Miller writes, that “he does not have what 
he wants” once he wins his beloved, but that what he wanted all along 
was a version of himself.
 To wit, Tess’s insistence on rejecting a stable, bookish version of 
her past is based on her (possibly projected32) belief that angel would 
prefer such blankness and freshness. indeed he seems to, but his under-
standing of people, of others, is in fact built on utterly rigid concep-
tions, wherein he cannot allow an individual room to change or even 
deviate from the narrow narrative he has fixed upon him or her. Tess’s 
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blank past becomes a screen onto which angel can project himself, 
though Clare cannot see his influence. Once Tess appears to him, her 
story—which he problematically equates with her—becomes fixed and 
fetishized; Clare functions by concretizing the flexible and historicizing 
the fresh. When faced with any information outside of his version of 
Tess, angel simply cannot reconcile the two. hardy’s metaphors for this 
process depend on natural imagery of solid metal: “Within the remote 
depths of his constitution, so gentle and affectionate as he was in gen-
eral, there lay hidden a hard logical deposit, like a vein of metal in a soft 
loam, which turned the edge of everything that attempted to traverse it. 
it had blocked his way with the Church; it blocked his way with Tess” 
(241). Clare’s position is complicated by his seeming awareness of Tess’s 
individuality—that vein of metal exists within the otherwise “soft loam” 
of his expansive mind. Tess’s appreciation of this awareness serves as a 
primary source of his pain. he seems, according to the narrative, to note 
and respect her individuality, characterizing his “conscience” as that 
part of him that recognizes her “precious life”: “a life which, to herself 
who endured or enjoyed it, possessed as great a dimension as the life of 
the mightiest to himself. Upon her sensations the whole world depended 
to Tess; through her existence all her fellow-creatures existed, to her. The 
universe itself only came into being for Tess on the particular day in the 
particular year in which she was born” (154). Still, his convictions mean 
little when challenged, and his actions in light of difficulty prove to be 
unequal to those stated beliefs. The contrast between Clare’s statements 
and Clare’s actions calls further attention to the disconnection between 
text and life illustrated throughout Tess.
 if angel presents a combination of rigidity couched among procla-
mations of free-thinking flexibility, his understanding of Tess presents 
an equally complicated vision. he believes her to be simple in her 
desires and expectations: he thinks, “what a creature of moods she was, 
and how careful he would have to be of her when she depended for 
her happiness entirely on him” (196). even here, her mercurial moodi-
ness does not preclude her complete dependence—whatever her mood, 
then, her happiness always depends on angel. is this an indication of 
his solipsism, that even when accounting for her variability he reduces 
her to a constant? in other moments his understanding of her as being 
dependent on himself, however, is shown to be incomplete. The narrator 
adjusts the reader’s impression of Clare’s version of Tess a few pages 
later: “Clare knew that she loved him—every curve of her form showed 
that—but he did not know at that time the full depth of her devotion, 
its single-mindedness, its meekness; what long-suffering it guaranteed, 
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what honestly, what endurance, what good faith” (213). here, “single-
mindedness” and “meekness” ensure that “endurance” and “good faith” 
define Tess’s love; these are, at best, ambiguous qualities of a lover. Clare 
understands her to be dependent on him for her happiness in the pres-
ent, but is apparently unaware of how persistent her devotion is (note 
as well that enduring devotion to Clare is not the same as complete 
dependence on him).
 So while he may not grasp the depth of her dedication, and while he 
recognizes her mutability, Clare does believe Tess is knowable.33 his per-
sistence and rigidity become paramount when Tess confesses her past 
to him. now, faced with information that he cannot reconcile with his 
version of her, he rebels, insisting that she (the fixed, the dependent) is 
fundamentally altered. his language after her confession is stark. When 
she notes that she forgives his own earlier transgressions, he responds, 
“Forgiveness does not apply to the case. you were one person; now you 
are another. how can forgiveness meet such a grotesque prestidigitation 
as that?” (228). Critics seized upon hardy’s choice of words here, noting 
that “prestidigitation” was hardly the bon mot many in angel’s position 
would choose.34 yet the word is telling, planting angel firmly in the 
ground of the bookish, the stolid, and the unmoving, even as he accuses 
Tess of being a shape-shifter. One hoped-for result of Tess’s telling her 
past is the creation of a vision of the other that is commodious enough to 
contain multiplicity; she seeks to open out her own narrative to include 
coexisting versions of self—the Tess who carried alec d’Urberville’s 
baby is the same Tess who stands before angel. if she wishes to connect 
her past to her present, it is through an incarnation of personal history 
that insists on the unknown and multiple; she does not seek to con-
struct a stable, single, “historical self.”35 The revelation of her past has 
so altered angel’s perception of Tess that he wishes to alter other parts 
of her past so that her story better fits the embodied Tess he sees before 
him: in his mind, the actions of the person must match his narrative of 
that person, even if doing so requires changing the narrative he clings 
to. Curiously, this does not reflect a propensity to adapt. Clare simply 
rejects entirely the old narrative and creates a new one (which he treats 
as if it were always true) that conforms to present events. Tess’s noble 
ancestry at one point stood for her worthiness; now, he says to her, “i 
think that parson who unearthed your pedigree would have done bet-
ter if he had held his tongue” (232). While that story may be altered or 
may be wished never discovered, nature’s writing poses an even greater 
challenge. it is through angel that hardy articulates most directly the 
frustration wrought when nature’s syntax proves to be untrustworthy. 
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angel is continually nonplussed by such discord. he is “stupefied” and 
argues “erroneously” with himself, trying to reconcile her transgressions 
with what he believes is the uncontestable story told by her beauty (235).
 Clare’s recalcitrance would then seem to leave him ill-equipped to 
engage in fruitful relationships, but he ends the novel alive, hand in 
hand with Liza-Lu, the “spiritualized image” of Tess. Tess ends the 
novel in death, that most fixed, stonelike state. One might read these 
ends as just rewards for their lives—Tess punished for her crimes and 
angel living on with the potential for future happiness as recompense 
for his trials. But the novel’s dynamics demand that death be recognized 
not as a predetermined, eternal punishment but rather as the ultimate 
unknowable state, a state for which Tess is remarkably well adapted. in 
willing Liza-Lu to Clare, Tess acts upon a most intimate comprehension 
of angel’s desires without compromising her own. if henchard’s will, 
requesting that “no man remember me,” manifests his last attempt at 
controlling others’ encounter with even his memory, Tess’s final request 
manifests her acute understanding of angel’s desire (as opposed to 
her own) for continuity. in Liza-Lu, she intends angel to have what he 
seems to want most: an incarnation of Tess that revives his early mental 
constructions of her—as Tess describes it, “all the best of me without the 
bad of me.” her final utterance to angel, her final line recorded by the 
novel, “i am ready,” then shows her resignation to (or welcoming of) the 
unknown.
 This circumstance arises to varying degrees throughout Thomas har-
dy’s fiction; the wages that conflicting narratives inflict on interpersonal 
relationships are central to his plots. By layering those personal narra-
tives within the novel’s discourse, he ensures that the metanarrative 
reflects a similar tension: having access to a narrative—any narrative—
does not ensure access to the person it details. Much of the conflict that 
his characters experience arises when they, or others around them, can-
not reconcile their lived experience with the narratives describing, and 
thus defining, that experience. Despite Tess’s desire to create a present 
that does not depend solely on her past for meaning, angel’s response 
to that desire inhibits her ability to transcend her past with him. it’s not 
just what you’ve done that counts; it’s what others think you have done. 
Tess thus remains unknown and unknowable to angel; her inability to 
anticipate his reaction to her revelation (an inability, but certainly not 
a fault) ensures that he remains unknown and unknowable to her. he 
cannot grant her independence from his apprehension of her. and while 
it might seem that the greater fault lies with angel than with Tess, the 
novel makes clear that blame is a meaningless pursuit.
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The Novel and the Face-to-Face
With his characters, hardy interrogates the terms with which individu-
als encounter other individuals, and the role that narrative plays in those 
encounters is unmistakable. To confine an individual to a narrative is 
to make that which cannot be known (the human) into that which can 
be known (a story). By insisting on that distinction within his novels, 
hardy makes explicit what was more subtly present in Dickens’s and 
eliot’s36 works: the final limitation of the realist text, a limitation that 
is essential to the realist project, is that the text can never fully account 
for, explain, or contain, the human individual. That limitation does not 
inhibit productive representation; it enables productive representation.
 The novel, both its material manifestation of bound paper between 
two covers, and its less tangible version—the story it details, the words 
chosen to detail that story—are thoroughly and eminently knowable. 
They can be plumbed, torn apart, analyzed, and memorized: they can 
be consumed, in short, by a reader. Consumption serves a useful parallel 
here, in that it connotes the act of a reader bringing the novel into her 
own self. But, and here is where hardy’s work in particular becomes a 
useful illustration of the idea, since the novel can be consumed by the 
reader, the reader cannot admit its radical alterity. That is, to return to 
Levinas’s useful formulation, there can be no face-to-face with a novel. 
it is the people who inhabit the novel who retain their alterity only in 
relation to the other characters within the novel. hardy’s works iterate 
and reiterate the disconnection between the individual and her story, 
between the man and the narrative of his life, by depicting problems that 
arise when the two are collapsed. When one person refuses to recognize 
the alterity of the other through the consumption or reification of the 
other’s story, the possibility of effectual affective relationship ceases to 
exist. it is only in the granting of autonomy, the acknowledging that he 
cannot know her through her story, that any movement forward is pos-
sible.
 When hardy’s characters think about others, they think about the 
narratives that define those others—actions, genealogy, pasts, physical-
ity. That his novels themselves replicate this relationship, offering the 
reader a narrative that describes and defines the characters within, might 
seem natural. his contribution to lessons of empathic engagement aris-
es in his constant devotion to upsetting those narratives—diegetically, 
hardy shows that no stable definition can contain an individual but 
that instead the person always exceeds any limits defined by narrative. 
his characters are not reducible to their stories. Pulling back, his novels 
themselves uphold this argument by straining at their own boundaries: 
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Sue’s slippery character, Tess’s series of unenviable bad luck, henchard’s 
preternatural stubbornness. To uphold the dynamics that define his 
argument, hardy suggests that his novels exceed his grasp in moments, 
and they seem to; that excess calls attention to the often fraught relation-
ship between form and content—trying to represent that slipperiness 
within a novel casts into relief the permanent materiality of the novel 
form itself. That relationship, as will be seen in the next chapter, becomes 
a central concern in James Mcneill Whistler’s painting, in which inscru-
tability becomes a subject as well as a style.
an image of the Chelsea pier at night, a nocturne (figure 2) in misty 
blurs of gray, is so small—only 8 by 10 inches—that it demands that 
viewers approach closely; yet even close scrutiny offers little definitive 
pictorial information. no objects or landmarks are discernible, and the 
dock’s edges, if indeed that is what they are, are only hinted at with 
specks of red amid the field of silvery blue. There is modulation in 
the color; the image is interesting and complex, but it defies viewers’ 
attempts at interpretation. a drypoint from 18611 adopts a different 
pictorial vocabulary, eschewing the blurred diffuseness of the nocturne 
in favor of black hatches of color, but achieves a similarly unwelcoming 
effect (figure 1). it depicts a solitary male figure with his back to the 
viewer. he faces a window, its six panes divided by heavy black lines, 
the central mullion cutting into the middle of his head. he sits in a 
ladder-back chair; its horizontal slats are barely discernible in the print. 
Driving toward him are all directions of scratchings, each line bearing 
the burred, inky edges of Whistler’s drypoint technique.
 neither of these works by Whistler is particularly inviting. The noc-
turne is unfocused and foggy, and its content is explicitly and emphati-
cally muddy. The figure in the drypoint refuses the viewer’s attempt to 
interpret or engage through his position (his face turned away in the 
image) and through elements of the composition that intrude between 
the man and audience. The cross-hatching common to all etching here 
mimics and amplifies the barriers between subject and viewer, barriers 
that include the ladder-back chair, the window mullions, the edges of 
the table and bench, and the beams that line the ceiling—all of these 
elements simultaneously point to the figure and block him from view. 
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These two images—one a landscape and the other of a single subject—
distance their audience with visual obstacles.
 in another category of Whistler’s oeuvre, group scenes depict indi-
viduals with barriers between them, as opposed to or in addition to 
the interpretive barriers between viewer and image. here are people 
sharing a space, a room, a conversation, a family, a moment. and yet 
Whistler’s pictorial strategies insist on the subjects’ disconnection, even 
alienation, from one another, all without undermining artistic verisi-
militude. Through this insistence, Whistler accomplishes a feat parallel 
to that of the realist authors: he depicts images of people that are pro-
foundly moving, yet profoundly unreachable, all the while emphasizing 
through form the necessity of connection. This chapter focuses on three 
of Whistler’s earliest canvases—At the Piano (1858), Harmony in Green 
and Rose: The Music Room (1861), and Wapping (1860–64)—to explore two 
of Whistler’s techniques for capturing these moments of disconnection, 
fixing them permanently on the canvas: the use of profile and deliberate 
obfuscation via pictorial cluttering. These techniques form part of the 
repertoire of Whistler’s painterly methodology and philosophy.
 i shift to Whistler’s painting as a means of demonstrating the trend in 
nineteenth-century realism to emphasize the unbridgeable alterity of the 
human other. in doing so, i anticipate one vociferous objection: Whistler’s 
work has little in common with realist painting, much less with realist 
fiction. indeed, Whistler’s diffuse, idiosyncratic style might appear to 
reject the tenets of realism espoused by his contemporaries or the authors 
addressed in this study; the techniques of alienation Whistler adopts in 
his painting actively and expressly resist, for example, narrativizing. and 
yet, Whistler’s very resistance to narrative links his works to those of the 
realist authors. his painting emphasizes the formal aspects, the painterly 
qualities of painting that make the work of art a spectacle, while frequently 
resisting the spectacularization of the human subject. The visual aversions 
that could seem only to alienate the viewer are actually quite productive; 
his paintings, much like hardy’s novels, draw a clear and unmistakable 
line between the work of art itself, which is knowable, and those figures 
depicted within those works, who are not knowable to one another. in 
addition to that distinction, Whistler develops an intricate visual language, 
with which he depicts interpersonal dissention, discomfort, or alienation. 
The insistent disconnectedness of those depicted within his paintings 
signals a fundamental lesson of victorian realism: even in gatherings of 
intimates, the human other remains always ultimately unknowable.
 Whistler may present viewers with images of inscrutability, but his 
canvases invite analysis, focusing the gaze of the viewer on his method 
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of representation. it is a distinction Whistler himself insists on. One may 
not be able to identify the exact location from which Whistler painted the 
Chelsea pier; one may not be able to discern what time of day or night 
a scene occurs; one may not know who—as in the case of the etching—a 
figure represents. But by eliding identifiable markers of content, Whistler 
shifts the weight of his works onto their form. When viewers jettison 
anxieties associated with content labeling, the modulations of color, 
technique of paint application, even the size of the canvas, all readily 
discernible qualities, move to the foreground. Those knowable quali-
ties remain in tension with the murkiness of the scenes or relationships 
depicted. his titles reflect a will to obscure; his mid-career decision to 
title or retitle his paintings using musical terms was surely influenced by 
aesthetic and Symbolist trends, but at its base was less an act of fidelity 
to an artistic movement than a means to deflect viewers’ attempts to nar-
rate the images he paints. Perhaps more than the other realists addressed 
in this study, Whistler is alive to the fact that letting go of expectations 
of comprehensive certainty is difficult for readers or viewers, and his 
attempts to manipulate viewers’ expectations with regard to both form 
and content may be felt as perverse.
 Despite this rich fodder for analysis, his oeuvre has remained until 
very recently remarkably underanalyzed and undertheorized. as recent-
ly as the 1990s, critics bemoaned the lack of critical attention received by 
Whistler’s work in comparison to the wealth of attention devoted to his 
biography.2 One reason for the omission is that his life story is easily as 
interesting as his work; he was equally provocative in both, his highly 
idiosyncratic behavior matching the unicity of his artwork. One recent 
critic breezily summarizes the public Whistler as follows: “a pugnacious 
but dandified american expatriate aesthete, precocious champion of 
Japonisme, quick-witted and sharp-tongued battler of the press, painter 
of ‘nocturnes,’ ‘Symphonies,’ and ‘arrangements,’ beyond whose sur-
face lie barely perceptible traces of recognizable motifs.”3 The Whistler 
of this description—aesthete, dandy, rabble-rouser—is but a cartoon 
version of the real, complicated artist, but a cartoon so compelling that 
even the very reductive biographical sketch often overwhelms consider-
ation of his art. Some of the blame for that reductive portrait must fall 
on Whistler himself, who was not always savvy—or was perhaps too 
savvy—about the attention he sought. Whistler’s self-promotion reached 
what some regard as an apotheosis in his broadly publicized 1878 libel 
trial against John ruskin. Whistler published his account of the trial in 
a volume titled The Gentle Art of Making Enemies; the title alone shows 
the artist’s wry disdain for his critics.4 This moment, and the style of 
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Whistler’s painting that was at the heart of the civil action, becomes the 
touchstone for Whistler’s oeuvre.
 Given the idiosyncrasies of his life and self-promotion, it is not sur-
prising that when recent scholars turn their attention to Whistler, they 
turn to his later works, works in the style that inspired ruskin’s sharp-
est criticism. There are two results of this focus: first, by emphasizing 
his later, London-based work, such criticism encourages a portrait of 
Whistler defined within and against a strongly British art environment. 
Second, because the criticism emphasizes Whistler’s later (British) work 
to the exclusion of his earlier work, Whistler’s oeuvre appears to have 
more in common with that of albert Moore and Frederic Leighton than 
with the works of French realists or with the artists described by Tim 
Barringer as “hogarthian barbarians of mid-victorian art”: William hol-
man hunt, William Powell Firth, and Ford Madox Brown.5 Whistler 
emerges, in contrast to those moralistic painters who valued verisimili-
tude in representation, as an aesthete.6 elizabeth Prettejohn—writing in 
what might rightfully be considered a definitive text on aesthetic art—
acknowledges the painter’s ambivalent position within the aesthetic 
movement, noting that Whistler was not “a spokesman, self-appointed 
or otherwise, for an artistic movement that might be united under” the 
“art for art’s sake” slogan, conceding that his work, and the theory to 
which his work contributes, “is nonetheless exemplary for the range of 
practices that explored the question of what art might be, if it were for 
the sake of anything else.”7 Ultimately, though, she situates his eccen-
tric, nonnarrative work firmly within the aesthetic tradition, citing with 
approval Colvin’s description of the works of Whistler, Leighton, and 
Moore as “beauty without realism.”8 even those reevaluating Whistler’s 
work cannot escape the claim of aestheticism: rachel Teukolsky makes 
the case that Whistler’s aesthetic drive links his work to the modernism 
that follows, but does not engage the earlier link in that chain, the French 
realist tradition in which Whistler trained.9
 Whistler’s prominence within the critical literature on aestheticism 
ensures that his place in the development of realist iconography is over-
shadowed by French painters. Michael Fried rightly includes Whistler 
among the “Generation of 1863” in his Manet’s Modernism, but his is a 
lonely voice;10 no work of Whistler’s appears in Linda nochlin’s semi-
nal (and heavily French) Realism, which focuses on France during the 
period of Whistler’s tenure there. That the artist’s biography precludes 
a stable identification, national or otherwise, contributes to the issue. 
Born in america, Whistler traveled extensively, trained in France, and 
settled in London with his sister and brother-in-law. Unlike Mary Cas-
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satt, for example, who left the United States but firmly inserted herself 
into the French art scene, where she longed to stay, and did indeed stay, 
Whistler was peripatetic. Moreover, his timing was odd: he moved 
from France to Britain at a time when French art was exploding in 
new directions and British art was, by comparison, conservative if not 
reactionary. Whistler and his art seem to fit comfortably into neither 
the French nor the British art-historical traditions. While he was in 
France, Courbet was his teacher, and it is in Courbet’s realist tradition 
that Whistler cultivated his early treatment of figures and developed 
his unique pictorial language. he might later have rejected the influ-
ence of Courbet on his work (“il n’y en a pas eu, et on n’en trouvera 
pas dans mes toiles,” he writes to Fantin-Latour in the late 1860s) but 
the resonances are evident.11 Whistler was grounded within an existent 
and emerging movement; the variations in representational strategies 
that would define his artistic individuation from that movement were 
influenced by and manifested in response to a uniquely French realist 
tradition, which he in turn influenced.
 Whistler’s contribution to that realist tradition exhibits a movement 
out of and away from the perceived teleology of Western art—his style 
(and, unlike many of his realist contemporaries, his life) extends past 
high realism into the twentieth century, when his refusal to engage in 
narrative painting does align him in some way with those anti-realist 
aesthetes. his later work, especially, seems to fall out of that juggernaut 
of ever-increasing verisimilitude, driving always to eliminate “those 
obstacles which impede the reproduction” of an external, universal real-
ity.12 The assumption that art drives always to greater verisimilitude has 
long been assailed by art historians,13 just as its literary complement has 
been assailed by literary critics, yet it remains remarkably resilient, and 
any consideration of realism in text or images must still be divorced 
from claims of objectivity. Whistler’s realism resides not in the objectiv-
ity of his images but rather in what he chooses to represent and how he 
does so, and foremost among his contributions to realist iconography 
is his pictorial insistence on the surface of the painting, his refusal to 
encourage narration of images, his depiction of interpersonal discord, 
and his use of a variety of techniques to obscure access to the individuals 
represented in his paintings. it is precisely these modes of representa-
tion, techniques that might feel alienating to a viewer accustomed to 
more conventional (victorian) paintings with more conventional (victo-
rian) messages, that form the central focus of this study.
 Whistler’s insistence on the formal qualities of painted images, 
including the habit of referring to his paintings as “arrangements,” con-
founds the viewer and art historian. about the portrait of his mother, 
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Prettejohn summarizes this reaction: “we are forbidden, apparently, to 
speculate on the character, biography or feelings of the sitter, and told 
peremptorily to consider her merely as an ‘arrangement.’”14 Though 
Prettejohn notes the upside to Whistler’s instruction—that in describ-
ing the painting as an arrangement, the artist frees the viewer from the 
influence of his own emotions, predilections, or expectations—she does 
not quite consider what happens when we do regard Whistler’s paint-
ings as arrangements. What do the arrangements tell us—the bifurcated 
scenes, the solid verticals cutting up the interiors, the emphatic verticals 
breaking up the spaces between the paintings’ subjects? in objecting to 
a traditional moralizing, Whistler opened up the way for something 
else—a means of painting that explicitly depicts its subjects as unique 
individuals, insistently making those subjects unknowable to the others 
who share the canvas. and through that depiction, the artist shatters the 
viewer’s access to the safety of a unifying narrative, and offers instead 
a meditation on the fiction of understanding the other.
Realist Bona Fides
early in 2009 an exhibition of the domestic scenes of nabis painter 
Pierre Bonnard opened at the Metropolitan Museum in new york. Bon-
nard’s intimate spaces, often centered on a dining table or a window, 
frequently feature human figures who appear coldly at odds, a curious 
effect considering the warm tonal glow of what look like cozy spaces. 
Drawn mostly from Bonnard’s late period from the mid-1920s through 
the 1940s, the images seem, as some critics have noted, to engage stylisti-
cally much more with the artistic past than with the period during which 
they were painted. Bonnard’s artistic style feels more comfortable among 
earlier vuillards, Cézannes, or Gauguins than it does among his late con-
temporaries Picasso or Matisse. What then locates his works in the Mod-
ernist tendencies of his period are his scenes of interpersonal alienation, 
what Christopher Benfey calls “domestic disturbance, isolation, and sad-
ness.”15 Still, the sense of shared discomfort that does appear thoroughly 
contemporary has its roots in a realist—a nineteenth-century—past. This 
mode of representation, as Benfey accedes, places Bonnard’s interior 
scenes among the works of ibsen or henry James. Through that earlier 
realist genealogy—from Gauguin and Cézanne backward to Manet and 
Courbet—one can locate the genesis of the temperament communicated 
in Bonnard’s uncomfortable, though beautiful, interiors. in particular, 
the depiction of discomfort between people within their everyday milieu 
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must be located in a realist ancestry. and one essential component of 
that French family tree is Whistler.
 among the novel choices deployed in French realist paintings was the 
representation of disharmony, and one way to depict misunderstanding 
was through seemingly alienated subjects; communal scenes were one 
trope representing nonidealized, ostensibly nonposed, rural life. illustrat-
ing community is not as simple as depicting a group, a problem regularly 
explored in Courbet’s works.16 Courbet’s Burial at Ornans (1849–50), for 
example, includes some forty-five figures, seemingly representing an 
entire community. Despite its size (over 10' x 20') and breadth of subject 
choice, it does not depict communal unity, but rather “internal tensions 
and ambiguities,” and what T. J. Clark called “collective distraction.”17 
This depiction of a crowd that seems comprehensive, cutting across class 
boundaries, attending an event that might be regarding as unifying (a 
burial),18 appears instead as a scene of people mired in their separation 
and well aware of their differences from one another.
 even outside of large-scale communal scenes, subjects with disparate 
body positions, effaced from one another or the viewer, can denote mis-
communication. Édouard Manet was Whistler’s cotemporary, and in his 
oeuvre the trope is prevalent, and is, indeed, regarded as a hallmark of 
his style. That Manet is among the most analyzed artists of the period 
makes him an interesting complement to Whistler. Manet’s Le Chemin 
de Fer, for example, features a woman and child, and while the woman 
is situated directly facing the viewer, the young girl’s back is turned 
toward both the woman and the viewer.19 The woman’s dog is uncon-
cerned with the viewer as well. That one subject does gaze directly out of 
the image negates the reading that the subjects were captured unawares 
or spontaneously (as often happens in, for example, Degas’ works). Such 
paintings suggest a world in which the subject may seem to be aware 
of his viewer and may seem even to acknowledge his viewer instead of 
his companion. Le Balcon (1869) is another example of such an image 
in Manet’s oeuvre, as are Argenteuil, Déjeuner sur l’herbe (1863), Olympia 
(1863), Nana (1877), and so on. That those people depicted within the 
immediacy of the frame of a painting should somehow miss each other 
is much like the situations within the examined novels, where proxim-
ity never guarantees connection. The representational tropes that these 
canvases share, defying as they did conventional iconography, did not 
ingratiate their viewers, and a negative critical response should, per-
haps, have been expected.
 Manet’s thwarted and problematic connections with his audience are 
another trait he shared with Whistler. Manet’s tortuous relationship with 
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the Salon judges, his critics, and his public attests to the power of his 
signifiers being interpreted in ways he did not expect. The audience’s 
insistence on narrativizing the images he painted was one source for 
their hyperbolic reactions, as the narratives (as opposed to the paintings 
themselves) provided the basis for many of the objectives. The public 
furor over Olympia (1863) demonstrates this idea, and certainly Whistler, 
working and exhibiting at the same time, experienced the risks of this 
kind of painting and the pitfalls associated with the narratives provided 
by viewers and critics. Manet’s painting was thrust into a world that 
constructed meaning out of readable markers, and class seems to be 
inscribed in the trappings of the image, including the title: “Olympe,” 
nancy Locke writes, “was a pseudonym in use among nineteenth-cen-
tury prostitutes.”20 Just as nature’s syntax may be read on the face of a 
perfect beauty, it may also, the argument goes, be read on the face of the 
prostitute. T. J. Clark argues that the most readable aspect of Olympia is 
her nakedness, though critics were unable to deal with this fact because 
of the “lures” of the image that detract attention away from the body: 
“the cat, the negress, the orchid, the bunch of flowers, the slippers, the 
pearl earrings, the choker, the screen, the shawl—they were all lures, 
they all meant nothing, or nothing in particular,”21 a fact that did not 
stop critics from interpreting those red herrings innumerous ways. if one 
accepts Clark’s argument that the objects in the image signify nothing, 
that lack of signification was itself provocative. Olympia refuses, in a 
sense, to be read within the comfortable confines of art criticism or social 
drama.22
 Whistler’s The White Girl (1862; later renamed Symphony in White No. 
1), a rare case of his painting a woman in full face, was displayed in the 
1863 Salon des refusés with Manet’s Déjeuner sur l’herbe. Like Olympia, 
The White Girl goaded critics not to supply a narrative, a challenge they 
failed miserably.23 yet unlike Manet’s works of the same period that have 
received near constant critical attention, The White Girl, “no less ambigu-
ous than Manet’s [works], has remained relatively undiscussed.”24 The 
prettiness of Whistler’s canvases distinguishes his work from Manet’s, 
but he shares with Manet the knack for creating images that resist nar-
ration.
The Trouble with Reading
From the French realist tradition Whistler gained appreciation for imag-
es of discord and a potentially antagonistic bent for disappointing spec-
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tators’ desire for the comfort of narrative certainty. French realism also 
provides example after example of images that, after initial critical deri-
sion or apathy, went on to be hailed as exemplary if not genius works—
and as Whistler would outlive many of his realist cohort by decades, this 
trend bolstered his willingness to persist stubbornly against naysayers. 
Whistler had, by the 1860s, moved to england, where the general tenor 
of the visual arts remained moralizing and narrative-based, rather than 
embracing the French trends toward a new visual vocabulary defined 
by Courbet, Manet, and others. Pamela Fletcher notes that “a test of 
aesthetic success” of any painting was its “ability to arouse emotion in 
its viewers,” and the proper result of the desired emotional response 
was a movement toward moral edification if not direct altruistic action.25 
viewers, as Whistler wrote, seemed to confound beauty “with virtue,” 
asking before paintings, “What good shall it do?”26
 Whistler had good reason to critique that conflation of morality with 
aesthetic judgment. While in France even the academic establishment 
was by this time beginning to embrace the possibilities of representing 
images outside of narrative and outside of communion, in Britain the 
academy was still rewarding paintings that implied narrative as well 
as morals. in fact, there seemed to be a causal relationship between an 
implied story and an implied moral; see, for example, Millais’s The Order 
of Release, hunt’s The Awakening Conscience, or any of the biblically or 
mythologically inspired works of the Pre-raphaelite Brotherhood. The 
libel trial against ruskin solidified the position of Whistler’s works 
within a binary conflict “between literary, moralizing art identified with 
victorianism and the purely pictorial, self-referential aesthetics associ-
ated with nascent modernism.”27 But the struggle began long before 
the trial. augustus Leopold egg’s Past and Present triptych (1858) is one 
work typical of “literary, moralizing art identified with victorianism.” 
egg illustrates three scenes that ruskin understood as the unraveling of 
a marriage ruined by a wife’s infidelity. in each, the symbols for marital 
disharmony are so obvious that they nearly cease to be symbols.28 The 
first, hung in the center, depicts a woman prostrate on the floor in front 
of a man, wringing her hands. Two young girls sit in front of a collapsing 
house of cards, which had been built upon a novel by Balzac (of course). 
an apple is sliced in two: one half sits on a table next to the husband and 
is stabbed by a knife. The other half is on the floor, lying next to the wife. 
To ruskin, these images spelled out a narrative with utter certainty; he 
summed up the narrative told by the other two canvases of the triptych 
in his exhibition review: “the husband discovers his wife’s infidelity; he 
dies five years afterwards. The two lateral pictures represent the same 
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moment of night a fortnight after his death. The same little cloud is 
under the moon. The two children see it from the chamber in which they 
are praying for their lost mother, and their mother, from behind a boat 
under the vault of the river shore.”29 even outside of the specificity of 
ruskin’s supplied narrative, the paintings unmistakably represent mis-
ery, and the title Past and Present suggests a causal relationship between 
events depicted in the first canvas and the sadness that permeates the 
second and third. it is perhaps not too great of a leap to conclude that 
egg intended to communicate a moral: adultery will be punished by 
misery for all involved. in reading this story into and onto the image, 
Whistler believed, the qualities of the image are ignored. Little riled the 
artist more.
 in Ten O’Clock, an 1885 lecture that was later printed, Whistler defined 
the problem with this approach—often prescribed by the mediating 
critic—to “reading” paintings:
For some time past, the unattached writer has become the middle-
man in this matter of art, and his influence, while it has widened the 
gulf between the people and the painter, has brought about the most 
complete misunderstanding as to the aim of the picture. For him a 
picture is more or less a hieroglyph or symbol of a story. apart from a 
few technical terms, for the display of which he finds an occasion, the 
work is considered absolutely from a literary point of view; indeed, 
from what other can he consider it? and in his essays he deals with it 
as with a novel—a history—or an anecdote. he fails entirely and most 
naturally to see its excellences, or demerits—artistic—and so degrades 
art, by supposing it a method of bringing about a literary climax. it 
thus, in his hands, becomes merely a means of perpetuating something 
further, and its mission is made a secondary one, even as a means is 
second to an end.30
First, Whistler critiques the act of looking for an invented unknown 
beyond the image instead of regarding the surface of the painting. Far 
from proposing a theory of art that depends on a pure superficiality, 
that is, an art that lacks depth, he is countering the ruskinian tendency 
to compose extended narratives that usurp the primacy of the image. 
Whistler refocuses on the surfaces of the canvas so that it resumes its 
position as fundamental and not secondary to the story it purportedly 
tells; the canvas must not be appropriated by moral claims, and it should 
not function merely as a vehicle for a lesson. Whistler is not arguing 
against analysis or interpretation, but against the unnecessarily and 
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formulaic pasting of a narrative onto what is expressly not a narrative.31
 That Whistler’s rejection of ruskinian tendencies focuses on the 
approach to appreciating a work of art rather than on the content, per 
se, of a painting becomes clear when we consider ruskin’s adoration of 
Turner. Turner’s later work has much in common with Whistler’s—the 
diffuse and suggestive landscapes, the lushly imprecise depiction of nat-
ural elements—but while ruskin wholeheartedly champions Turner’s 
works, he routinely denigrates Whistler’s. On one level, the distinction 
is due, as David Craven writes, to ruskin’s perception of the “vulgar 
commercialization” attributable to Whistler’s “willful deletion of asso-
ciative values” in an attempt to gain wealth “without contributing to 
the betterment of society.”32 yet even when ruskin praises Turner on 
seemingly purely visual or formal terms (as opposed to narrative, com-
mercial, or moral ones), it is because Turner’s works inspire “associa-
tive thinking,”33 making demands on the interpretative powers of the 
viewers. ruskin felt, as elizabeth helsinger describes, that Turner’s 
canvases made “greater demands on his viewers” while at the same 
time providing explicit direction. To the extent that ruskin recalls the 
“familiar romantic interest in the unfinished or incomplete,” he praises 
Turner because of the “precise directions for imaginative activity” that 
his paintings provide.34 Whistler’s refusal to offer instruction through 
titles (where a great contrast between Whistler and Turner’s work can 
be drawn) and his statements about art and criticism seem to foreclose 
all interpretative acts.
 Curiously, in his effort to distinguish his images from narrative, 
Whistler nevertheless outlines an approach to art that is analogous to 
that of the realist writers. Whistler proposes in his own work a means 
to counter the symbolic and chronological pictorial elements that seem 
to compel narrative readings of images. it is not a new critical approach 
as much as it is a new compositional approach.
 One consequence of Whistler’s admitted distaste for the moralizing 
aspect of much conventional victorian visual art is that he is, as i have 
noted above, too often aligned with others who spoke loudly against the 
conventional—the aesthetes. Despite his adherence to a belief that art 
should be regarded (seen) for its own merits and demerits as opposed to 
its instructive value, his version of rendering art must not be conflated 
with the aesthetic dictum “art for art’s sake”; further, it is important to 
note that he was not universally regarded as an aesthete even in his 
own time. Wilde accused him of “[explaining] to the public that the only 
thing they should cultivate was ugliness, and that on their permanent 
stupidity rested all the hopes of art in the future,”35 and of loving the 
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ugly, finding “le beau dans l’horrible.”36 This particular criticism was not 
new to realist artists, who since Balzac had been accused exactly of a fas-
cination with or adoration of the ugly and base. For Whistler, the charge 
sits uneasily because of the very prettiness of his imagery, if nothing 
else. in fact, that surface beauty allows other critics to charge Whistler 
with the opposite: rather than fetishizing the ugly, some suggest, Whis-
tler instead “aesthetically and psychologically evade[s] concern for the 
human dilemmas rife in east London and [ . . . ] even nullif[ies] these 
dilemmas by subsuming them into his overriding aestheticism.”37 
 indeed, much of the scholarship on Whistler and his oeuvre insists on 
its prettiness, often to the exclusion of analysis of technique or composi-
tion. Whistler’s regular and highly idiosyncratic use of the profile in his 
compositions, for example, garners little attention. in roy McMullen’s 
biography of Whistler, the trope earns merely a glancing mention and 
is explained away as a means to render his subjects in a most flattering 
position. Describing At the Piano (1858), McMullen includes Whistler’s 
penchant for the “profile view that idealizes a sitter” among his other 
traits: “an association with music, a preference for muted light, and a 
readiness to be pensive.”38 The idealizing of a subject, preferences for 
one kind of light, and pensiveness are qualities of the artist, of course, 
and not necessarily the art, and McMullen’s aim is to construct a biog-
raphy, not art criticism. in other cases, even the expectation of prettiness 
can be overwhelming; nearly all discussion of his iconic portrait of his 
mother, Arrangement in Grey and Black, insists on equating his representa-
tional choices with lack of emotion; it is described as “decidedly unsen-
timental”39 with colors that “are low key, verging on monochrome” and 
as a “composition” with “ the willful oddity of a harshly cropped Pola-
roid”40 when in fact the image simply does not conform to a typically 
Whistlerian aesthetic of diffuse softness. if the lack of prettiness causes 
viewers to read more discord in an image that it demands, when images 
are too pretty, viewers risk overlooking discord altogether.
 repeatedly, though people share the frame, they do not seem to 
share an experience. Compared with others’ works, the difference in 
Whistler’s group depictions is stark. Consider again egg’s Past and Pres-
ent; it too depicts discord, but while its subjects might not share a gaze, 
they certainly are actors within the same space, responding to the same 
events—a posture that is not frequently discernible in Whistler’s works. 
a more salient comparison might be one made by elizabeth Prettejohn, 
who compares Leighton’s Spanish Dancing Girl (1867), Moore’s A Musi-
cian (1867), and Whistler’s Symphony in White #3 (1865–87) to illustrate 
their shared traits. in Leighton’s and Moore’s paintings, there are mul-
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tiple subjects; in Leighton’s, as the title indicates, a Spanish girl (later, the 
painting was renamed Greek Girl Dancing) dances while three onlookers 
clap, and in Moore’s, two lounging women listen to a man playing a lyre. 
The settings of both paintings seem to be classical—all subjects wear the 
loosely draped clothes of the ancients, and in both paintings all of the 
subjects are sharing the experience of listening to the music produced 
within the painting. One might safely assume that the Spanish (or Greek) 
girl is dancing to music supplied by someone outside of the images, and 
at the very least the clapping of the three people watching her would 
provide a rhythm; in Leighton’s, there can be no doubt that the man is 
playing the lyre. Other than the title, there is no indication of music within 
Whistler’s Symphony in White #3. Moreover, Whistler’s painting clearly 
depicts women in contemporary dress—it is a scene influenced by the 
japonisme that Whistler encouraged in his interior design; it is a victorian 
scene. here, as elsewhere, the choice of title is not intended to give the 
viewer insight into what is happening within the scene; we are not meant 
to view the painting as a scene of two women sharing the experience of 
listening, for example, to a symphony. Further, the two women in Whis-
tler’s painting, though sharing a space, are posed in direct contraposition. 
The woman on the divan leans with her back to the sitter on the floor, 
her legs forming a vertical barrier between the two. Though their arms 
reach out toward one another, they do not touch. it is, in other words, 
a scene of disconnection, of averted gazes, and of physical dissimilarity. 
Prettejohn collapses these distinctions to claim that the three paintings 
are of a piece, are all examples of high aestheticism. i would suggest that 
despite their superficial similarities—similar color tones, a similar soft-
ness of rendering—the three paintings reflect the fundamental difference 
between Whistler’s work and that of the aesthetes: his painting depicts 
contemporary subjects, resists on every level a narrative, and gestures 
toward the interminable alienation between people.
at the piano: Family in Profile
in this earliest of Whistler’s successful canvases he sets down the artistic 
vocabulary that will define his oeuvre: the use of elements of the scene 
to separate subjects from one another and the depiction of subjects in 
profile. The visual space of At the Piano (figure 3) is defined in stark geo-
metrics: the bisected bottom halves of two frames split the upper half of 
the image and are themselves split. This break is continued through the 
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dual black piano legs. These vertical elements create a central separa-
tion that separates mother from daughter.41 echoing the upper horizon 
of the piano is that most victorian of decorative elements, the wallpaper 
dado. Just as the two frames break the image up into two parallel col-
umns, coinciding with the two figures, this horizontal similarly breaks 
the visual plane into upper and lower sections: the sitters’ heads are 
severed from their bodies. The result is a grid of four quadrants, bal-
anced via opposition or repetition in shape and color: the mother’s black 
triangular body to the daughters’ white triangular body, the larger frame 
picture behind the smaller girl, and the smaller framed picture behind 
the larger mother. even the girl’s shoes repeat the bracketing-off—their 
black straps crisscross against her white tights. visually, it appears as a 
sort of mathematic equation, and on both sides are appropriate victorian 
versions of mourning.42
 Breaking the plane this way ensures that a viewer realizes the spa-
tial distance between the two figures as well as the figurative distance 
between them. it also mimics the spatial separation of the stereoscope, 
what Jonathan Crary calls “the most significant form of visual imagery 
in the nineteenth century.”43 in what was then a popular diversion, two 
subtly different images are blended via the prismatic lenses of the ste-
reoscopic viewer to give the viewer the illusion of a three-dimensional 
vista. Without that technology to blend the images, to mimic the human 
eye’s depth perception, a viewer can focus on only one of the images 
at a time, the left or the right, but not both simultaneously. Whistler’s 
manipulation of this two-halved image insists on the lack of depth in his 
picture space. There is an emphatic lack of blurring, lack of mingling 
possible. Contributing to this effect of flat space is his use of expanses of 
color: the mahogany of the piano, the white of the girl’s dress, the black 
of the mother’s dress, the green that is repeated in the dado on the wall 
and the shadow of the seemingly empty frames.
 as McMullen notes, Whistler employs the profile for both women, yet 
the organization resists McMullen’s reading that the arrangement flatters; 
rather, it obscures. Further, though they face each other, the subjects are 
not looking at each other, as might be expected in such a composition: 
the viewer regards the right side of the mother’s face and the left side of 
the daughter’s—they are placed facing each other; the mother plays the 
piano, the daughter ostensibly listens. and yet even that connection, one 
playing what the other hears, is not at all obvious. The mother’s head is 
turned downward and inclined slightly to the right, and her focus seems 
to be the keys beneath her fingers. The child faces straight ahead and yet, 
because she leans against the piano at its bend, is not directly across from 
102  /   cHapter 4
her mother and cannot be looking directly at her. also separating the 
figures from one another are the markedly different techniques and styles 
used on their faces, contrasts that echo the other contextual juxtapositions 
of the image. The crisp, reflective surface of the piano’s top contrasts with 
the softened, nearly muddled rendering of the girl’s face.44 Warm-toned 
and fresh, she lacks the pictorial specificity of the older woman’s features, 
whose wrinkled face and double chin render her features discernible and 
readable in comparison.
 in this early work, Whistler places two women in close physical 
proximity. They appear to be family. They appear to mourn a single 
person. They appear to share a moment of music, one playing and the 
other listening. and yet the composition insists on representing barriers 
between the two. These barriers are both physical, like the piano sepa-
rating the women from each other, and visual, like the hard vertical and 
horizontal lines defined by the frames images, the dado, and the piano 
leg. even the solidity of both women’s skirts seems repellent; all in all, 
it is an image of shared space but not of shared experience.
Harmony in Green and rose: Crowded Scenes and 
Cross-Purposes
if At the Piano represented an isolated instance of these tropes demon-
strating pictorial disconnection, the glosses of gallery notes or biogra-
phers might suffice to explain Whistler’s choices. But it is not an isolated 
instance; the strategies are repeated over and again, comprising the 
phonemes on which his artistic vocabulary is built. Harmony in Green and 
Rose: The Music Room (1861) (figure 4) features two of the same sitters 
depicted in At the Piano, Whistler’s sister and his niece, and it continues 
the trend begun in At the Piano. The Music Room also anticipates the pic-
torial moves that will come to define those who follow him: the mirror 
reflects a face effaced—present but not pictured in the primary frame 
of the image; a mirror does not reflect those figures that do occupy the 
focal space; visual space is flattened to the degree that the figures appear 
to be collaged cut-outs from other paintings. The image raises the same 
questions as At the Piano—are these three female figures experiencing 
the same moment in the same space?
 Whistler achieves the effect of separation in a surprisingly cluttered 
scene. Whereas At the Piano was defined by austere horizontal and verti-
cal splits, in The Music Room those orthogonal lines persist but are joined 
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by the effusive floral of window drapes that both reinforce the vertical 
lines, repeated as they are four times throughout the image, and scatter 
the cleanly readable right angles that, in the earlier canvas, composed 
the matrix that defined the pictorial space. and yet, just as the harsh 
angles of At the Piano enforced the rigidity of the separation of the two 
figures through their solidity and impenetrability, here the tangled mess 
of flowers (modeled on the actual drapes of the artist’s sister’s London 
house45) contributes to the claustrophobic feeling of the image as a 
whole.
 For The Music Room illustrates another version of disconnection, 
one predicated on too-closeness as opposed to separation or distance. 
The figures crowd the image, quite literally. The woman in black in the 
foreground overlaps the young girl reading. Pushed off the canvas on 
the left would be the figure whose face is reflected in the mirror—she 
is present, but only via image, her physicality rendered offstage. Those 
drapes function in this regard as well; not only their print but their 
placement indicates business and cramped space. They overlap the 
girl’s dress, their reflection in the mirrors blocks the woman’s reflection 
(and the reflection of the drapes is in turn blocked by the vase’s reflec-
tion), they puddle onto the floor in excess. Whistler’s aesthetic regard 
(or disregard) for the drapes notwithstanding, their contribution to the 
scene is essential. Countering the flat spaces of black and white defined 
by the dresses, the contrast emphasizes both extremes. Whereas in At 
the Piano those monolithic presences of mother’s and daughter’s dresses 
stood opposed and apart, here the black dress—not the mother’s this 
time—intrudes onto the space of the daughter’s dress. The curve of the 
woman’s bustle suggests a further crowding. and the flattening of the 
space is used to particular effect in the contrast between white and black; 
there is so little communication between the images, one imagines that 
they exist in different picture planes.
 The effect of crowded disconnection—of people crammed into a 
tight space and yet utterly unaware of the other or unresponsive toward 
the other—echoes Courbet’s Burial at Ornans. here Whistler achieves a 
similar effect: the women who are, ostensibly, facing one another are 
depicted as looking instead toward the same direction—both look to the 
left, one with her head inclined backward and the other forward. Split-
ting the two older women, the girl sits opposing each. She turns her face 
down, reading. if she were to be looked at, by mother, by visitor, or by 
viewer, she would not meet the gaze.46
 The title is important too.47 Whistler’s penchant for musical names 
provokes a curious reflection: whereas At the Piano, which depicts a 
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musical scene, does not benefit from a retrospective renaming, The Music 
Room does. it, like At the Piano, already evinces musicality in its title, 
even if there is no pictorial evidence of music in the scene. and yet 
“harmony” as his choice—does it indeed call attention to the harmoni-
ous mingling of green and rose? Or is the naming ironic, as the image is 
hardly one of interpersonal harmony. Whatever narratives biographers 
may assign to the scene—the mourning visitation of a friend to the fam-
ily, for example48—the painting is noisy, cluttered, and features three 
figures, none of which is seen in communion with any other. What kind 
of harmony is this?
 Depictions of a lack of communication or lack of shared experience, of 
alienation, are represented by spatial distance but also by the cluttering of 
bodies, piling one on top of the other, glances effaced. it is as if Whistler 
insists on the distinctive presence of each figure, even going so far as to 
depict them in ways that make them appear as if they were not in the 
same space. Proximity, then, guarantees neither union nor communion.
wapping: Visual Interference
in the later Wapping (1860–64) (figure 5), however, three figures are rep-
resented as sharing in a communal moment. Three figures sit around 
the table. Titled for the area of the London docks where Whistler was 
staying, it is a subject that he reproduced numerous times. The hatched 
lines of the boats’ masts and rigging form a tight web, a confusion of 
lines that Whistler returned to again and again.49 in Wapping, the mass 
forms the background for an intimate seated group, pushed to the for-
ward boundary of the frame in the lower right corner. art historians and 
biographers alike have named the sitters and provided narratives for 
the events depicted, usually describing a transaction between one of the 
men and the woman, a prostitute.50 What Whistler has painted, however, 
explicitly illustrates a scene that comprises a number of the elements that 
defined his earlier sitting-room paintings, all of which resist narrative. 
Between the woman and the central man are interposed at least seven 
visual barriers: the five lines of the sail behind, the gray pole (presum-
ably a mast) with a pulley, and the black column supporting the roof; 
between him and the man on the far right are more sail lines and the 
heavy, impenetrable frame of a window. here, as in the refined London 
parlor, the image contains barriers. and here Whistler’s insistence on 
the superficiality of the painting is crucial. Considering the image as a 
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scene from a story, a photograph capturing a moment of everyday life, 
one could certainly argue that these lines do not separate the sitters, as 
the rigging, the mast, the column, and the window frame are all behind 
them and thus do not interfere with their communication. visually, those 
elements function as barriers between the subjects. The window frame, 
for example, is not delineated by line, paint, or color from the blackish 
blur where the man’s body might be.
 each of the three is painted in a curiously different manner, anticipat-
ing wildly different artists and echoing the differing manners of repre-
sentation that distinguished the two subjects of At the Piano. The woman 
resembles renoir’s dappled portraits of valadon, her hair casting a fuzzy 
reddish halo around her head and her mouth blurring into her face; the 
central bearded man suggests Manet’s Le Bon Bock (1873), with ruddy 
skin, and clearly delineated lines on his face; and the second man, face 
suspended on a body cut out of the image, suggests blue-period Picas-
so, completely flattened, eyes hollow. Though the location has shifted, 
can we consider this grouping to be fundamentally different from the 
women in the drawing rooms of a London townhouse in At the Piano 
and The Music Room? They too are separated by representational style 
and by elements of the image that slice through the space they share.
Looking at, Not Looking through
Whistler’s artistic philosophy can perhaps best be summarized in the 
distinction he draws between looking at art and looking through it. For 
literary critics who privilege interpretation, it might surprise that Whis-
tler comes down firmly on the side of looking at. yet Whistler’s attitude 
is not that of the aesthete; we should not ask that painting “elevate,” 
but neither should the panel “merely decorate”:
hence it is that nobility of action, in this life, is hopelessly linked 
with the merit of the work that portrays it; and thus the people have 
acquired the habit of looking, as who should say, not at a picture, but 
through it, at some human fact, that shall, or shall not, from a social 
point of view, better their mental or moral state. So we have come to 
hear of the painting that elevates, and of the duty of the painter—of the 
picture that is full of thought, and of the panel that merely decorates.51
in refusing to provide his audience with stable narratives that rein-
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force conventional notions of morality, Whistler forces that audience to 
encounter images which—through that very refusal—demand new ways 
of seeing. The artist shatters the viewer’s access to the safety of a unify-
ing narrative; he risks alienating his audience but gains an opportunity 
to create a new engagement with painting. Flattening the image field, 
embracing musical titles, gesturing at a sense of presence rather than the 
instillation of a narrative; these aspects define Whistler’s oeuvre as does, 
perhaps, warring against the scenes of domestic tranquility that, for 
example, George eliot marveled at in Dutch genre painting. Doesn’t the 
suggestion that his canvases inscribe the similar disconnection on dis-
play in realist novels perform the same reduction of image to narrative? 
am i not imposing a story—that Whistler seeks to represent difference—
where he would instead prefer a response to the canvas as canvas? in 
fact, it is Whistler’s very insistence, in his technique and composition as 
much as his statements (which depended constantly on sarcasm, irony, 
and provocation) on flatness, on the refusal to render images according 
to the strictures of true perspective and illusionism preferred by the 
neoclassicists who preceded him, that makes his work such a useful 
parallel to fiction. he insists adamantly on the artifice of his art, and 
not only in ways that align him with the aesthetes. art for art’s sake is, 
after all, not the same as art that confines itself to presentation, and not 
representation. There is no ingratiating beckoning from the eyes of his 
women, no acknowledgment of the other figures within the frame, much 
less of those outside of it, that is, those in the viewer’s position. amplify-
ing the artifice of the paintings, the artist reminds viewers that the thing 
is simply that: an object that, like the bearskin rug the subject stands on, 
can be moved, taken off the wall, reframed, or bought for two hundred 
guineas. it is consumable. Those he represents, however, are not. They 
are not consumable; they may not be captured or bought—not even in 
the images themselves; not even by the painter. Whistler’s visual strate-
gies defy the viewer’s desire to see the painting as an instance of alterity. 
Like hardy’s fiction, Whistler’s images insist that their subjects, and not 
the paintings themselves, are instances of the other. We may read his 
pictorial strategies as resisting interpretation, but in fact they call more 
attention to the fact of their paintedness. They instruct us to look at the 
paintings, and in doing so, what we see are images of people who are at 
odds, who are not looking at one another. insisting that we look at and 
not through, he reminds that the painting is a thing.
 These are aspects of painting that make it a compelling counter-
point to fiction. The unchangeable, unchallengeable boundary defined 
by the canvas’s end (a boundary Whistler plays with, as in The Music 
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Room, reminding us of its presence and that it leaves some out just as it 
includes others) is analogous to the defined parameters of the novel, its 
first sentence serving as one boundary and its last sentence as the other. 
Proximity does not guarantee notice, or understanding, or recognition. 
Whistler’s paintings depict inscrutability; so if they do mirror reality, 
they reflect the inscrutability inherent in all others. They show us that 
disconnection must be recognized and cannot be explained away; they 
capture dissention and concretize discord, all within and among a style 























































































































































































































































































































Figure 4. James McNeill Whistler, Harmony in Green and rose: the music room 
(1860–61). Oil on canvas. Freer Gallery of Art, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 













































































i end this study with moments from two very different novels, one 
an exemplary romantic text, Goethe’s The Sorrows of Young Werther 
(1774), and the other an exemplary realist text, George eliot’s Middle-
march (1871–72). The contrast between these works throws into relief 
a distinction threatened by the reductive definitions that have come to 
plague realism and, indeed, romanticism, definitions that set the objec-
tivity and comprehensiveness of realism in opposition to the emotional 
subjectivity of romanticism. in the preface to Werther, Goethe prepares 
his readers for the story that is to follow. he adopts the tone of a mere 
editor who has collected Werther’s letters; who cares deeply about the 
novel’s subject; and who expects readers to share a uniform, predictable, 
emotional response to the novel:
i have carefully collected whatever i have been able to learn of the 
story of poor Werther, and here present it to you, knowing that you 
will thank me for it. To his spirit and character you cannot refuse your 
admiration and love: to his fate you will not deny your tears.
 and thou, good soul, who sufferest the same distress as he endured 
once, draw comfort from his sorrows; and let this little book be thy 
friend, if, owing to fortune or through thine own fault, thou canst not 
find a dearer companion.1
Goethe enfolds the reader into the story by declaring the value of 
Werther’s “spirit and character” and positioning the reader as admirer 
and friend. in addition to framing the reader’s relationship to Werther, 
the preface also frames the reader’s relationship to the novel. “The little 
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book” itself can function as a friend to the reader, in moments when the 
reader is in need.
 The novel’s structure works hard to enact the relationships detailed 
in this preface. With its one-sided epistolary form, The Sorrows of Young 
Werther situates its reader as the recipient of Werther’s letters, and 
Werther addresses the reader as “dear friend” in the first lines of the 
first letter. Further, Werther’s narrative focuses almost exclusively on his 
interactions with others; he falls in love, he endears himself to the locals, 
he offends his employer, he goes mad when his love rejects him. When 
he believes he has lost the relationships that were most important to him, 
and feeling himself quite alone, Werther commits suicide. The Sorrows of 
Young Werther ends with his lonely burial, and the novel’s last, stark line 
reads “no clergyman attended.”
 One hundred years later, George eliot opens Middlemarch with a 
prelude in which she describes her heroine Dorothea Brooke in terms of 
what she is not: no Saint Theresa, defined by indefiniteness, “foundress 
of nothing.” not only is there no “coherent social faith and order” in 
which women such as Dorothea could locate an outlet for their yearnings 
and ambitions, there is no community of friends to which they belong: 
“a cygnet is reared uneasily among the ducklings in the brown pond, 
and never finds the living stream in fellowship with its own oary-footed 
kind.”2 The central figure is introduced not as a heroine to be admired or 
loved, but rather as an odd creature, out of place in her own time, and 
lost among a sea of others who bear no resemblance to her.
 Middlemarch ends, as it begins, considering Dorothea’s relation to the 
world and those around her:
her finely touched spirit had still its fine issues, though they were not 
widely visible. her full nature, like that river of which Cyrus broke 
the strength, spent itself in channels which had no great name on the 
earth. But the effect of her being on those around her was incalculably 
diffusive: for the growing good of the world is partly dependent on 
unhistoric acts; and that things are not so ill with you and me as they 
might have been, is half owing to the number who lived faithfully a 
hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs. (838)
in eliot’s construction, the “hidden life” and “unvisited tomb” are not 
signs of rejection, alienation, or abandonment. rather, they are a nec-
essary consequence of the realities of a social order that is not ideally 
suited to the temperament and desire of every individual. and still, in 
spite of or perhaps because of the mysteries that define human existence, 
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the effect of an individual on those around her is incalculable, diffuse. 
Dorothea might not be a celebrated martyr, but the “growing good of 
the world” depends on the unknown acts of Dorothea and those like her.
 For Goethe’s novel presumes a universal response to its content, 
and it affects so thorough a portrait of an individual that merely read-
ing his letters can serve as the basis of friendship. eliot’s novel, on the 
other hand, asserts from beginning to end the strangeness of Dorothea, 
a woman who does not even know herself fully. and so in a narrative 
of infinitely greater complexity and length than The Sorrows of Young 
Werther, eliot frames Middlemarch by reminding readers not what they 
know or what they will know, but rather what they do not know and 
cannot know. This is the work of realism: to describe alterity through 
the recognition, representation, and reification of the limits of the self. 
The unknowable other serves to check the expansive knowledge of the 
external world that is the other central concern of the realist enterprise.
 indeed, the vast historical and stylistic differences between the works 
(and there are many) do not overwhelm the shift in conception of the 
relationship between the individual and the other, or between the book 
and the reader, evident in these novels. Goethe defines the relationship 
between reader and text as one of identification and admiration. We will 
admire and love Werther; we will feel his pain. The text that tells his 
story will be our companion in loneliness, itself a friend. and though no 
clergyman attends Werther’s funeral, and though his suicide is intended 
to pain those who were his friends by completing a long cycle of attrac-
tion and repulsion, we readers are there at his burial, faithful to the 
end of the narrative. Werther thus demonstrates—perhaps unintention-
ally—the precarious separation between identification and empathy. if 
we feel all of Werther’s feelings with him, if we experience his joy and 
his sorrow, how can we distinguish our joy or pain from his? When are 
we being empathic toward the radical other, and when are we simply 
being aware of our own feelings?
 eliot uses a prelude and finale to structure her insistence not on 
identification but rather on mystery, diffuseness, and the hidden. Doro-
thea’s is a story of not fitting in; her assumptions even about herself are 
constantly assailed. if Dorothea can’t know herself, could the book claim 
to know her? Could its readers? eliot escapes from this potential bind 
by foregrounding the lack of knowledge and uncertainty of situation 
that defines Dorothea’s life. eliot places that uncertainty at the center 
of the novel, and what results is a generous vision of the unknown and 
unremarkable. The beauty of the hidden life and unvisited tomb is pre-
cisely that we may never know exactly the greatness of the impact of 
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those lives. and in that recognition of a true alterity exists the space for 
empathic extension.
 The goal of this study was to establish the ways that alterity arises 
in realist texts and images, and to consider how depictions of unique 
individuals test the limits of representation. i have further attempted 
to work through the tension that underpins the realist project: how 
empathic extension can occur in light of those limitations. if we recog-
nize that the radical alterity of the other is a feature of lived experience, 
it becomes clear that realists’ strategies for representing the unknow-
ability of the other do not undermine their project but rather enhance 
it. By emphasizing the impossibility of knowing a character purely by 
knowing her story, and the impossibility of regarding the novel or the 
painting as an other, realists break away from the literary and pictorial 
traditions that preceded their own. This condition of not knowing the 
other does not damn the individual to a life of solitude or misery, a fact 
that distinguishes realism from other movements that follow. Perhaps it 
took Levinas to articulate a vocabulary that could account for both the 
ethical imperative that drives the realist project and the insistence on the 
limitations of representation that define its aesthetics. his descriptions of 
intersubjectivity construct the relationship between the self and the other 
as one of insurmountable difference, yet he asserts that the potential for 
an ethical engagement with the other exists in and only in the recogni-
tion of that difference: the lesson of realism that we might come to know 
is that we can never fully come to know the human other. realist works 
temper the starkness of radical and insurmountable alterity with the 
awareness that such recognition requires work, which is itself edifying. 
Learning to read realist novels and paintings depends on the realization 
that we might never know the other fully, but that as a consequence of 
that inherent mystery, “things are not so ill with you and me as they 
might have been.”
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Modern Philology 87, no. 3 (February 1990): 316. Those relationships to the physically 
distant stranger are based not on a real apprehension of distinctive and individual 
alterity but on a wholesale dialectic that inhibits an ethical relationship. Focus-
ing on the realists’ relationship with the colonized in relation to eliot’s nuanced 
formulations of representation allows nancy henry, for example, to explore “a 
disjunction between the expressed politics of a realist aesthetic that did not permit 
eliot to represent what she had not seen, and life in a society that encouraged 
practical decisions based on abstractions—the colonies.” George Eliot and the British 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 9. While not dismissing 
this important work, i must note that my interest is in another kind of relationship 
depicted in these works—not with those whom characters assume are the wholesale 
other, but with those whom characters do not accord alterity.
 35. Kay young, “Middlemarch and the Problem of Other Minds heard,” Litera-
ture, Interpretation, Theory 14 (2003): 230.
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 36. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and other Essays, ed. John Gray (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 42–43. also cited in anderson’s Detachment, 17.
 37. George Levine, Dying to Know: Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victo-
rian England (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 269.
 38. ibid., 271.
 39. “as i conceive it, this moral perfectionism is a particular narrative form 
(rather than a concept, theory, or disposition) capable of great variation and 
extension. at its heart is the complex proposition that we turn from our ordinary 
lives, realize an ideal self, and perfect what is distinctly human in us—and that 
we do so in response to exemplary others. how exactly do we become better? 
Certainly we often imagine ourselves improving through following rules, com-
mandments, laws, guidelines. Without denying this, moral perfectionism stresses 
another means of improvement, one in which individual transfiguration comes 
not through obedience to such codes but through openness to example—through 
responsive, unpredictable engagements with other people.” Miller is careful to 
note that this movement-toward lacks finitude, writing that “it bears repeating 
that none of these mechanisms has the power to banish skepticism in any final or 
conclusive fashion.” andrew Miller, The Burdens of Perfection: On Ethics and Reading 
in Nineteenth-Century British Literature (ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2008), 
4, 25.
 40. ibid., 272.
 41. i do not claim to offer a comprehensive overview of notions of sympathy 
and empathy as understood from the eighteenth through the nineteenth centuries, 
as others have done that work far more effectively than i can here. See David 
Marshall’s The Surprising Effects of Sympathy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1988), rachel ablow’s The Marriage of Minds: Reading Sympathy in the Victorian 
Marriage Plot (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2007), and Suzanne Keen’s 
Empathy and the Novel (Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), for clear 
overviews of the tradition.
 42. audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fic-
tion (ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2000), 8.
 43. ibid., 15.
 44. David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy, 1. ethical literary criticism 
arises from the knowledge that readers do attempt to enter into the sentiments of 
characters within fiction. Wayne Booth’s description of the ethics of fiction is even 
less invasive, as one need not “enter into” a character’s sentiments but can learn 
from a character’s actions, the text itself serving as a “relatively cost-free offer 
of trial runs.” The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 485. as Jil Larson notes, the recuperation of ethical criti-
cism begun by Booth and Martha nussbaum sought to avoid the essentializing 
tendency of reductive moralizing without completely excluding ethics from literary 
analysis. Larson follows in their path, and her work along with the work of others 
reinvigorating ethical criticism paved the way for studies such as this one. Ethics 
and Narrative in the English Novel, 1880–1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001).
 45. David hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London: John noon, 1886), 365.
 46. adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment (London: henry G. Bohn, 1853), 3.
 47. ibid., 4.
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 48. Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Sympathy, 3.
 49. Catherine Gallagher, Nobody’s Story: The Vanishing Acts of Women Writers in 
the Marketplace 1670–1820 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 170.
 50. ibid., 168.
 51. ibid., 169.
 52. Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel, xii.
 53. rachel ablow, The Marriage of Minds, 6.
 54. Letter, July 5, 1859; author’s italics. John Cross, vol. 2 of George Eliot’s Life as 
Related in Her Letters and Journals (London: Blackwell and Sons, 1885), 118.
 55. Paul Cobley, Narrative (London: routledge, 2001), 92–93.
 56. Felicia Bonaparte, Will and Destiny: Morality and Tragedy in George Eliot’s 
Novels (new york: new york University Press, 1975), 163, 169. ellen argyros, also 
writing about sympathy in eliot’s works, produces a similar conclusion about 
the sympathy engendered by eliot’s novels: sympathy is “a kind of imaginative 
transportation beyond the boundaries of the self and its most egoistic claims to a 
recognition of the differences between self and other.” “Without Any Check of Proud 
Reserve”: Sympathy and Its Limits in George Eliot’s Novels (new york: Peter Lang, 
1999), 1.
 57. George eliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin Books, 1994), 643.
 58. honoré de Balzac, Le Père Goriot (Paris: Pocket Books, 1989), 33. “il s’y 
rencontrera toujours un lieu vierge, un antre inconnu, des fleurs, des perles, des 
monstres, quelque chose d’inouï, oublié par les plongeurs littéraires.”
 59. Tobin Siebers, Morals and Stories (new york: Columbia University Press, 
1992), 203; roland Barthes, “The Man-eater,” in Critical Essays on Émile Zola, ed. 
David Baguley (Boston: G. K. hall and Co., 1955), 93.
 60. Time and the Other, trans. richard a. Cohen (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne Uni-
versity Press, 1987), 75.
 61. “The Proximity of the Other,” in Is It Righteous to Be? Interviews with Emman-
uel Lévinas, ed. Jill robbins (Palo alto, Ca: Stanford University Press, 2001).
 62. “The Other in Proust,” in The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán hand (London: Black-
well, 1989), 160–65; 163.
 63. ibid., 164–65.
 64. James r. Mensch, Hiddenness and Alterity: Philosophical and Literary Sightings 
of the Unseen (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 2005), 3.
 65. “[ . . . ] labor in its possessive grasp suspends the independence of the ele-
ment: its being. The thing evinces this hold or this comprehension—this ontology. 
Possession neutralizes this being: as property the thing is an existent that has lost 
its being. [ . . . ] Possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future 
of the element—its independence, its being [ . . . ] Labor in its primary intention is 
this acquisition, this movement toward oneself; it is not a transcendence.” Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), 158–59.
 66. David P. haney, “aesthetics and ethics in Gadamer, Levinas, and romanti-
cism: Problems of Phronesis and Teche,” PMLA 114, no. 1 (January 1999): 43.
 67. “the structure of the reader’s interpretative relationship to a literary text has 
affinities with a person’s ethical relationship to others.” ibid., 38.
 68. ibid., 40.
 69. adam Zachary newton, Narrative Ethics (Cambridge, Ma: harvard Univer-
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sity Press, 1995), 13. newton goes on to make the parallel between the story and the 
person explicit: “Stories, like persons, originate alogically. as ethical performance, 
in Levinas’ sense, they are concussive; they shock and linger as ‘traumatisms of 
astonishment.’” ibid., 13.
 70. in What Do Pictures Want? Mitchell wrestles with “the peculiar tendency 
of images to absorb and be absorbed by human subjects in processes that look 
suspiciously like those of living things,” regarding that tendency not a problem 
that must be shut down by criticism, but rather a valuable mode of experiencing 
images. What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005), 2.
 71. Dorothy hale, Social Formalism: The Novel in Theory from Henry James to the 
Present (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8.
 72. Levinas, “reality and its Shadow,” in The Levinas Reader, 139.
 73. Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Pittsburgh, Pa: Duquesne University Press, 
1969), 183.
cHapter one
 1. rosemarie Bodenheimer, Knowing Dickens (ithaca, ny: Cornell University 
Press, 2007), 17.
 2. John Forster, The Life of Charles Dickens (London: Lippincott and Co., 1874), 
47–70.
 3. Bodenheimer argues that these moments are typical of Dickens’s anxiety to 
convince the reader who might not otherwise believe him, a hyperexertion of truth, 
but one that is overdetermined by his desire.
 4. Forster, 23, 24, 27.
 5. Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (London: Penguin, 2002), 248. Subsequent 
citations of Great Expectations will be given parenthetically in text.
 6. These failures are nevertheless constructive and instructive. John Fenster-
maker addresses the often overlooked role of the failure of language in Bleak House: 
“The central symptom of much of the sickness Dickens examines is the failure of 
words, written and spoken, to express truth and to communicate genuine human 
fellow-feeling. Too often language is used, as the narrator says, ‘under false pre-
tences of all sorts’ to effect ‘trickery, evasion, procrastination, spoliation [and] 
botheration,’ creating ‘influences that can never come to good.’” “Language abuse 
in Bleak House: The First Monthly installment,” in Victorian Literature and Society, 
ed. James Kincaid (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1984), 241.
 7. Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (London: Penguin, 2003), 14. Subsequent 
citations of A Tale of Two Cities will be given parenthetically in text.
 8. robert alter, “The Demons of history in Dickens’ Tale,” NOVEL: A Forum 
on Fiction 2, no. 2 (Winter 1969): 139.
 9. Barbara Lecker, “The Split Characters of Charles Dickens,” Studies in English 
Literature, 1500–1900 19, no. 4 (autumn 1979): 698. Later, Lecker argues, Dickens 
will unite the heart and head in single characters, such as the “happily schizoid” 
Wemmick in Great Expectations. ibid., 699.
 10. Some examples: “don’t heed me any more than if i was a speaking machine” 
(25); “i am a mere machine” (25); and, as repeated several times, “i am a man of 
business” (25, 83, 101, 151, 210, 212). its fullest iteration is uttered at the peak of the 
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Parisian drama, when Lorry is in danger of losing the only family he has known: 
“i have been a man of business, ever since i have been a man. indeed, i may say 
that i was a man of business when a boy” (322).
 11. a critique that applies regardless of the class of the perpetrator. Foulon’s 
dismissive “let them eat grass” is matched by the brutality of the mob’s attack and 
decapitation of Foulon.
 12. estella refers to Miss havisham as her “mother by adoption” (304). See 
also hilary Schor, Dickens and the Daughter of the House (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 167.
 13. Cf. Max Byrd, “reading in Great Expectations,” PMLA 91, no. 2 (1976): 259–65.
 14. The resonance between this statement and eliot’s description of learning to 
read is impressive; see my discussion in chapter 2.
 15. Monique Morgan contrasts this scene of misinterpretation with Pip’s last 
interaction with Magwitch, at the convict’s death. There, she argues, physical 
intimacy trumps written declarations, and Pip is able to understand Magwitch 
through just a squeeze of his hand. “Conviction in Writing: Crime, Confession, and 
the Written Word in Great Expectations,” Dickens Study Annual 33 (2003): 87–108.
 16. Peter Brooks, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative (Cam-
bridge, Ma: harvard University Press, 1992), 131.
 17. adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiment (London: henry G. Bohn, 1853), 
3.
 18. See, for example, Q. D. Leavis’s “how We Must read Great Expectations,” in 
Dickens the Novelist (London: Pantheon, 1970).
 19. J. hillis Miller, Victorian Subjects (Durham, nC: Duke University Press, 1991), 
179.
 20. For example, handwriting serves to identify Dedlock’s former lover and 
esther’s father. here the issue is being able to discern the familiar shapes that 
identify an individual; the words written are, for this enterprise, meaningless. 
Much as Pip attempted to make out his parents in the shapes of the letters on their 
tombstone, character and personhood can be interpreted from the literalization of 
the writing.
 21. David Cowles, “Methods of inquiry, Modes of evidence: Perception, Self-
Deception, and Truth in Bleak House,” The Dickensian 87, no. 425 (autumn 1991): 
159, 154. The sentiment is echoed by Camilla humphreys, who catalogues a similar 
trajectory in the personal letters that populate the novel. Whereas “Court of Chancery 
writings confuse and obfuscate,” creating “obstacles to understanding and solu-
tion,” personal letters are “clear and concise and written from the heart,” providing 
“consistent movement towards a coherence and connection.” Camilla humphreys, 
“Dickens’s Use of Letters in Bleak House,” Dickens Quarterly 6, no. 2 (June 1989): 53.
 22. Graham hough, “Language and reality in Bleak House,” in Realism in Euro-
pean Literature, ed. nicholas Boyle and Martin Swales (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 59. hough also echoes the formulations of Cowles and 
humphreys cited above, noting that Dickens’s appeal in esther’s narration is “not 
to experience, the conventional wisdom, or the social order; it is to the wisdom of 
the heart.” ibid., 65.
 23. The duality of the novel’s narration supports these distinctions, alternat-
ing as it does between esther’s retrospective rendering of the tale and unnamed 
omniscient narrative voice. The narrative oscillations help to render distinctive 
language patterns in a uniquely realist way. realism, as Graham hough writes 
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with particular attention to Bleak House, “speaks in the language of fallible human 
beings who have lived too close to the events they describe for the completeness 
of an inventory or the precision of a diagram.” ibid., 51.
 24. harold Skimpole is another, and his aesthetic embrace of suffering and con-
comitant lack of action form a complement to Mrs. Jellyby. Connecting representa-
tions of such characters with altruistic action is a cornerstone of Dickens’s writing 
and the criticism of his works. “a Christmas Carol” is perhaps his best-known work 
devoted (ostensibly) solely to the promotion of altruistic action in his readers by 
depicting characters whose primary fault is a lack of empathic action. This dynamic 
is undeniable in Dickens’s work, but it is not my focus. Cf. Mary-Catherine har-
rison’s “The Paradox of Fiction and the ethics of empathy: reconceiving Dickens’s 
realism,” Narrative 16, no. 3 (October 2008): 256–78.
 25. Charles Dickens, Bleak House (London: Penguin, 2003), 53. Subsequent cita-
tions of Bleak House will be given parenthetically in text.
 26. her problem, then, is not one of blindness, but of focus.
 27. Bruce robbins, “Telescopic Philanthropy,” in Nation and Narration, ed. homi 
K. Bhabha (new york: routledge, 1990), 224. it is worth noting that robbins’s use 
of “face-to-face” is not the Levinasian formulation of the phrase.
 28. “The central symptom of much of the sickness Dickens examines is the fail-
ure of words, written and spoken, to express truth and to communicate genuine 
human fellow-feeling.” Fenstermaker, “Language abuse in Bleak House: The First 
Monthly installment,” 241.
 29. Carolyn M. Dever, “Broken Mirror, Broken Words: autobiography, Proso-
popeia and the Dead Mother in Bleak House,” Studies in the Novel 27, no. 1 (Spring 
1995): 44.
 30. “among the many issues Bleak House explores is that of eloquence, of one 
person’s ability by means of language to persuade another to act in the world of 
gesture, a world which may contain, but does not necessarily depend on, language.” 
Sandra young, “Uneasy relations: Possibilities for eloquence in Bleak House,” Dick-
ens Studies Annual 9 (1981): 67.
 31. audrey Jaffe, Scenes of Sympathy: Identity and Representation in Victorian Fiction 
(ithaca, ny: Cornell University Press, 2000), 29, 44.
 32. ibid., 44.
 33. Paul Saint-amour, “‘Christmas yet to Come’: hospitality, Futurity, the Carol, 
and ‘The Dead,’” Representations 98 (Spring 2007): 99. Saint-amour’s is an argument 
informed by Levinasian conceptions of alterity.
 34. ibid., 99–100.
cHapter two
 1. an earlier version of the Adam Bede analysis in this chapter appeared in 
“Learning to read: interpersonal Literacy in Adam Bede,” Papers on Language and 
Literature 44, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 145–67.
 2. George eliot, Adam Bede (London: Penguin, 2008), 215. Subsequent citations 
of Adam Bede will be given parenthetically in text.
 3. in Adam Bede, eliot writes, “nature has her language, and she is not unvera-
cious; but we don’t know all the intricacies of her syntax just yet, and in a hasty 
reading we may happen to extract the very opposite of her real meaning.” ibid., 168.
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 4. July 5, 1859. John Walter Cross, George Eliot’s Life as Related in Her Letters and 
Journals (London: Blackwood, 1885), 118.
 5. J. hillis Miller, Others (Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 68.
 6. ernst Gombrich’s discussion of geographical and zoological woodcuts in 
Art and Illusion offers an interesting illustration of the same tendency (London: 
Phaidon, 1977).
 7. “The natural history of German Life,” in Selected Essays, Poems, and Other 
Writings (London: Penguin, 1990), 108–9.
 8. George eliot, Middlemarch (London: Penguin, 1994), 77. Subsequent citations 
of Middlemarch will be given parenthetically in text.
 9. “ . . . her mind had glanced over the possibility, which she would have pre-
ferred, of finding that her home would be in a parish which had a larger share of 
the world’s misery, so that she might have had more active duties in it.” ibid., 78. 
Perhaps equally problematic is the fact that she accepts the curate’s description as 
accurate.
 10. Mathilde Blind, George Eliot (London: W. h. allen and Co., 1883), 120, 119, 
120.
 11. Judith Mitchell, “George eliot and the Problematic of Female Beauty,” Mod-
ern Language Studies 20, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 17.
 12. ibid., 19.
 13. Critical assessments have begun to unseat eliot’s heroines from these bina-
ries. nina auerbach’s analysis of hetty as a “fallen woman” hinted that hetty 
and Dinah have more in common than is evident at first glance. “The rise of the 
Fallen Woman,” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 35, no. 1 (January 1980): 29–53. Marina 
van Zuylan’s later Monomania breaks new ground by arguing that Dorothea, a 
pious heroine like many others in eliot’s fiction, is the monomaniac of interest in 
Middlemarch (not Casaubon with his Key to All Mythologies), as her commitment to 
the purely altruistic bettering of others’ lives compels her disavowal of her own 
desire, and indeed her own physicality. van Zuylan’s argument thus removes 
Dorothea from the seat of piety and in turn considers her as more fully human by 
noting the limitations of her self-understanding. Monomania (ithaca, ny: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). Caroline Levine similarly complicates our understanding 
of Dinah through her analysis of visual alterity in Adam Bede; she views Dinah and 
hetty as contrasting examples used by eliot to communicate a message of ethical 
viewing, concluding that eliot endorses a normative heterosexuality through the 
novel’s repudiation of hetty’s actions. The Serious Pleasures of Suspense: Victorian 
Realism and Narrative Doubt (Charlottesville: University of virginia Press, 2003). i 
propose a further reconsideration of Dinah and hetty by exploring not their dif-
ferences (well-established both within the novel and in its criticism) but rather the 
similarities of their parallel journeys though the text by focusing not only on the 
way women see others or see themselves but also on the way they control others’ 
readings of their bodies. eliot provides a useful paradigm for this consideration 
through the act of reading as defined in “Book Second” and throughout Adam Bede: 
learning to read offers a means of achieving humanity for the characters within 
the novel. See also Jennifer Uglow’s George Eliot (London: virago, 1987) and alan 
Bellringer’s George Eliot (new york: St. Martin’s, 1993). More current forays into 
hetty’s plight include neil hertz’s George Eliot’s Pulse (Palo alto, Ca: Stanford 
University Press: 2003), Bernard Paris’s Rereading George Eliot: Changing Responses 
to Her Experiments in Life (albany: State University of new york Press, 2003), and 
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nancy Marck’s “narrative Transference and Female narcissism: The Social Message 
of Adam Bede,” Studies in the Novel 35, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 447–69.
 14. This explication is buttressed by eliot’s inclusion of the language of phrenol-
ogy and physiognomy in the text, which is documented in n. n. Feltes’s “Phrenol-
ogy: From Lewes to George eliot,” Studies in the Literary Imagination 1, no. 1 (april 
1968): 13–22, and in T. r. Wright’s “From Bumps to Morals: The Phrenological 
Background to George eliot’s Moral  Framework,” The Review of English Studies 33, 
no. 129 (February 1982): 34–46.
 15. George Willis Cooke, George Eliot: A Critical Study of Her Life, Writings and 
Philosophy (Boston: J. Osgood, 1884), 267.
 16. in chapter 3, i discuss a related dynamic in Thomas hardy’s Tess of the 
d’Urbervilles, where Tess’s similar complicity highlights the distinction between the 
individual and the narrative of her life.
 17. This inability is mutual, as demonstrated by the marked use of animal or 
nonhuman metaphors to describe hetty: her ears are like shells, her cheeks like 
rose petals, and her lashes like flower stamens (even the narrator describes her not 
as a girl, but as a “dear young, round, soft, flexible thing”). She is compared to a 
kitten no fewer than seven times through the novel, calling to mind not only the 
precocious cuteness of the animal but also its sharp claws: “it is a beauty like that 
of kittens” (92); “kitten-like maiden” (92); “this kitten-like hetty” (403); “She was 
like a kitten, and had the same distractingly pretty looks” (228); “she put up her 
round cheek against his, like a kitten” (390); “kitten-like glances” (167); “as if he 
had seen a kitten setting up its back” (286).
 18. Peter Brooks, Realist Vision (new haven, CT: yale University Press, 2005), 99.
 19. hetty’s most famous instance of being late is when, prior to marrying adam, 
“she had waited and waited, in the blind vague hope that something would happen 
to set her free from her terror; but she could wait no longer” (396). hetty is late; or 
rather, her period is late, as she is pregnant.
 20. Stephen Gill, introduction to Adam Bede, by George eliot (London: Penguin, 
1980), xxx.
 21. Barbara hardy, Rituals: Feelings in the Novels of George Eliot (London: Univer-
sity of Swansea Press, 1973), 7.
 22. in this respect, my reading diverges from Miller’s in Others. While much of 
this chapter, and indeed much of this book, owes a debt to Miller’s unique analysis 
of alterities in eliot’s (and others’) fiction, i want very much to suggest that the 
novel—through the narrator—insists on its own limits. Miller, on the other hand, 
sees a tension between the limitations of the characters and the omniscience of 
the narrator: “[ . . . ] the narrator of Middlemarch has precisely a ‘keen vision and 
feeling of all ordinary human life’ and can deploy such vision at will. The narrator 
has the same kind of keen vision that destroys the protagonist of ‘The Lifted veil.’ 
it is just such vision that the narrator of Middlemarch [ . . . ] says we are lucky not 
to have.” Others, 75.
 23. Before she can love adam and accept his proposal, Dinah must move into a 
space that is uncomfortable for her and that she has tried to avoid—a space where 
her conscious and psychical desire cannot be repressed. i discuss that movement 
more fully in “Learning to read: interpersonal Literacy in Adam Bede.”
 24. in Marina van Zuylan’s characterization, Dorothea is intent on dulling the 
banality of a woman’s existence in rural england with an active devotion to causes 
that demand her selflessness. via this active refutation of her self, the argument 
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goes, Dorothea manages to gain the very control that she is denied in most arenas 
of her life. Monomania, 99–119.
 25. a typical example, from Sidney Colvin’s January 1873 review in the Fort-
nightly Review: “For the general lesson of the book, it is not easy to feel quite 
sure what it is, or how much importance the author gives it. in her prelude and 
conclusion both, she seems to insist upon the design of illustrating the necessary 
disappointment of a woman’s nobler aspirations in a society not made to second 
noble aspirations in a woman. and that is one of the most burning lessons which 
any author could set themselves to illustrate.” Cited in David Carroll, ed., George 
Eliot: The Critical Heritage (new york: Barnes and noble, 1971), 337.
 26. The OED cites first figurative usage dating from 1874, relatively contempo-
rary with the writing of Middlemarch.
 27. This is, of course, emmanuel Levinas’s formulation.
 28. here eliot’s difference from Dickens is clear, as in his novels a character’s 
insistence on his or her own difference from the crowd or the usual is often enough 
to ensure empathic extension.
 29. The Lifted Veil easily deserves extended analysis. Given that such analysis 
has been performed by Thomas albrecht in his article “Sympathy and Telepathy: 
The Problems of ethics in George eliot’s The Lifted Veil,” it is not worth revisiting 
ground he has covered so well. My primary dissention from his argument, which 
otherwise directly anticipates my critical approach, is that he does not go far enough 
in addressing the significance of Latimer’s relationship with the unknown. ELH 73, 
no. 2 (2006): 437–63.
 30. Sally Shuttleworth, introduction to The Lifted Veil and Brother Jacob, by George 
eliot (London: Penguin, 2001), xiii.
 31. eliot, The Lifted Veil, 15.
 32. Kate Flint, “Blood, Bodies, and The Lifted Veil,” Nineteenth-Century Literature 
51, no. 4 (March 1997): 456.
 33. ibid., 472.
 34. Cf. albrecht, “Sympathy and Telepathy.”
 35. rae Greiner’s article on The Lifted Veil was published just weeks before this 
study was completed. in it, she gestures toward the idea that albrecht articulates 
and that is the central focus of this study: empathic extension was not necessar-
ily predicated on identification. She traces eliot’s depiction of that idea to adam 
Smith, emphasizing the narrative time in which sympathetic extension is always 
situated. She does not, however, go so far as to say that the other cannot be known, 
only that the movement into knowledge takes time and that eliot acknowledges 
its limitation with regard to the reader: “eliot had reservations about the degree 
to which such intimacy with others’ thought prompted ethical responses in us.” 
“Sympathy Time: adam Smith, George eliot, and the realist novel,” Narrative 17, 
no. 3 (October 2009): 306.
cHapter tHree
 1. Desmond hawkins, Thomas Hardy (London: a. Barker, 1950), 17. Kathleen 
Blake articulates Sue’s character beautifully, and cites hawkins’s comment, in “Sue 
Bridehead, ‘Woman of the Feminist Movement,’” Studies in English Literature 18, 
no. 4 (autumn 1978): 703–26.
128  /   notes to cHapter tHree
 2. hardy writes to Florence henniker on august 12, 1895, “Curiously enough, i 
am more interested in the Sue story than in any i have written,” in Collected Letters 
of Thomas Hardy, vol. 2, 1893–1901, ed. richard Little Purdy and Michael Millgate 
(London: Clarendon Press, 1980). See also elizabeth Langland’s “a Perspective of 
One’s Own: Thomas hardy and the elusive Sue Bridehead,” Studies in the Novel 12, 
no. 1 (Spring 1980): 14; and Maria DiBattista’s First Love: The Affections of Modern 
Fiction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 94.
 3. This is of course Brooks’s thesis in Reading for the Plot: “the absolutism of the 
desire from which narrative as narrating is born: it is in essence the desire to be 
heard, recognized, understood, which, never wholly satisfied or indeed satisfiable, 
continues to generate the desire to tell, the effort to enunciate a significant version 
of the life story in order to captivate a possible listener” (54); “desire comes into 
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